Sixth Slovenian Report under the

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Sixth Slovenian Report under the

JOINT CONVENTION
ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND
ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

October 2017
PREFACE


This report was prepared by the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration. Contributions to the report were made by the company NEK d.o.o., the Jožef Stefan Institute, the Agency for Radwaste Management, the public company Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o., the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Isotope Laboratory of the Institute of Oncology, the Department of Nuclear Medicine of the Ljubljana University Medical Centre, and the Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration. It constitutes an up-dated document with basically the same structure as previous national reports under the Joint Convention. The issues raised at the fifth review meeting and future plans are addressed in Section K of the report.

The report was approved by the Expert Council for Radiation and Nuclear Safety and adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.
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<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALARA</td>
<td>As Low As Reasonably Achievable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAO</td>
<td>Agency for Radwaste Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASME</td>
<td>American Society of Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRDM</td>
<td>Control Rod Driving Mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Central Storage for Radioactive Waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRPI</td>
<td>Digital Rod Position Indication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRI</td>
<td>Electric Power Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDO-WG</td>
<td>European Repository Development Organisation - Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Fuel Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLW</td>
<td>High Level Waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERCA</td>
<td>Heads of Radiation Protection Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRP</td>
<td>International Commission on Radiological Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGD-TP</td>
<td>Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste Technology Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJS</td>
<td>Jožef Stefan Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPO</td>
<td>Institute for Nuclear Power Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LILW</td>
<td>Low and Intermediate Level Waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKSID</td>
<td>On-Line Communication System in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Nuclear Power Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD/NEA</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Nuclear Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSART</td>
<td>Operational Safety Review Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries Assistance for Economic Restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR</td>
<td>Pressurised Water Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republic of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Radioactive Waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTD</td>
<td>Resistance Temperature Detector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Spent Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNSA</td>
<td>Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRPA</td>
<td>Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Systems, Structures and Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENORM</td>
<td>Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLD</td>
<td>Thermoluminescent Dosimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIGA</td>
<td>Training Research Isotope General Atomic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTC</td>
<td>Tube-TAbleType Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NRC</td>
<td>United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>Waste Acceptance Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANO</td>
<td>World Association of Nuclear Operators</td>
</tr>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Slovenian Nuclear Programme

The Republic of Slovenia has a small nuclear programme (Figure 1): one operating nuclear power plant, one research reactor and one central storage facility for institutional radioactive waste. In addition, there is also a closed and remediated uranium mine at Žirovski Vrh with two remediated disposal sites for mining and milling waste at the site. The geographical locations of the nuclear and radiation facilities are given in the figure below. The Republic of Slovenia has no facility for final disposal of radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel.

Figure 1: The nuclear programme in the Republic of Slovenia

The Krško Nuclear Power Plant (Krško NPP) is one of the main pillars of the Slovenian power system. It is situated on the left bank of the River Sava in the south-eastern part of Slovenia. It is a Westinghouse two-loop pressurised light water reactor with nominal output power of 727/696 MWe (gross electrical power/net electrical power). It is designed to operate until the end of 2023. In 2012 the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration issued a decision approving modifications that will enable the long-term operation of the Krško NPP. It is planned that the operation of the NPP will be extended from 2023 to 2043, pending the successful conclusion of periodic safety reviews in 2023 and 2033. The plant is owned by state-owned Slovenian and Croatian electrical power companies (GEN energija d.o.o. and Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d., respectively).

The plant is operated by the public company Krško NPP d.o.o. The Krško NPP is the major producer of radioactive waste in the Republic of Slovenia. All operational radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are stored within the area of the plant. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored under water in the spent fuel pool. In order to improve the safety of spent fuel storage as one of actions following the Fukushima accident, it was decided to construct a dry storage facility for spent fuel with an operating lifetime of 60 years. According to current plans, it should be constructed by 2020.

Solid radioactive waste is treated and then packed into steel drums, which are then stored in the solid radwaste storage facility.

In the Krško NPP a new Waste Manipulation Building is under construction. This building will provide new premises for the storage of drums during the manipulation and preparation for transport, collection, and sorting of radioactive waste.

The Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre (IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre) is a part of the Jožef Stefan Institute (IJS). It is located in Brinje, about 15 km northeast of Ljubljana. The main purpose of the centre is to operate the TRIGA Mark II research reactor for the needs of IJS and other research groups. The TRIGA Mark II research reactor is a General Atomics open-pool type research reactor with a thermal power of 250 kW. It was initially licensed in 1966 and was re-licensed for steady state and pulse
operation after renovation and reconstruction in 1991. The facility is used in research projects and for education. The fuel elements are kept in the reactor building of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre. In addition to spent fuel, the reactor produces a small amount of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW). One part of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre is a hot cell laboratory, which is, *inter alia*, also licensed for the treatment of institutional radioactive waste.

The research reactor is operated by the Jožef Stefan Institute, a public research institution that is financed from the national budget by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. In 2015 the operator of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor decided to extend the operation of the reactor at least until the conclusion of the next periodic safety review in 2026.

The Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine was in operation in the period from 1984 to 1990. Its lifetime production was 610,000 tons of ore, from which 452.5 tons of UO₃ was produced. The Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine ended regular operations in 1990. The decision to close it was influenced by economic reasons, since its uranium production was no longer economically competitive. In 1992, the Republic of Slovenia, as the owner of the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine, established a company named Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. to carry out the permanent closure of the mine (Permanent Cessation of Exploitation of the Uranium Ore and Prevention of Consequences of the Mining in the Uranium Mine at Žirovski Vrh Act). The financial resources for decommissioning and environmental remediation were provided from the national budget.

All entrances to the underground mine are now closed. The uranium ore mill has been decommissioned and the resulting waste has been disposed of at the Jazbec mining waste disposal site. All mining waste from numerous other mining waste piles has been moved to this site and disposed of. The total amount of disposed material at this site is 1,910,425 tons, with a total activity of 21.7 TBq. At the Boršt uranium mill tailings disposal site, 610,000 tons of hydrometallurgical waste, 111,000 tons of mine waste and 9,450 tons of material collected during the decontamination of the mill tailings in the Boršt site vicinity have been disposed of, with a total activity of 48.8 TBq. Closure works at the Jazbec disposal site have been completed and the Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO) started the long-term surveillance and maintenance of the site in 2015. The closure of the Boršt disposal facility has been delayed due to the activation of a landslide and the required additional remediation works.

Two studies were carried out in 2015 and 2016. In the first study, the distribution of tailings in the case of an extraordinary event (e.g. intensive rain or an earthquake) was assessed. On the basis of the study, the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning ordered an additional study on the radiation exposure of residents and the workers who would carry out the remediation of the deposited material on the riverbeds of the Tobraščica, Brebovsčica and Poljanska Sora Rivers. The results of both studies will be used to complete the safety report. In 2016, additional intervention measures for reducing the speed of landslide movements were carried out and the work continues in 2017.

The Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste (CSF) at Brinje is intended for the storage of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste arising from medical, industrial and research applications. The construction of the facility started in 1984 and it was put into operation in 1986. In 1999, the responsibility for managing and operating the storage facility was transferred from the IJS to the ARAO. Following refurbishment and two and a half years of trial operation, a new operating licence was issued in early 2008 with validity until 2018. In 2015, the ARAO started the first periodic safety review (PSR) of the CSF. It will be finished in 2018 and will provide the basis for the renewal of the operating license of the CSF for the next 10 years.

The Agency for Radwaste Management is a public utility for the implementation of radioactive waste management as a mandatory service of general economic interest. It also provides technical support regarding radioactive waste management to its stakeholders. It was established by the Slovenian Government and is responsible for radioactive waste management, including the management of institutional radioactive waste, long-term surveillance and maintenance of disposal sites for uranium mining and milling waste, and the disposal of radioactive waste from the Krško NPP. It is financed from the national budget and fees paid by waste producers when the liabilities for further waste management are transferred from them to the state. Activities regarding the siting and construction of an LILW repository are financed from the Fund for Financing the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP and Disposal of Radioactive Waste from the Krško NPP.
**Governmental Policy**

The governmental policy in the area of the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management is governed by the national nuclear legislation and international agreements. Based on the legislation, a number of measures have been implemented to protect the environment and the public from the harmful impact of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The most important measures are:

- The establishment and functioning of the regulatory body, the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA), which is the competent authority in the area of nuclear and radiation safety and radioactive waste management. It was established in 1987. Previously, the functions of the regulatory body were performed by the Committee for Energy and Industry.


- The establishment of Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o., a public enterprise for the decommissioning of the uranium production site (1992).


In addition, the Government has prepared several documents pertinent to policy in the area of radioactive waste management. The most important are as follows.

**The Resolution on the National Energy Programme** adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in 2004. In this document the following policy was adopted:

- The share of nuclear energy shall be maintained at the current level.

- The Krško NPP shall operate at least until 2023.

- Adequate measures shall be implemented in order to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the Krško NPP.

- A decision on extending the operating life of the Krško NPP shall be adopted in 2011 on the basis of an evaluation of the programme, which shall start in 2008.

The revised National Energy Programme (NEP) or National Energy Concept is still in preparation and in the phase of general public consultation. The draft National Energy Programme foresees the use of nuclear energy as a contributor to the transition to reliable low-carbon power supply sources.

**The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Regulation of the Status and Other Legal Relations Regarding the Investment, Exploitation and Decommissioning of the Krško NPP** (hereinafter the Agreement). The following policy is adopted in the Agreement:

- The decommissioning of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant and the management of its radioactive waste and spent fuel are the joint responsibility of the contracting parties, and they should ensure efficient common solutions from both economic and environmental protection points of view.

- If the contracting parties do not reach agreement on a common solution for radioactive waste and spent fuel management during the regular lifetime of the Krško NPP, they undertake that within two years of that time they must complete the removal of the operational radioactive waste and spent fuel from the location of the Krško NPP (one half by each party) and that they will individually bear the costs of the management thereof (including the subsequent division and removal of radioactive waste from decommissioning).

- The contracting parties shall, in equal shares, ensure funds for the preparation of the decommissioning programme and its execution and funds for the preparation of the programme for the disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel. If the contracting parties agree on a joint solution for the disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel, they shall finance it in equal shares or shall finance their shares of the activities.

- The Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia shall jointly prepare and approve a new plan for the decommissioning of the Krško NPP and the disposal of LILW and high-level waste (hereinafter the Decommissioning Plan).

- The Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia shall establish funds for the management and collection of financial resources for decommissioning and radioactive waste disposal costs.
The current contribution to the Slovenian fund for financing one half of the decommissioning and spent fuel and radioactive waste disposal is 0.30 Euro cents per kWh of the Slovenian share of energy produced by the Krško NPP.

The Intergovernmental Commission met in July 2015. It confirmed the decision of the NPP owners to extend the operation of the plant until 2043, in line with international practice and recommendations and with the goal of ensuring sustainable nuclear safety. The Intergovernmental Commission also approved the construction of a dry spent fuel storage within the Krško NPP site. The dry spent fuel storage will be financed by the owners. The construction costs are included in the Krško NPP operating costs.

At the meeting, the Intergovernmental Commission adopted the decision to suspend all activities in connection with the second revision of the Decommissioning Programme of the Krško NPP and the Disposal of LILW and High-Level Waste that was prepared in 2011 and not approved by the Intergovernmental Commission. At the same time, it identified the need to draft a new revision of the Decommissioning Programme and the Programme for the Disposal of the RW and SF from the Krško NPP. Two expert organisations from Slovenia and Croatia were authorised to draw up two project tasks for the implementation of the new revision. As of the end of 2016, the expert organisations together with the Krško NPP had not yet reached agreement on the content of the project tasks.

At the same session, the Republic of Slovenia presented the project of the Vrbina LILW repository and invited the Republic of Croatia to study its interest in joining the project.

The Resolution on the National Programme for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management for the 2016–2025 period (ReNPRRO16–25) was adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in April 2016. This Resolution replaces the Resolution on the National Programme on Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management for the period 2006–2015. It contains the radioactive waste and spent fuel management policy, as well as strategies (concrete measures) for achieving the policies/objectives. According to the programme, the Krško NPP, the major radioactive waste generator, shall continue to operate until 2043, pending the successful conclusion of periodic safety reviews in 2023 and 2033.

The spent fuel will be transferred to dry storage for a period of approximately 60 years, when the spent fuel repository should be operational. The option of regional or multinational disposal has been kept open. The LILW waste repository shall be built in Slovenia. The selected type of repository envisages the disposal of radioactive waste in a near-surface silo. The National Programme envisages two scenarios: the baseline scenario allowing for the disposal of half of the waste, and the extended scenario, which, in accordance with the Agreement on the Krško NPP, provides for the disposal of all LILW waste from the Krško NPP. The spent fuel from the Triga Mark II research reactor will be managed (disposed) together with the spent fuel generated by the Krško NPP. The institutional waste stored at the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje that meets the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) shall be disposed of in the LILW repository. Radioactive waste containing naturally occurring radionuclides is to be managed in accordance with the established level of radioactivity and other waste properties.

The Resolution on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in the Republic of Slovenia (for the period 2013–2023) was adopted by the National Assembly in June 2013. The Resolution is a programmatic, high-level national policy document that contains a descriptive part divided into chapters; for each chapter, the objectives which must be delivered during the period of validity of the Resolution are set. The Resolution therefore comprises the national policy, strategy and plan. The focus of the chapters is as follows:

- fundamental safety principles;
- a description of nuclear and radiological activities in Slovenia;
- a description of international cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety;
- a description of the existing legislation (including binding international legal instruments, e.g. conventions);
- a description of the institutional framework;
- the competences of professional support (research, education and training).
Siting and design of the LILW repository

Within the framework of siting of the LILW repository, activities were carried out at two sites: Vrbina (Municipality of Krško) and Vrbina Šentlenart (Municipality of Brežice). The latter was proposed only at the beginning of 2007. Within the process of preparing the Spatial Plan of National Importance for the Vrbina site, the SNSA issued guidelines determining the content and scope of the special safety analysis of the LILW repository. Considerable effort and attention were devoted to communication with the stakeholders, including the local communities and non-governmental organisations.

The municipal council of Krško gave its consent to the proposal of the national spatial plan in July 2009. A great step forward was the adoption of the Decree on a Detailed Plan of National Importance for an LILW repository in Vrbina in the Municipality of Krško, at the end of 2009. With its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (No. 114/09) on 31 December 2009, the procedure for the siting of the repository was completed. Unfortunately, further procedures for the preparation and approval of the environmental impact assessment, detailed field investigations, the finalisation of the design, and its construction and entry into operation were significantly delayed due to different administrative reasons. There were complications related to the method of financing the project and the legal arrangements among investor and implementing organisations, which were slowly resolved only towards the end of 2013. The investment programme for the project, which is a prerequisite for most of the other steps, was signed by the Minister of Infrastructure and Spatial Planning only in the summer of 2014.

Since 2014, activities related to the LILW repository project have made significant progress. The ARAO fully finished assessing the on-site geo- and hydrosphere and ensured the availability of land for the construction of the repository. The ARAO is in the final stage of drafting the project and technical documentation, conducting safety analyses, defining the waste acceptance criteria, and preparing the environmental impact assessment in order to continue the work on obtaining environmental approval.

In parallel with the preparation of the project documentation for the repository, all necessary activities for the certification of the concrete container that is to hold packaged waste are being carried out. Construction of the first prototype of the container intended for testing and calibrating computational models of the container was prepared at the end of 2016.

The current target is that the repository could start receiving waste in 2021.

The following internet sites are available for additional information:

- Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration: http://www.uvps.gov.si/
- Ministry of Infrastructure: http://www.mzi.gov.si/
- Krško NPP: http://www.nek.si/
- Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre: http://www.rcp.ijs.si/
- Jožef Stefan Institute: http://www.ijs.si/
- Agency for Radwaste Management: http://www.arao.si/
- GEN energija d.o.o.: http://www.gen-energija.si/
- Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o.: http://www.rudnik-zv.si/

An overview matrix is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Overview matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Long-term Management Policy</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Current Practice/Facilities</th>
<th>Planned Facilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spent Fuel</td>
<td>Geological disposal, as a reference scenario, multinational option kept open</td>
<td>Decommissioning Fund (Levy on kWh)</td>
<td>On-site wet storage at the NPP</td>
<td>Dry storage, then geological disposal or export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Fuel Cycle Waste</td>
<td>LILW repository</td>
<td>Decommissioning Fund (Levy on kWh)</td>
<td>On-site storage</td>
<td>LILW repository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HLW together with SF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HLW in geological repository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application Waste</td>
<td>Central Storage for Radioactive Waste, then transfer to the LILW repository (short-lived)</td>
<td>Users and the State</td>
<td>Central Storage for Radioactive Waste</td>
<td>LILW repository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decommissioning Liabilities</td>
<td>National programme for RW and SF management</td>
<td>Decommissioning Fund (Levy on kWh)</td>
<td>Periodic review of the Decommissioning Plan</td>
<td>LILW repository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral agreement with Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HLW &amp; SF repository in 2065 at the earliest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disused Sealed Sources</td>
<td>Central Storage for Radioactive Waste, then transfer to the LILW repository</td>
<td>Users and the State</td>
<td>Central Storage for Radioactive Waste</td>
<td>LILW repository or together with high-level waste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixth Slovenian Report under the Joint Convention 13
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION


In this sixth report, the fulfilment of the obligations in the period 2014-2016 is evaluated. The report presents the achievements in and contributions to enhancing the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

This report has been prepared in order to meet the obligation to report under Article 32 of the Convention. It is structured in accordance with IAEA guidelines INFCIRC/604/Rev.3. In order to ensure more readability, certain information is provided in the form of attachments and referred to in the text. The information provided in the report presents the status at the end of 2016.

In the following sections, fulfilment of Articles 3 to 32 of the Convention is evaluated separately. It can be concluded that Slovenian regulations and practices are in compliance with the obligations of the Convention.
SECTION B: POLICIES AND PRACTICES

Article 32, Paragraph 1: Reporting

In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shall also address its:

(i) spent fuel management policy;
(ii) spent fuel management practices;
(iii) radioactive waste management policy;
(iv) radioactive waste management practices;
(v) criteria used to define and categorise radioactive waste.

(i) Spent Fuel Management Policy

The first strategic document related to radioactive waste and spent fuel management was approved in 1996, only five years after the Republic of Slovenia became independent. This document was the 1996 Strategy on Spent Fuel Management, and included general directions regarding how to manage all spent fuel in Slovenia.

On the basis of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Regulation of the Status and Other Legal Relations Regarding the Investment, Exploitation and Decommissioning of the Krško NPP (hereinafter the Agreement), the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia jointly prepared and approved a Programme for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP and the Disposal of LILW and High-Level Waste (hereinafter the Decommissioning Programme). In accordance with the requirements from the Agreement, a revision of the document should be adopted every five years.

In 2006, Slovenia approved the first revision of the national strategy: the Resolution on the 2006–2015 National Programme for Managing Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel (hereinafter the 2006 Resolution). This resolution included all relevant topics regarding the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, from legislation and the identification of different waste streams in Slovenia to the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The 2006 Resolution duly implements the relevant provisions of the Agreement with Croatia.

The long-term strategy for spent fuel and high-level waste management, based on the Decommissioning Programme from 2004 and the 2006 Resolution, foresees spent fuel storage in dry casks. Spent fuel will be moved from the pool to dry storage between 2024 and 2030 and will be stored in casks until 2065, when a deep geological repository will be provided. The operational phase of the spent fuel repository will end in 2070 and the repository should close in 2075. In the event of an export option, the removal of spent fuel from dry storage is planned for between 2066 and 2070.

According to the Decommissioning Programme, for all domestic scenarios disposal in deep geological formations is considered a safe long-term solution for spent fuel and high-level waste. In preparing the evaluation, the Swedish concept was used as a guideline.

In 2016, Slovenia adopted the second revision of the national strategy: the Resolution on the National Programme for Managing Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel 2016–2025 (hereinafter the 2016 Resolution). This document incorporates several relevant changes affecting spent fuel management plans that have taken place since 2006. Regarding spent fuel management and disposal, one of the main changes is that in the 2016 Resolution the dry storage of SF generated in the Krško NPP is foreseen to start approximately 6 years earlier, mainly for safety reasons.

As a consequence of the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 and in view of reducing the risk of a nuclear accident in the Krško NPP and in light of the SNSA decision to assess the options for improving...
the safety of the spent fuel pool, the Krško NPP carried out a study assessing different possibilities for storing spent fuel in the Krško NPP and proposed, in order to ensure uninterrupted operation and sufficient storage capacity, that a dry storage facility for spent fuel with an operating life of 60 years should be constructed by 2020.

The construction of a dry storage facility for spent fuel was also addressed by the Intergovernmental Commission for monitoring the implementation of the bilateral Slovenian-Croatian Agreement on the Krško NPP at its 10th session in July 2015. The Intergovernmental Commission decided that the construction of a dry storage facility at the Krško NPP site to be used until the cessation of the NPP’s operation is part of a joint solution for spent fuel disposal and in accordance with point seven of Article 10 of the bilateral Slovenian-Croatian Agreement on the Krško NPP.

The 2016 Resolution also requires that the Krško NPP spent fuel owners evaluate reprocessing as an option that could reduce the volume and radiotoxicity of waste for final disposal.

After the period of dry storage, spent fuel or high-level waste generated from spent fuel processing is to be further treated, packaged and disposed of. For spent fuel or HLW generated from the reprocessing of spent fuel, a deep geological repository should be built to ensure adequate isolation of the waste from the environment.

The construction of a deep geological disposal (national, regional, or multinational) is necessary regardless of the selected option for storage, processing, and other forms of spent fuel management.

The 2016 Resolution included the option of shared facilities and regional cooperation in waste management, including the dual-track approach. For long-term spent fuel management, a dual-track strategy has been adopted as a reasonable solution in the present situation. The dual-track approach in the Slovenian strategy includes the option of multinational disposal and the basic reference conceptual scenario for national geological disposal.

The revised national strategy opened the possibility for the disposal of spent fuel in the national repository to begin slightly earlier compared to the previous version. In the revised national strategy, the beginning of the national spatial plan process determining the location of spent fuel and the HLW repository is to be adopted by 2055, the repository is to be constructed in the period between 2055 and 2065, and the commissioning of the spent fuel repository is to start in 2065. The closure of the repository and the commencement of the regulatory control and maintenance of the repository is to begin after 2075.

In parallel with the national disposal programme, the multinational disposal option is possible. Both options go in parallel until the choice of the construction of the national repository or participation in multinational repository is made.

Given that the operator of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor decided to continue the operation of the facility and considered different options regarding spent fuel management, a proposal was made for the final disposal of the spent fuel together with the spent fuel generated by the Krško NPP.

The Agency for Radwaste Management (hereinafter the ARAO), as the provider of radioactive waste management services in Slovenia, will continue to monitor international developments in spent fuel and HLW management – permanently. According to the 2016 Resolution, the ARAO is to conduct planning and carry out development-related activities for the continuation of dry storage after the cessation of the Krško NPP operation and for ensuring the final disposal of the spent fuel and HLW generated by the Krško NPP, and of the reprocessed spent fuel and HLW generated by the TRIGA Mark II research reactor and the Krško NPP, in a national, regional, or multinational repository.

In this respect, progress made in international and regional efforts to draft a joint regional programme on disposal is also to be considered.

With regard to final disposal options, the ARAO participates at the EU level in two programmes which address the possibility of building a multinational/regional repository for spent fuel and high-level waste (ERDO-WG and IGD-TP) and is also involved in the work of the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC).
(ii) Spent Fuel Management Practices

The Republic of Slovenia has no facilities for off-site management of spent fuel. The spent fuel that is generated by the Krško NPP and the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre (the TRIGA Mark II research reactor) is managed in wet storage facilities that are an integrated part of these nuclear facilities.

**Krško NPP**

Spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool inside the Fuel Handling Building of the Krško NPP. In 2003, the project of increasing the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool (reracking) was completed. Following the reracking, 1,694 storage locations are available for spent fuel. Following the accident at Fukushima in 2011, more restrictive requirements were implemented for safe storage of nuclear fuel in the spent fuel pool under potential beyond design bases accidents. By the end of 2016, 1,208 locations were filled with nuclear fuel. Part of the Krško NPP Safety Upgrade Programme is also the construction of a dry storage, which would consequently improve nuclear safety due to its passive nature and by reducing the number of fuel assemblies in the pool. The timeline for the construction of the dry storage facility is in line with the SNSA Safety Upgrade Programme decision, which assumes the finalisation of safety upgrades and measures by the end of 2021. The relevant Krško NPP activities started in 2016 and the contract for the construction of a dry storage facility was signed at the beginning of 2017.

Following the reracking, the spent fuel racks are now of two types. The old racks are designed without neutron poison control. These racks provide 621 cells (6 × 72, plus 3 × 63 cells), and constitute a storage capacity for spent fuel plus one full core for emergency unload. The new racks are designed with neutron poison control and comprise nine modules providing 1,073 usable cells.

The spent fuel racks are designed to withstand shipping, handling, normal operating loads (impact and dead loads of fuel assemblies), and Safe Shutdown Earthquake and Operating Base Earthquake seismic loads meeting Seismic Category I and American Institute of Steel Construction requirements.

**Technical characteristics of the spent fuel pool**

The spent fuel pool structure is made of reinforced concrete. The walls and floor of the pool are covered with a stainless steel liner. Underneath the liner plates there is a system of embedded leak collection channels. A spent fuel pool leak detection system is provided to monitor the integrity of the liner of the spent fuel pool, the fuel transfer canal, and the cask loading area.

Removable gates are provided in the spent fuel pool to enable the submerged transfer of fuel assemblies between the spent fuel pool and the transfer canal or the cask loading area. When the gates are in place, the canal and the cask loading area may be drained.

The spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up system is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool and to maintain the cooling water at the desired temperature, level, clarity and chemical specifications. The cooling system consists of two redundant pumps and three heat exchangers with associated piping, valves and instrumentation. The third heat exchanger was installed in April 2002 in the framework of spent fuel pool reracking.

**The water purification system** with spent fuel pool demineraliser and filter is designed to provide adequate purification in order to enable the plant personnel unrestricted access to the spent fuel storage area and to maintain the optical clarity of the spent fuel cooling water. Water surface clarity is maintained by the operation of the spent fuel skimmer system.

System piping is arranged in such a way that the failure of any pipeline cannot drain the spent fuel pool below the water level required for radiation shielding. A depth of approximately 3.05 m of water over the top of the stored spent fuel assemblies is required to limit direct radiation to 0.025 mSv/h.

Whenever a fuel assembly with defective cladding is removed from the reactor core, a small quantity of fission products may enter the spent fuel cooling water. The provided purification loop removes fission products and other contaminants from the water. By maintaining radioactivity concentrations in the spent fuel cooling water at 18.4×10⁴ Bq/cm³ (β and γ radiation) or less, the dose at the water surface is 0.025 mSv/h or less, thus providing the plant personnel unrestricted access.
A criticality analysis for the spent fuel pit racks was performed as a design basis criterion. For the old racks calculations were performed for an infinite array of cells with a spacing of 296.42 mm by 304.80 mm to verify that the configuration is critically safe. For the new racks, criticality safety is ensured by geometrically safe configuration, the use of a borated stainless steel absorber sheet and a procedure to verify that the reactivity equivalence curve is met.

Fuel management strategy

All the spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool. To minimise the amount of spent fuel and reduce fuel costs, the Krško NPP is extending the burnup of fuel elements. The average spent fuel burnup in the spent fuel pool is 39.3 GWD/MTU, while the last three spent fuel regions had an average burnup of 49.7 GWD/MTU. The Low Leakage Loading Pattern was introduced in the design several years ago. By using this type of design, an additional reduction in spent fuel production was achieved. As a consequence of the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, in view of reducing the risk of a nuclear accident in the Krško NPP and in light of the SNSA decision to assess the options for improving the safety of the spent fuel pool, it was decided to construct a dry storage facility for spent fuel with an operating lifetime of 60 years. According to current plans, it should be constructed by 2020.

IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre

Two spent fuel pools are part of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor. The first spent fuel pool was constructed with the reactor in 1966 and is no longer in use. The second one was constructed in 1992. Its capacity is 195 spent fuel elements and it is located in the basement of the reactor building. It is accessible by crane through a cover in the reactor hall floor. The pool is 3.5 m deep and is lined with stainless steel sheets. It is equipped with an on-line water radioactivity monitor.

Both pools have been empty since 1999, when all spent fuel elements (a total of 219) were shipped to the USA. The new pool is maintained as operational and prepared for immediate use if necessary.

In 2007, 10 fresh fuel elements were transferred to the French company AREVA and shipped to France. The total number of the remaining fuel elements (irradiated and fresh) at the reactor is 84.

A detailed criticality analysis of the spent fuel racks design was performed. Heat removal is not applicable for the TRIGA Mark II research reactor fuel. A safety analysis of accidents involving spent fuel during normal operation and fuel handling was performed and is included in the safety analysis report.

(iii) Radioactive Waste Management Policy

In the 2016 Resolution, LILW management is treated as an integral process, covering all stages from waste generation to waste disposal. Various current and near-future radioactive waste streams are taken into account, considering both present and planned waste management practices. Besides radioactive waste from the Krško NPP, other small producers (from medicine, industry and research) and other activities involving radioactive waste (the uranium mine undergoing decommissioning, TENORM, the decommissioning of reactors, etc.) are also described. The Programme includes an analysis of measures for the minimisation of radioactive waste production and its treatment and conditioning before disposal.

The strategy for radioactive waste management during the operation of nuclear and radiation facilities is founded on the principle of using such processes, technologies, and methods that generate the least operational waste, and on further radioactive waste management that reduces the waste volume in the radioactive waste storage facilities and at their final disposal sites. The strategy promotes the usage of such processes, technologies, and methods that reduce the volume and quantity of radioactive waste and meet the waste acceptance criteria for final disposal, where they exist.

The prime responsibility for radioactive waste management in nuclear and radiation facilities rests with the holders of operating licences. Radioactive waste is to be managed in accordance with the approved safety analysis reports for the operation of individual nuclear facilities. Storage is to be implemented for the purpose of efficient and safe phased disposal at the LILW repository. In the field of radioactive waste management, the strategy promotes the concept of the clearance of radioactive materials from regulatory
control in accordance with the prescribed criteria in order to avoid the unnecessary generation of radioactive waste.

The construction and operation of a repository for short-lived LILW is one of the principal goals of LILW management in Slovenia. The limited storage capacities at nuclear facilities call for decisions to be taken and practical solutions to be found.

A significant step forward in solving this problem was made by the selection and approval of a site for LILW disposal in 2009. The Vrbina site in the municipality of Krško has been adopted by the governmental decree on the national spatial plan. The selected type of repository envisages the disposal of radioactive waste in a near-surface silo. The location and design of the repository enable extension by means of additional silos. The Investment Programme for the LILW Repository in Vrbina, Krško, which was confirmed in July 2014, envisages two scenarios: the baseline scenario allowing for the disposal of half of the waste, and the extended scenario, which, in accordance with the Agreement on the Krško NPP, provides for the disposal of all LILW waste from the Krško NPP. The repository must be designed with a capacity enabling the disposal of any kind of LILW generated in Slovenia, with the exception of small quantities of long-lived or other waste.

Responsibility in the field of LILW management is clearly defined. Three independent parties – the generators of radioactive waste, the SNSA as the regulatory body, and the ARAO as the provider of radioactive waste management as a mandatory service of general economic interest – are involved in the process of radioactive waste management. The operators of nuclear and other radiation facilities are responsible for radioactive waste management at their facilities. The ARAO is an independent implementing organisation that concludes contracts in connection with its activities with the line ministry competent for the Energy Directorate. The ARAO has responsibility for takeover, collection, transport, preliminary treatment and storage prior to disposal, the construction of a repository, and the disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel not originating from power-generating nuclear facilities. The ARAO’s mandatory service of general economic interest also encompasses the conditioning of radioactive waste and spent fuel prior to its disposal and the disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel originating from power-generating nuclear facilities, as well as the management, long-term monitoring and maintenance of the disposal sites for mine and hydro-metallurgical tailings originating from the extraction and exploitation of nuclear minerals, and the management and long-term monitoring of radioactive waste and spent fuel repositories. All activities are made transparent to the public through annual reports, via the internet and through outreach activities.

(iv) Radioactive Waste Management Practices

Within the scope of the Convention, the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje, the Boršt mill tailings site and the Jazbec mine waste pile at the former Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine are the only radioactive waste management facilities in the Republic of Slovenia. The LILW that is generated by the operation of the Krško NPP is managed and stored at the Krško NPP site, while the waste produced by the operation of small producers (the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre and in industry, research and medicine) is managed in the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje.

Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje

Institutional radioactive waste is stored in the Central Storage Facility (CSF), situated in Brinje near Ljubljana. The facility is operated by the ARAO.

The ARAO holds a licence to carry out a radiation practice. The licence to carry out a radiation practice includes the following activities:

- the collection of radioactive waste at the waste producers’ premises;
- the collection of radioactive waste on-site in the event of accidents;
- the collection of radioactive waste in cases where the waste producer is unknown;
- the dismantling of sealed radioactive sources at the premises of the producer or holder (less complex sources);
- the use of radioactive sources for the calibration and testing of measuring devices;
• the treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste in a hot cell laboratory for the purposes of storage; and
• the transport of radioactive materials and the transportation of nuclear materials as a part of radioactive waste management as a mandatory service of general economic interest.

The ARAO has a Radioactive Waste Management Programme. The Programme is an operational document for radioactive waste management valid for two years. It contains information on the organisation of activities and methods of carrying out activities, recording and reporting, definitions of responsibilities for services, information on basic documents for carrying out activities, information on packaging, information on radioactive waste, management procedures and methods, measures to minimise radioactive waste generation, clearances and capacities in place, and consideration of interdependencies between all stages of management, and the alignment of management procedures with operative programmes under the national programme for radioactive waste management.

The radioactive waste inventory in the CSF has been characterised, treated and conditioned. The ARAO has been performing treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste as a regular activity at a nearby processing facility (a hot cell laboratory) since 2012. ARAO staff carry out waste sorting, characterisation and compression, the dismantling of disused ionising smoke detectors, and the solidification of liquid radioactive waste. It is planned that it will implement the dismantling of other disused sealed radioactive sources in the next two years.

During the development of the WAC for storing institutional radioactive waste in the CSF, the ARAO considered the generic WAC for the planned LILW repository, the IAEA TECDOCS, IAEA Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series, Slovenian legislation, and operators’ practices. The WAC for the storage facility will be revised when the WAC for the repository is approved.

A series of new documents related to the facility and revisions of existing documents have been produced in the last three years, including a nuclear and radiation safety training programme for staff, a facility decommissioning plan, a radioactive waste management programme, a physical protection plan, documents on working procedures, and manuals. In 2015, the ARAO started the first periodic safety review (PSR) of the CSF. It will be finished in 2018 and will provide the basis for the renewal of the operating license of the CSF for the next 10 years.

**Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine**

The uranium mine ceased operation in the summer of 1990. All surfaces in the mining area affected by uranium production have been decontaminated and have been returned to unconditional land use. The contaminated material produced by mining, uranium ore processing and decontamination has been disposed of at two disposal sites nearby the mine: the Jazbec mine waste pile and the Boršt mill tailings disposal site. All other former temporary mine waste disposal piles and contaminated waste materials (scrap metal, plastics and building debris) were relocated to the Jazbec mine waste pile.

The radiological and chemical long-term impacts of uranium mining on the environment were minimised to the lowest reasonable level by an environmental remediation project carried out by the public company Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. Parts of the mine’s galleries have been backfilled with mine waste and some contaminated scrap material arising from the decommissioning of the ore processing area. All entrances to the mine have been sealed. Institutional control of the radiological and chemical parameters of mine water discharges is ensured.

No regular monitoring is needed at the decommissioned site where the processing of uranium ore took place.

Environmental remediation works at the Jazbec mine waste pile were finished in 2009. A five-year transitional period followed when the efficiency of the remediation measures was checked by monitoring the relevant radiological and chemical parameters. After proving that the remediation had been successful, the administrative procedure for the permanent closure of the mine waste pile was completed in 2015. The area acquired the status of a facility of the state infrastructure. The ARAO is authorised to carry out the long-term surveillance and maintenance of the site in order to maintain the achieved environmental performance of the site. Monitoring of air, seepage and underground water, radiation dose rates, monitoring...
of the stability of geodetic points, visual control and facility maintenance is performed as a mandatory service of general economic interest and is financed from the state budget.

The Boršt mill tailings site is situated on a hillside, 535–565 m above sea level. During the short operational life of the site, approximately 610,000 tons of mill tailings and 73,000 tons of mine waste were deposited there. In 2004, an additional 38,000 tons of mine waste was transported to Boršt for the purpose of its final arrangements. During 2008 and 2009, 9,450 tons of contaminated materials from the decontamination of auxiliary objects were deposited at Boršt. The total mass of the deposited materials is 730,450 tons. The area of Boršt is 42,000 m². The mill tailing materials are sands and slimes under 28 mesh (0.5 mm). The average activity of $^{238}$U is 1,000 Bq/kg and 8,600 Bq/kg for $^{226}$Ra.

The environmental remediation of the Boršt mill tailings disposal site is not yet finished and the conditions for its closure are not yet fulfilled. The main problem is a landslide at the base of the tailings site. Additional works to divert water from the disposal area are in progress.

The current rate of movement is approximately 3 cm per year. An expert group concluded that the probability of the collapse of the slope is negligible, but proposed an investigation of the landslide by way of drill holes.

In 2015 and 2016, two studies were carried out. In the first study, the distribution of tailings in the case of an extraordinary event (e.g. intensive rain or an earthquake) was assessed. On the basis of the study, the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning ordered an additional study on the radiation exposure of residents and the workers who would carry out the remediation of the deposited material on the riverbeds of the Todraščica, Brebovščica and Poljanska Sora Rivers. The results of both studies will be used to complete the safety report.

In the meantime, it was decided to implement the emergency drainage measures that were proposed by the expert advisory board. In 2016, an external contractor started to implement the emergency drainage measures in the passageway of the tunnel under the hydrometallurgical tailings of the Boršt site.

The current arrangement of the mill tailings ensures protection against background waters, prevention of the spread of soluble components into underground and surface waters, the reduction of radon exhalation and the prevention of erosion by rainfall. The multilayer cover of a total thickness of 2.05 m is composed of a drainage layer (mine waste and crushed stone), compacted clay (the sealing layer), local material (the protecting layer), and grassed topsoil. Remediation of the Boršt mill tailings started in 2007 and was completed in 2010. The radon exhalation rate from the mill tailings surface before the arrangement was 1 – 5 Bq/m²/s, and after final arrangement it is now less than 0.1 Bq/m²/s. Institutional monitoring of seepage water, ground water, the ground water level, air, surface integrity and stability will be needed in the future.

By carrying out the final arrangements of the Boršt mill tailings disposal site and the Jazbec mine waste pile, the radiation limitations set according to the authorised limits were achieved.

**Krško NPP**

The Krško NPP has its own Radioactive Waste Management Programme, supplemented by a technical report. The Programme is revised and updated at least every two years. The Krško NPP considers this document a valuable source of input for future decision-making and long-term planning in the area of operational radioactive waste management. Waste generation rates are predicted based on the present situation and future options. The available storage capacity for radioactive waste at the Krško NPP is assessed by extrapolation. In addition, a Radioactive Waste Committee was formed at the Krško NPP as an interdisciplinary team, through which communication and transparency in the area of radioactive waste management have been enhanced. Due to slow progress in the construction of the repository for LILW, the storage capacities at the NPP are almost exhausted. The NPP is planning to provide additional storage capacity in the waste preconditioning area of the storage building. The entrance area of the storage building will be adjusted for the preconditioning of waste by the construction of a new Waste Manipulation Building. With the construction of the new Waste Manipulation Building, the plant will be provided with new premises for the storage of drums in the process of the manipulation and preparation for transport, collection, and sorting of radioactive waste.
Radioactive waste treatment and conditioning

During the operation of the Krško NPP, various radioactive substances in liquid, gaseous and solid form are generated. Radioactive substances are collected, segregated and processed to obtain a final form for storage in the plant’s radioactive waste storage locations. Depending on the processing method, radioactive substances are collected and segregated. These radioactive substances are processed in a system for radioactive waste treatment. The system is constructed for collecting, processing, storing and packaging waste in a suitable form to minimise releases into the environment. Three fundamental systems are used for radioactive waste management, i.e. systems for liquid, solid and gaseous radioactive waste.

The plant is provided with a Gaseous Waste Processing System consisting of two parallel closed loops with compressors and catalytic hydrogen recombiners and six decay tanks for compressed fission gases. Four of the tanks are used during normal plant operation, while the remaining two are used during reactor shutdown. The capacity of the tanks is adequate for more than one month’s gaseous waste hold-up. Within this period, the majority of the short-lived fission gases decay, while the remaining gases are released into the atmosphere under favourable meteorological conditions. Automatic radiation monitors in the ventilation duct prevent uncontrolled release when the radioactive gas concentration exceeds the permissible level.

Liquid radioactive waste arising from all sources during the operation of the Krško NPP is processed by the Liquid Waste Processing System, consisting of tanks, pumps, filters, evaporators and two demineralisers. The system is designed to collect, segregate, process, recycle and discharge liquid radioactive waste. The system design considers the potential exposure of personnel and ensures that the quantity of radioactivity released into the environment is as low as reasonably achievable.

All solid radioactive waste generated during plant operation, maintenance activities and servicing is collected in the Solid Radioactive Storage Facility. Used spent resins, evaporator concentrates (boric acid), used filters and other contaminated solid waste such as paper, towels, working clothes, laboratory equipment and various tools, form most of the solid waste. Compressible solid waste is compressed and encapsulated in standard 208 l drums, while dried evaporator concentrate and sludges and dried spent resin are stored in stainless steel drums. These drums are presently stored in the Solid Radwaste Storage Facility within the plant area.

The radioactive waste volume reduction programme

Numerous programme improvements, design changes and work practice improvements have been pursued at the Krško NPP to decrease the generation rate of radioactive waste of various types. With the introduction of an 18-month fuel cycle, the generation of radioactive waste was additionally reduced.

Segregation techniques are used for collecting non-contaminated materials separately, which allows waste streams to be processed separately. Metal materials exceeding exemption/clearance levels are stored onsite before melting. To reduce the volume of the solid radioactive waste to be stored, supercompaction campaigns are carried out.

The original Westinghouse procedure for evaporator bottoms and spent resin treatment was replaced with a treatment system for these types of waste called the In-drum Drying System. The drying process converts the accumulated wet spent resins into a dry free-flowing bead resin condition. The dried primary resins are filled directly into 200 l stainless steel heavy drums with biological shields (150 l of usable volume). Dried secondary spent resins are filled into 200 l stainless steel drums without biological shields. The drying and volume reduction process for evaporator bottoms and sludges converts the concentrate into dry solid waste products with low residual moisture and no free water. The Krško NPP is using an external service for the incineration of combustible waste and the melting of radioactive metallic waste material.

The risks associated with radioactive waste management are kept reasonably low. Different types of waste are segregated in an early collection phase and stored separately to avoid chemical interactions. Tube-type containers are used as an overpack for the storage of standard 200 l drums and the products of supercompaction in the plant’s radioactive waste storage facility. Any new type of radioactive waste resulting from a new technology being used is evaluated and incorporated into the safety analysis report.
Safety Review

The 2nd Krško NPP periodic safety review phase was completed on 15 December 2013. The radioactive waste management programme has been reviewed, including an evaluation of the design basis for the durability and integrity of waste packages. The periodic safety review has shown that the durability and integrity of the radioactive waste packages are within acceptable levels.

There was also a recommendation by the IRRS mission dealing with strengthening administrative control over the storage of radioactive waste in the Krško NPP, particularly in terms of the accessibility and integrity of the containers. After the IRRS mission, a thorough analysis was carried out that showed that any solution of this problem before the removal of the waste to the final repository would represent such an additional radiation protection burden and such costs that could not justify the small benefit of slightly reducing the current risk. As the final repository is expected to be operational in a few years, it was decided to not follow the recommendations of the IRRS mission.

Small Producers of Radioactive Waste in the Republic of Slovenia

Management of institutional radioactive waste (from medical and industrial applications and research activities) was delegated to the relevant public utility as a mandatory service of general economic interest, i.e. to the radioactive waste management organisation ARAO. This includes the collection of waste at the producers’ premises, the transport of waste, and the treatment, conditioning, storage and disposal of waste. The ARAO is also responsible for the management of radioactive waste in the event of industrial accidents and for historical waste.

The Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre

Only a small amount of solid radioactive waste has been produced during the lifetime of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor (approximately 200 litres per year). This waste mainly consists of contaminated material and equipment (paper, plastics, glassware, etc.) and contaminated mechanical and chemical filters (e.g. ion exchange resins). Spent resins are collected in drums. The activity content is estimated to be less than 1 GBq/m³. The waste is transferred to the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje.

The reactor does not directly produce any radioactive liquid waste. However, some radioactive liquids are produced during the chemical treatment of irradiated samples in the adjacent research laboratories. This liquid waste is collected and further conditioned. Wastewater containing radionuclides is collected in a special 20 m³ decay tank. After measuring the isotope concentration and activity, the liquids are released into the River Sava in accordance with the prescribed limits.

No gaseous radioactive waste that needs further treatment or storage is produced. Radioactive gases produced due to normal reactor operation (mainly argon) are released through controlled atmospheric release venting.

Radioactive Waste Management in Industry and Research

Radioactive sources are widely used in industry and research. There are a number of industrial applications, for example in industrial radiography, thickness, level and density gauges, moisture detectors, eliminators of static electricity, lightning conductors, etc. In the Republic of Slovenia, 75 industrial and research organisations were using 651 sealed sources as of the end of 2016. Spent and disused radioactive sources were either returned to the suppliers or shipped to the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje.

The requirements for the use and storage of disused radioactive sources and waste are set out in the 2002 Act (Articles 9–16). A licence must be obtained to conduct radiation practices. An applicant shall submit a plan for the use and storage of the radiation source, as well as a plan for the handling of the radioactive waste resulting from the radiation practice.

During the decontamination and decommissioning of buildings at the Reactor Infrastructure Centre of the Jožef Stefan Institute used for the processing of uranium ore, which took place from 2005 until 2007, as many as 31 drums of waste contaminated with naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) were produced. Part of this material (12 drums) was transferred to the Central Storage Facility in February 2010. In accordance with the SNSA’s decision, the Institute sent part of the material, i.e. 12 drums of contaminated
construction material and soil, which were conditionally cleared, to a municipal landfill in June 2011. Since it is not allowed to dispose of metal items or wood at any municipal landfill, the remaining 7 drums are still being temporarily stored at the location of the Reactor Infrastructure Centre in Brinje.

Radioactive Waste Management in Medicine

In the Republic of Slovenia, unsealed radioactive sources (radiopharmaceuticals) for diagnosis and therapy are used in seven clinics or hospitals. The main users are the Institute of Oncology and the Ljubljana University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine. There is no production of radiopharmaceuticals in the Republic of Slovenia.

The Institute of Oncology imported (among other sources) 0.57 TBq of $^{131}$I, and the Ljubljana University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine imported 0.35 TBq of $^{131}$I in 2016. All other users together imported 0.075 TBq of $^{131}$I in 2016. The Institute of Oncology uses decay storage tanks in order to control releases of radioactive effluents. The Ljubljana University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine releases the effluents directly into sewerage systems. Patients from other hospitals are not hospitalised. It is estimated that less than 0.3 TBq of $^{131}$I is released annually into the environment.

Short-lived radioactive waste (residues contaminated with $^{131}$I, $^{123}$I, $^{125}$I, $^{99m}$Tc, $^{99}$Mo, $^{201}$Tl, $^{177}$Lu, $^{90}$Y, $^{111}$In, $^{67}$Ga, $^{18}$F or $^{223}$Ra) produced during medical practices is stored locally at the users’ locations. After decay, the material is transferred to the municipal disposal sites. In 2010, the Ljubljana municipal waste disposal site was equipped with a portal radiation monitor, which raised the alarm on several occasions in the period from 2011 to 2013. It was determined that certain short-lived radioisotopes from medical practices had not decayed below clearance levels before being transferred to the disposal site. Corrective measures and procedures were later agreed upon and implemented. Over the last three years no alarms have been reported to the SRPA or to the SNSA.

Other small amounts of solid radioactive waste, mainly containing $^{57}$Co, $^{137}$Cs, $^{68}$Ge, $^{153}$Gd or $^{106}$Ru (in total, less than 1 GBq) are temporarily stored at local sites and periodically transported to the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje.

(v) Criteria used to define and categorise radioactive waste


The provisions of this regulation apply to substances in gaseous, liquid or solid form; they apply to objects or equipment containing radioactive substances or that are so contaminated that they exceed clearance levels, if generated as waste from radiation practices or from intervention measures, if their holder intends or has to discard them since their further use is not foreseen, or if the holder does not have a licence for their use in accordance with the regulations on protection against ionising radiation.

With regard to their aggregation state, radioactive waste is divided into solid, liquid and gaseous waste.

With regard to the level and type of radioactivity, solid radioactive waste is categorised as follows:

1. transitional radioactive waste;
2. very low-level radioactive waste, for which the competent regulatory body for nuclear and radiation safety may approve conditional clearance;
3. low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW), with insignificant heat generation, which is classified into two groups:
   3.1 short-lived LILW, containing radionuclides with a half-life shorter than 30 years and a specific activity of alpha emitters equal to or lower than 4,000 Bq/g for an individual package, but on average not higher than 400 Bq/g in the overall amount of LILW;
   3.2 long-lived LILW, where the specific activity of alpha emitters exceeds the limitations for short-lived LILW;
4. high-level radioactive waste, which contains radionuclides whose decay generates such an amount of heat that this has to be considered in its management;
5. radioactive waste containing naturally occurring radionuclides that are produced in the processing of nuclear mineral materials or other industrial processes and are not sealed sources of radiation in accordance with the regulations on the use of radioactive sources and radiation practices.

The Decree on Activities Involving Radiation defines the conditional and unconditional clearance of radioactive material.

The regulatory control of solid radioactive material can be terminated without a prior decision of the competent ministry if the specific concentration of radionuclides in the material does not exceed the values set in Table 1 or Table 2 of the Decree on Activities Involving Radiation (clearance levels).
SECTION C: SCOPE OF APPLICATION

Article 3: Scope of Application

1. This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the spent fuel results from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.

2. This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when the radioactive waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention shall not apply to waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party.

3. This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.

4. This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.

The Convention applies to the safety of spent fuel management in the Krško NPP and in the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre. No spent fuel reprocessing is foreseen.

It also applies to the safety of the operational waste from the Krško NPP, the safety of the mining, milling and decommissioning waste from the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine and the safety of the waste from small non-power applications which are stored in the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste in Brinje.

The 2002 Act does not stipulate any special legal provision for the spent fuel or radioactive waste that results from military or defence programmes. Therefore, the same legal provisions are applicable to such waste. However, it should be noted that there is no radioactive waste from the defence programme of the Republic of Slovenia.
SECTION D: INVENTORIES AND LISTS

Article 32, Paragraph 2: Reporting

This report shall also include:

(i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;

(ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total activity;

(iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;

(iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:

(a) is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;

(b) has been disposed of; or

(c) has resulted from past practices.

This inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate information available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;

(v) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.

(i) List of Spent Fuel Management Facilities

The Republic of Slovenia has no off-site spent fuel management facilities. The spent fuel that is generated by the operation of the Krško NPP and the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre (the TRIGA Mark II research reactor) is managed in storage facilities that are integral parts of these nuclear facilities.

(ii) Inventory of Spent Fuel

Krško NPP

The Fuel Handling Building is a part of the Krško NPP. It is operated under the plant’s licence and is therefore not considered an independent nuclear facility. The Fuel Handling Building consists of a spent fuel pool and the fuel handling system.

There were 884 spent nuclear fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool at the end of 2016. There are altogether 1210 fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool, but not all have been declared to be fully used. The fuel batches of the spent fuel assemblies with corresponding region numbers are listed in Section I, Annex (d), Table 7. These fuel assemblies will probably never return to the core unless emergency core loading has to be performed.

There are eight spent fuel groups stored in the Krško NPP’s spent fuel pool:

- All Westinghouse standard type fuel assemblies, including Siemens KWU fuel, are considered spent. Fuel batches No. 1 ["A"] to No. 8B ["HH"] are standard fuel type.

- Vantage 5 fuel type, including fuel batches No. 15 ["P"] and No. 15B, are spent.

- There are two leaking Vantage 5 fuel assemblies (L02, N20) with very low burnup. These two assemblies are not compatible with current repair technology and cannot be reused in future cycles. Therefore they have been included in the spent fuel series.
• Fuel assemblies potentially susceptible to top nozzle separation (FAs with 304L sleeves that are welded to the top nozzle) – fuel batches No. 8 to 18 (altogether, the fuel batches susceptible are from No. 1 to 18 ["T"]).

  – average burnup higher than 50 GWD/MTU or
  – that have previously been declared to be spent fuel.

• The fuel rod storage basket containing single fuel rods from repaired fuel assemblies is also considered to be spent fuel.

• Fuel rod segments containing nuclear material stored in the Strainer Basket for Fuel Rods (SBFR), and

• NEW criteria – from 2014: damaged fuel assemblies that cannot be repaired and reused in the core (AD11, AD12, AD13, AD17 and AE03).

**IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

There are two interim storage pools that are part of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre. The old storage pool is not in use. The newer storage pool is maintained in operational condition and prepared for immediate use if necessary. Both pools have been empty since 1999, when all spent fuel elements (a total of 219) were shipped to the USA for final disposal.

(iii) **List of the Radioactive Waste Management Facilities**

The Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje, the Boršt mill tailings site and the Jazbec mine waste pile at the Žirovski Vrhn Uranium Mine are the only radioactive waste management facilities in the Republic of Slovenia pursuant to the Convention. The operational waste from the Krško NPP is managed and stored in storage under the operating licence for the Krško NPP.

**Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje**

The storage facility is a near-surface concrete building whose roof is covered by a layer of soil. The building is subdivided by concrete walls into nine storage sections and an entrance area. The ground plan of the facility is 10.6 m × 25.7 m and its height is 3.6 m. A small area is intended as a checkpoint between the radiologically controlled and supervised area, the area for loading and unloading waste, and for internal transport. The storage section at the back of the building is deeper relative to the level of the other sections.

The facility is equipped with a ventilation system for reducing radon concentration and air contamination in the storage facility. To obtain relatively low and constant humidity, it is equipped with an air-drying system. The water and sewage collection system is designed as a closed system to retain all liquids from the storage facility in the sump. Liquids are discharged after measurements of radioactive contamination show that this is below the regulatory limit. The storage facility is physically and technically protected against fire, acts of violence, burglary, sabotage and so forth.

**Jazbec Mine Waste Pile at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine**

The Jazbec mine waste pile is located on the north-eastern slope of the hill named Žirovski Vrh at an altitude above 427 metres. The pile area was reshaped and covered with a final 1.95-m-thick layer. A detailed inventory of the Jazbec mine waste pile is provided in Table 12. The remediation design and the safety analysis report on the final remediation of the Jazbec mine waste pile were realised in 2004. The remediation was completed in 2008. Since September 2013, the Jazbec mine waste pile has been a national infrastructure facility. After proving that the remediation was successful, the administrative procedure for permanently closing the Jazbec mine waste pile was completed in 2015.
Boršt Mill Tailings Site at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine

The Boršt mill tailings site is located on the north-western slope of Boršt Hill at an altitude above 535 metres. The waste inventory is provided in Table 13. During the operation and construction of the Boršt mill tailings site, some mine waste was used to consolidate the surfaces used for mill tailings transportation. In the remediation process the slopes were minimised and a rock support scarp was constructed at the head of the mill tailings. The surfaces were covered by a 0.5 m-thick layer of mining waste overlaid by various soil layers with a thickness of 2.05 m, thus with a total of 2.55 m.

In 1991, a few months after a heavy rainfall, a landslide beneath the deposited mill tailings was activated. About 4.5×10^6 m^3 of the hillside became unstable and sliding started at a rate of about 0.5 to 1.0 mm per day. The main reason for the landslide was probably the extremely high groundwater level. In 1994 and 1995, a drainage tunnel of nearly 600 metres in length was constructed together with vertical drainage wells. Consequently the speed of the landslide’s movement was reduced in 1995.

The design of the remediation and the safety analysis report on the final remediation were approved in 2005. The remediation was completed in 2010. In 2008, during intensive work on the implementation of the final arrangement of the mill tailings, the landslide was reactivated. An expert team was set up to assess the situation and to propose mitigation measures. The team concluded that the probability of a sudden collapse of the landslide was negligible, but proposed investigation of the incoming water using drill holes.

In 2015 and 2016, two studies were carried out. In the first study, the distribution of tailings in the case of an extraordinary event (e.g. intensive rain or an earthquake) was assessed. On the basis of the study, an additional study was performed on the radiation exposure of residents and the workers who would carry out the remediation of the deposited material on the riverbeds of the Todraščica, Brebovsčica and Poljanska Sora Rivers. Dose assessment covered all important exposure pathways originating from disposal material. In the event of the total disintegration of the disposal facility, the radiological impact on the environment and the local population in the Todraščica Valley would be 4.52 mSv/year for a member of the public who would remain there and continue to live as before. This is one order of magnitude higher than during the operational period of the mine. The authorised limit for population exposure after the remediation of the uranium exploration site was set at 0.3 mSv/year. A conservative exposure assessment was carried out also for workers engaged in remediation work. The workers would receive 1.5-2.9 mSv/year.

The results of both studies will be used to complete the safety report. The safety report will have to provide measures to remedy such a very unlikely event.

In the meantime, additional intervention measures for reducing the speed of the landslide’s movements were performed and the work continues in 2017. It is planned that the drainage bores will lower the water’s back-flow in the landslide zone. Furthermore, it is supposed that the groundwater level will be lower in the pile’s base and in the pile itself.

Krško NPP

The Krško NPP includes the following buildings for radioactive waste management:

The Auxiliary Building, where the systems for solid, liquid and gaseous waste processing are located. The building is located adjacent to the Fuel Handling Building and the Reactor Building within the Radiologically Controlled Area. Appropriate monitoring and radiological control is provided during all stages of radioactive waste processing. The main activities related to waste management in this building are pre-treatment (waste collection, segregation, chemical adjustment, decontamination), treatment (radionuclide removal, volume reduction) and conditioning (drying, immobilisation, packaging). The conditioned waste is transported to the Solid Radwaste Storage Facility by forklift or an electric-powered cart (using a special shield when necessary).

The Solid Radwaste Storage Facility, an interim storage, originally built as a 5-year storage. Its operating licence was extended in 1988 due to the lack of an LILW repository. It is a reinforced concrete structure, seismically designed, located adjacent to the Auxiliary Building. The total area is 1,470 m^2; following an area optimisation project, by applying a special steel structure to support the storage of waste on the second level, the useful volume was increased to allow waste storage for a longer period of time. The storage time in the Solid Radwaste Storage Facility is variable and is dependent on waste generation rates and waste
management plans. The inner area is divided into 6 fields by 60-cm-thick interior concrete walls; the exterior walls and the ceiling are 100 cm thick, providing appropriate insulation and radiological shielding. The facility has provisions for storing different types of solid radioactive waste separately and retrieving them for further processing (supercompaction, incineration, melting and clearance after decay of the radionuclide) or disposal at a later time. The Storage Facility is equipped with a ventilation system, smoke detectors and a local radiation monitor.

The Decontamination Building, an interim storage, built for decay storage of two old steam generators and radioactive waste produced through the replacement of steam generators and other larger components. It is a seismically-designed reinforced concrete structure consisting of the following three areas: the decontamination area, a “mock-up” area, and an area for the storage of old steam generators. The building meets the requirements for a LILW storage. The outer wall and the roof slab design were governed by radiological shielding requirements.

(iv) Inventory of Radioactive Waste

Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste in Brinje

At the end of 2016, 93 m$^3$ of radioactive waste (RW) and disused radioactive sources was stored at the CSF, with a total weight of 53 tons and a total activity of 2.8 TBq. The storage facility is already filled to around 80% of its capacity, and consequently the operator is taking measures towards volume reduction. In the last five years, the ARAO has taken over from small producers or holders RW and disused radioactive sources with an average volume that amounts to 2.5 m$^3$ per year – gross volume including packaging.

Because of the conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS), the volume of stored RW and disused radioactive sources in the storage facility has been very slightly increasing by approximately 0.5 m$^3$ per year. Due to the large number of DSRS, it is becoming a routine practice in the treatment thereof that the device is disassembled and the associated radioactive source is recovered and conditioned for storage. The rest of the non-radioactive materials (plastic, metal and electronic components) are treated and prepared for recycling. After such conditioning the radioactive part is in a more appropriate form for storage and requires significantly less space in the storage facility. Solid RW is mostly packed in metal drums, while some unconditioned RW is packed in small plastic or metal containers. The drums contain mostly contaminated materials such as paper, glass, soil, sand, metal pieces and plastic materials. DSRS are stored in the original shielding containers or are repacked in lead containers.

RW and disused radioactive sources generated by small producers are divided into three main groups: solid RW (Group I), disused sealed radioactive sources (Group II), and other radioactive waste (Group III).

Figure 2: Inventory of RW and disused radioactive sources in the CSF as of the end of 2016
The inventory of RW and disused radioactive sources is given in Section L, Annex (e), Table 11. DSRS accounted for approximately 94% of the activity stored at CSF at the end of 2016; the remaining activity is represented by solid RW types: T1, T2, T3, and T4. As much as 62% of RW/DSRS stored at the end of 2016 contained short-lived radionuclides ($^{60}$Co, $^{137}$Cs, $^{90}$Sr, etc.), whereas the remainder contained long-lived radionuclides ($^{226}$Ra, $^{241}$Am, $^{232}$Th, etc.).

In 2016, the greatest portion of RW at the CSF, in terms of volume fraction, was from Group I. Solid RW accounted for approximately 85% of the stored inventory volume, whereas DSRS accounted for the remaining percentage. Among solid RW, combustible waste (compressible and incompressible waste) accounted for 27%; slightly less than half of the combustible waste is also compressible (combustible and non-combustible waste), while the remaining 32% was incompressible, non-combustible waste in special form, or bulky items (T4), regarding which further processing is not reasonable. Although DSRS contribute substantially to the activity, the share of the volume they occupied in the storage facility was only 15%. RW from the other radioactive waste group (liquid and mixed waste) is rarely taken over since it must be pre-treated before it is brought into the CSF.

**Jazbec mine waste pile and Boršt mill tailings site**

Basic data on mine waste and other debris at the Jazbec and Boršt sites are summarised in Section L, Annex (e), Tables 12 and 13, presenting the situation as of the end of 2016.

**Krško NPP**

See Section L, Annex (e), Tables 8, 9 and 10.

**(v) Nuclear Facilities in the Process of Being Decommissioned**

There are no nuclear facilities currently being decommissioned. The Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine, which is a radiation facility in accordance with the definition in the 2002 Act, is the only facility which has been successfully decommissioned in the Republic of Slovenia.
Article 18: Implementing Measures

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national Act, the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.

The legislative, regulatory and administrative measures, and other steps necessary for implementing the obligations of the Republic of Slovenia under the Convention are discussed in this report.

Article 19: Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.

2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
   (i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety;
   (ii) a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities;
   (iii) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility without a license;
   (iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation and reporting;
   (v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licenses;
   (vi) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.

3. When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.

1. Legislative and Regulatory Framework

The main law of the Republic of Slovenia in this area is the Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act (the 2002 Act), which also regulates radioactive waste and spent fuel management. The Act was amended in 2003, 2004, 2011 and 2015. In spite of the amendments, the short name “the 2002 Act” remains unchanged, and applies to the latest version with the amendments included.

Since the last reporting period, the 2002 Act was amended in 2015 (published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 74/2015, and entered into force on 17 October 2015).

The relatively long process of amending the 2002 Act was concluded in September 2015. The process began in 2013, but was frozen in May 2014 due to the resignation of the Government. The amendment process resumed after the new Government took office that same year. At the beginning of November 2014, amendments to the Act were sent for inter-ministerial co-ordination to all Ministries, the Information Commissioner and the Government Office for Legislation. The Government adopted the amendments to the Act in May 2015 while the National Assembly enacted it in September 2015.

The 2015 amendments brought some minor changes also in the area of radioactive waste and spent fuel management. The 2002 Act now clearly defines the obligations of the Agency for Radioactive Waste Management related to the provisions governing the implementation of various public utility services (management of radioactive waste, radioactive waste disposal, long-term monitoring and maintenance of closed radioactive waste repositories or mining waste disposal and tailings), as well as its rights in proceedings in which it clearly has a legal interest (e.g. the closure of a repository where it will subsequently perform the public service of long-term monitoring and maintenance).
The 2015 amendments also simplify certain administrative procedures by:

• merging into a single administrative procedure the radiation protection assessment of exposed workers and the license to carry out a radiation practice,
• simplifying the licensing procedure for radioactive sources, and
• eliminating the need for a certificate of entry in the register of radiation sources as a special administrative decision; only registration under a simplified procedure was introduced instead.

Several amendments have been introduced as a consequence of the lessons learned following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident and the European Union stress tests:

• a new article on the design basis of nuclear facilities and another article on the extended design basis of nuclear facilities,
• new provisions on safety culture management systems, and
• new provisions to prevent the incorporation of non-conforming, counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items into nuclear and radiation facilities.

Other amendments include:

• a new provision related to the construction of new nuclear facilities allowing the investor to submit progressively and in parts the required documentation that accompanies an application for consent to the construction,
• provisions concerning the vetting of persons working in nuclear facilities, and
• a more detailed determination of different types of operational monitoring (pre-operational, operational and post-operational).

The 2015 amendments also include minor editorial corrections as well as the elimination of minor inconsistencies and deficiencies that were identified during the application of the 2002 Act. These amendments to the 2002 Act, together with amendments to several implementing governmental decrees and ministerial rules, transpose the updated 2014 Western European Nuclear Regulators Association reference levels as well as the majority of the provisions of the new nuclear safety directive1.

A new legislative process started just after the adoption of the 2015 amendments. The SNSA in cooperation with the SRPA prepared a new draft Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act, which will transpose the new European Union basic safety standards2 and some remaining provisions of the new nuclear safety directive. Due to the significant number of changes in the field of radiation protection and the importance of this chapter in the 2002 Act, the decision was made to draw up a new law instead of amending the existing one.

The draft of the Act was approved by the Government in July 2017. The draft of the Act is expected to be adopted by the National Assembly in the last quarter of 2017. The main changes introduced by the draft of the Act in relation to the existing 2002 Act, and which are based on the new basic safety standards, are:

• protection against radiation from natural radiation sources, including protection from radon in workplaces and living areas and measures to reduce exposure from building materials,
• supervision of consumer products,
• management of existing exposure situations,
• a clear distinction between existing and planned exposure and exposure during an emergency,
• cooperation and coordinated action by all EU Member States in the event of an emergency,
• equalising the values of the exemption and clearance levels,
• unification of the classification of radiation sources under the IAEA and the EU classifications, and
• the requirements for the justification of medical radiological procedures for the early detection of diseases.

The draft of the Act also contains some further simplifications of the licensing procedure for practices, as the new law for some radiation practices allows the possibility of just registration and not only of obtaining a license.

In the area of radioactive waste and spent fuel management, the draft of the Act defines the rules of the functioning of the Agency for Radioactive Waste Management as a state public utility service, as well as its organisation, funding, infrastructure and criteria for the determination of fees. The draft of the Act furthermore clearly defines the duties of the Agency for Radioactive Waste Management with regard to orphan sources management. The draft of the Act also contains some provisions on acquiring title to land or an easement for the infrastructure that is needed for radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

On 6 March 2006, the Minister of the Environment and Spatial Planning adopted the Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management. It is planned that after the adoption of the new Act, these Rules shall be replaced by the new ones.

On 22 April 2016 the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Resolution on the National Programme on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management for the period 2016–2025 (2016 Resolution). This resolution, which builds on and replaces the Resolution on the National Programme on Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management for the period 2006–2015, contains the radioactive waste and spent fuel management policy, as well as strategies (concrete measures) for achieving the policies/objectives.

The main objective of the 2016 Resolution is to ensure safe and efficient management of RW and SF in Slovenia in accordance with the principles of decision-making and actions based on the latest findings from domestic and foreign research, cutting-edge technologies and the best practices and operational experiences, and, consequently, to ensure the safety of people and the environment at all times and to simultaneously ensure long-term, technologically modern and rational infrastructure support to users of nuclear and radiation technologies, including the necessary scientific and research activities, funding and communication with the public. The programme includes the principle of seeking a joint solution with the Republic of Croatia to the disposal of radioactive waste from the Krško NPP.

The resolution is appropriately placed in the overall Slovenian legal framework in this field. Based on the provisions of the 2002 Act, it is in line with the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia on the co-ownership of the Krško NPP and its content fully complies with the requirements of the EU directive on the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste3.

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On 2 July 2013 the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia passed the Resolution on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in the Republic of Slovenia (for the period 2013–2023) as a concrete and immediate response to one of the recommendations of the 2011 Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Slovenia. The Resolution represents a high-level national policy paper. The SNSA has to report to the National Assembly on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution once a year; such a report is an integral part of the SNSA’s Annual Report on Radiation and Nuclear Safety, which is adopted by the Government and subsequently by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. In such a report, success in achieving the objectives of the Resolution has to be pointed out.

A comprehensive overview of the legislative and regulatory framework that governs nuclear and radiological safety is attached to this report (Section I, Annex (f)). The list consists of the national legal framework and the international instruments (multilateral and bilateral treaties, conventions, agreements and arrangements) to which the Republic of Slovenia is a party.

(2i) National Safety Requirements and Regulations for Radiation Safety

In addition to the main principles (inter alia, “justification”, “optimisation”, “ALARA”, “prime responsibility for safety”, and the “causer pays” principles), the 2002 Act also includes, with respect to radiation protection areas, provisions on:

- reporting an intention to carry out radiation practices or to use a radiation source,
- licensing of radiation practices or use of a radiation source,
- general principles on the protection of people against ionising radiation,
- the classification of facilities (nuclear, radiation and less important radiation facilities),
- licensing procedures with respect to siting, construction, trial operation, operation and decommissioning of nuclear, radiation and less important radiation facilities,
- radioactive contamination and intervention measures,
- radioactive waste and spent fuel management,
- the import, export and transit of nuclear and radioactive materials, radioactive waste and spent fuel,
- the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities,
- non-proliferation and safeguards,
Based on the 2002 Act, nine decrees have been adopted by the Government and 23 rules have been adopted by the competent ministers. A number of second level acts will be amended following the amendments to the 2002 Act. In the period since the fifth report under the Convention, the Decree on the Method, Subject of and Conditions for Performing a Compulsory Public Utility Service of Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance of the Landfill of Mining and Hydrometallurgical Tailings Resulting from the Extraction and Exploitation of Nuclear Mineral Raw Materials was adopted in 2015. The decree implemented the provisions of the 2015 amendments to the 2002 Act on the obligations of the ARAO related to the provisions governing the implementation of various public utility services, including the management of the long-term monitoring and maintenance of mining waste disposal site and mill tailings site. The decree lays down the scope of this public service, the conditions to be fulfilled, funding and costs, and the requirements as to regular and emergency reporting, restricted use of land and inspection.

In 2014 the latest (third) amendments to the Decree on Areas of Restricted Use of Land due to Nuclear Facilities and on the Conditions for Construction in these Areas were adopted in order to comply with the provisions of the Construction Act in so far as it relates to demolition, replacement works, and the removal of structures and to comply with the new requirements for classifying and sorting objects according to the complexity of the construction. The aim of these latest amendments remains the same, i.e. to ensure the implementation of radiation and nuclear safety measures which restrict the use of land in the vicinity of nuclear facilities, thereby reducing the possibility of industrial or other accidents outside the nuclear facility which could have an impact on nuclear safety, and at the same time to impose restrictions in relation to population density and the requirements relating to local infrastructure facilities in order to minimise the possibility of damage to human health and to the environment if a nuclear facility incident occurs. The amendments to the Decree entered into force on 20 December 2014.

At the same time, the Decree on the Criteria for Determining the Compensation Rate due to the Restricted Use of Land and Intervention Measures in Nuclear Facility Areas was prepared and adopted, replacing the previous decree in this area from 2003. This Decree lays down the criteria for determining the amount of compensation the nuclear operator has to pay to municipalities for restricted use of land due to the area of the nuclear facility ("compensation") and for the planning and implementation of intervention measures ("the charge"). The Decree was adopted as a corrective measure on the basis of the conclusions of the Court of Audit, which were set out in the audit report on the site selection of the repository for low and intermediate level radioactive waste. This Decree is now consistent with the Act on Protection Against Ionising Radiation and Nuclear Safety and with the latest amendments to the Decree on areas of restricted use of land due to nuclear facilities and on the conditions for construction in these areas in order to eliminate deviations in the current determination of compensation as identified in the report of the Court of Audit. This Decree entered into force on 1 January 2015 and was amended in the middle of the same year.

The Government of the Republic of Slovenia also adopted the Programme on Systematic Monitoring of the Working and Residential Environment and Raising Awareness about Measures to Reduce Public Exposure due to the Presence of Natural Radiation Sources. The Programme replaced the previous programme in this area from 2006, which was adopted for ten years only. The new Programme, which has no time limit of validation, entered into force on 12 March 2016.

In March 2017, the Decree on Activities Involving Radiation was adopted for the implementation of the 2015 amendments to the 2002 Act in the area of radiation practices.

A number of ministerial rules were also adopted, mainly following the 2015 amendments to the 2002 Act. Amendments to the Rules on the Transboundary Shipment of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances were adopted in 2014. The amendments were introduced to improve the content of the application for authorisation. The amendments to the Rules entered into force on the day following their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, i.e. on 5 July 2014.

In December 2016 two rules governing the nuclear and radiation safety of radiation or nuclear facilities were adopted on the basis of the 2015 amendments to the 2002 Act. The Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors and the Rules on the Operational Safety of Radiation or Nuclear Facilities replaced the previous ones in this area from 2009 and introduced the updated Western European Nuclear Regulators Association
reference levels from 2014 and some of the requirements of the new nuclear safety directive, changes in response to the accident in Fukushima, changes in the “Safety and Quality Management” chapter due to the changed standards of the IAEA in this area, and more detailed requirements regarding the reporting and analysis of operating experiences.

In the area of radiation protection, the following rules were adopted following the 2015 amendments to the 2002 Act:

- in October 2015: Rules amending the Rules on the Requirements for Using Ionising Radiation Sources in Healthcare;
- in December 2016: Rules on the Method of Keeping Records of Personal Doses due to Exposure to Ionising Radiation;

The Slovenian legislation is based on broadly accepted international standards. Furthermore, all the European Union directives from the field of radiation and nuclear safety have been completely transposed into Slovenian legislation. The transposition of the new nuclear safety directive and the new basic safety standards directive is in the legislative process. The Slovenian legislation complies with all the provisions of IAEA Safety Standards in respect of the obligations arising from the Joint Convention.

Within the legislative and regulatory framework covering spent fuel and radioactive waste management, the following decrees and acts should be mentioned:

- The Decree on the Establishment of a Public Agency for Radwaste Management,
- The Decree on the Method and Subject of and Conditions for Performing the Public Service of Radioactive Waste Management,
- The Act Governing the Fund for Financing the Decommissioning of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant and the Disposal of Radioactive Waste from the Krško NPP,
- Permanent Cessation of Exploitation of the Uranium Ore and Prevention of Consequences of the Mining in the Uranium Mine at Žirovski Vrh Act, and
- The Decree on the Method, Subject of and Conditions for Performing the Compulsory Public Utility Service of Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance of Landfills for Mining and Hydrometallurgical Tailings Resulting from the Extraction and Exploitation of Nuclear Mineral Raw Materials.

All these decrees (except the Permanent Cessation of Exploitation of the Uranium Ore and Prevention of Consequences of the Mining in the Uranium Mine at Žirovski Vrh Act) are in the process of being amended or shall be replaced with new ones following the adoption of the new Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act.

(2ii) Licensing System

A system for licensing spent fuel and radioactive waste management is provided in the 2002 Act, while the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors (JV5) lay down details on the documentation that must be submitted in a particular phase of licensing. The prescribed licensing process is of a general nature, so it is applicable to the whole spectra of nuclear and radiation facilities. The licensing process in the new act will not differ significantly from the one in the 2002 Act, as described in this sub-chapter.

The basic classification of facilities is provided by the 2002 Act itself, where in definition No. 22 of Article 3 it provides that a nuclear facility is “a facility for the processing or enrichment of nuclear materials or the production of nuclear fuels, a nuclear reactor in critical or sub-critical assembly, a research reactor, a nuclear power plant or heating plant, a facility for the storage, processing or disposal of nuclear fuel or high radioactive waste, or a facility for the storage, processing or disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste.” Therefore, the entire spectrum of licensing requirements (for siting, construction, trial operation, operation, decommissioning and/or closure of the repository) have to be complied with by the applicant (the investor or operator of the facility) in accordance with the provisions of the 2002 Act and of the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.
The licensing system for a nuclear facility can be divided into four steps after the preliminary condition (the planning of the location of the nuclear facility in the national site development plan) is fulfilled:

- the environmental protection application – the competent body is the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning – with preliminary approval of radiation and nuclear safety; the competent body is the SNSA,
- the application for a license to construct a facility – the competent body is the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, with approval from the SNSA,
- the application for a license for trial operation – the competent body is the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, with approval from the SNSA,
- the application for operation and decommissioning (or closure in the case of a repository for radioactive waste) – the competent body is the SNSA.

The general requirements for the design basis for a radioactive waste or spent fuel storage facility and for a radioactive waste repository are laid down in the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.

In the licensing processes, the investor/operator shall attach to the licence application, in addition to the design documentation, a safety analysis report, the opinion of an authorised radiation and nuclear safety expert (authorised by the SNSA), and other prescribed documentation as determined by the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.

In the subsequent licensing processes (for approval of the trial operation, operation, decommissioning or closure of the facility) the licensee has to submit the above-described application with an appropriately amended set of documents and opinions. The operating experience and feedback and any modifications to the facility have to be clearly documented and described.

The general provisions on and the responsibilities of holders of the radioactive waste and spent fuel (as well as of the State) are defined in Section 4.8., “Radioactive waste and spent fuel management” of the 2002 Act. The 2002 Act (Articles 93–99) contains provisions on the following:

- radioactive waste and spent fuel management;
- the national public service for various public utility services (management of radioactive waste, radioactive waste disposal, long-term monitoring and maintenance of closed radioactive waste repositories or mining waste disposal and tailings);
- the long-term monitoring and maintenance of closed radioactive waste repositories or repositories of mining and hydro-metallurgical tailings;
- the national programme for radioactive waste and spent fuel management; and
- national infrastructure facilities.

On the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, the Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management were adopted. The Rules contain, inter alia, provisions on the following:

- the classification of radioactive waste with regard to the aggregation state and level and type of radioactivity;
- the requirements for radioactive waste and spent fuel management (general requirements – radioactive waste or spent fuel management procedures, programmes and plans; special requirements – sorting, treatment and packing, labelling, keeping, storing, decay-keeping, handover and takeover, reshuffling, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste release, disposal, acceptance criteria for storage or disposal, waste from the exploitation and reprocessing of raw nuclear mineral material, and very-low-level radioactive waste management); and
- record keeping and reporting (the holder’s records, the central records, reporting, loss and findings).

The Decree on the Method and Subject of and Conditions for Performing the Public Service of Radioactive Waste Management contains, inter alia, provisions on the following:

- the scope and type of public service;
- the general requirements for performing the public service;
- the requirements that have to be fulfilled by the performer of the public service;
- the rights and duties of the use of the public service;
- financial sources and the method of establishing the price; and
- inspection.
The public service for radioactive waste management referred to in Article 97 of the 2002 Act was established in 1991 as the ARAO (Governmental Decree on the Establishment of a Public Agency for Radwaste Management).

(2iii) System of Prohibition of the Operation of a Spent Fuel or Radioactive Waste Management Facility without a Licence

Spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities are defined by the 2002 Act as nuclear facilities. Consequently, all relevant licences are needed, including an operating licence. The operation of such a facility without a licence is prohibited according to Article 57 of the Act.

In the penal provisions of the 2002 Act, it is foreseen that a financial penalty of between EUR 5,000 and 500,000 shall be imposed on a legal entity that violates the above prohibition; in addition, a financial penalty of between EUR 1,000 and 10,000 shall be imposed on the responsible person of a legal entity for the same violation. If the violation is committed by a sole trader, a financial penalty of between EUR 5,000 and 150,000 shall be imposed. If the nature of the offence is particularly serious (due to the amount of damage caused, the amount of illegally acquired pecuniary advantage or the perpetrator's intent) these penalties can be tripled.

(2iv) System of Appropriate Institutional Control, Regulatory Inspection, and Documentation and Reporting

Institutional control and regulatory inspection with respect to the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management rests with the SNSA. Within the scope of inspection, an inspector may:

• issue decisions and orders within the framework of administrative proceedings;
• order measures for radiation protection and measures for radiation and nuclear safety to ensure that the licensee fulfils all legal requirements regarding safety;
• order the termination of a radiation practice or use of a radiation source where the inspector finds that a proper licence has not been issued or if there is a failure in following the prescribed methods for handling the radiation source or radioactive waste; an appeal against such a decision of an inspector shall not hinder its execution; and
• seal any radiological device which does not meet the acceptance criteria for proper operation.

The 2002 Act has only one article on inspection, since the Inspection Act prescribes the general principles of inspection, its organisation and status, the rights and duties of inspectors, inspection measures and other issues relating to inspection, which are to be followed also by nuclear and radiation safety inspectors.

(2v) The Enforcement of Applicable Regulations and of the Terms of Licences

The enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences is ensured by the application of penal provisions, inspection, and provisions relating to the issuance, renewal, amendment, withdrawal and expiration of licences, as provided for in the 2002 Act.

Based on the Inspection Act as well as on the 2002 Act, a graded approach in enforcement policy is ensured. Inspectors may (if in their assessment such a measure is sufficient and appropriate) only warn the licensee of the irregularities and set a date by which the corrective measures must be carried out. The inspector may also (among other measures) perform all measures in line with the Minor Offences Act or report (in the case of a criminal offence) the licensee to the public prosecutor.

Inspectors may also terminate a radiation practice or the use of a radiation source if the operator is operating without a licence, but may not revoke or suspend a licence. This can be done only by the authority that issued the licence (in most cases, the SNSA), although the inspector may propose such a measure.

(2vi) Allocation of Responsibilities

As described above, the legislative framework (the 2002 Act, the Decree on the Method and Subject of and Conditions for Performing the Public Service of Radioactive Waste Management and the Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management) provides a clear allocation of the responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of regulating spent fuel and radioactive waste management (producer, holder, mandatory state-owned public services, regulatory body), and also defines the system of recording and reporting.
Article 20: Regulatory Body

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.

2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions from other functions where organisations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation.

1. Regulatory Body – the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA)

In our last (fifth) report it was highlighted that following the early elections of deputies to the National Assembly at the beginning of December 2011 the composition of the Slovenian Government changed and as a consequence the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) became an organisational unit within the newly established Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment (MAE).

Another early parliamentary election took place in 2014, which was, of course, again followed by the reorganisation of the state administration, and the SNSA again became part of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP).

It should be pointed out that the legal status of the SNSA remains unchanged and that the SNSA retains (under the MESP) the same level of independence and autonomy as before (when it was under the MAE).

The SNSA, as a regulatory body in the area of nuclear and radiation safety, is a functionally autonomous body within the MESP (hereinafter the Ministry). The SNSA’s responsibilities and competences are defined in the Governmental Decree on Administrative Authorities within Ministries.

The SNSA performs administrative and developmental tasks in the field of nuclear and radiation safety, radiation practices and the use of radiation sources (with the exception of medicine and veterinary medicine), environmental protection against ionising radiation, the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the non-proliferation and security of nuclear materials, radiation monitoring and liability for nuclear damage; it also carries out inspection duties in the above areas and cooperates in radiological or nuclear emergency events with the State Civil Protection Headquarters in the determination of protective measures for the population and in informing the public.

The legal basis for its administrative and professional tasks in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection and inspection are given by the 2002 Act and implementing decrees and rules adopted on the basis thereof and bylaws within the wider area of nuclear and radiation safety, as well as by ratified and published international treaties in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear and radiation safety. A detailed presentation of the legislation in force is available on the SNSA website.

The precise competences of the SNSA and other relevant administrative bodies which are entrusted with implementation of the legislative framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are prescribed in particular in the 2002 Act and other legislation listed in Section I, Annex (f) of this report.

The SNSA is generally organised into four divisions and two offices. These are:

- the Nuclear Safety Division,
- the Radiation Safety and Materials Division,
- the Emergency Preparedness Division,
- the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Inspection,
- the Office of International Co-operation, and
- the Office of General Affairs.

The SNSA’s internal organisational units are shown in Figure 4.
The staff of the SNSA is interdisciplinary, consisting of employees with a range of educational backgrounds: physicists, mechanical, electrical and chemical engineers, geotechnologists, architects, metallurgists, geologists, lawyers, linguists, and administrative workers.

At the end of 2016, the SNSA had 43 employees, of whom 9 held a doctorate and 12 a master's degree; 21 had completed higher or university education, and one had completed secondary school education.

Each position in the SNSA organisational chart has recognised necessary competences for the staff member occupying it. In this context, however, it has to be mentioned that after years of a very strict and restrictive governmental policy on employment in the last two years, the SNSA has employed few new staff members.

At the same time, individual programmes for acquiring necessary competences are in progress. The course on “Fundamentals of Nuclear Technology” was attended by five new staff members of the SNSA and other courses at the Nuclear Training Centre in Ljubljana are frequently included in such programmes, as are events (courses and workshops) organised by the IAEA. Also, many SNSA staff attended courses on Westinghouse technology organised in the US NRC Training Centre in Chattanooga.

Each year, the SNSA prepares a so-called Educational and Training Plan for its employees. There are also other tools used for the career development of the SNSA staff, such as yearly interviews and on-the-job training. Furthermore, a so-called “systematic approach to training” is applied for the SNSA staff.

Due to financial restrictions and Government policies that greatly limit budgetary resources, since 2013 the SNSA has not been able to extend the contract with the external auditor and therefore could not maintain the ISO 9001:2008 standard; however, in its business the SNSA still preserves all the elements necessary for the implementation of the management system in accordance with this standard.

The Director of the SNSA is the head of the regulatory authority and represents the SNSA. At the governmental and parliamentary level, the SNSA is represented by the Minister of the Environment and Spatial Planning. The Director is responsible to the Minister for his work and for the work carried out by
the SNSA. The organisation of the SNSA is prepared by the Director and approved by the Government on the motion of the Minister.

Regulatory matters relating to spent fuel and radioactive waste management are dealt with by the Radiation Safety and Materials Division.

The budget of the SNSA is determined on the basis of the activities carried out in the previous year, taking into account new needs, which have to be well justified. The budget is the only source of financing for the SNSA’s basic activities. The operators of nuclear or radiation installations and other licensees do not pay any licensing or inspection fees. The only fee which is applicable under the general Act on Administrative Fees is the so-called administrative tax for the licensing (administrative) procedure, which is of symbolic value. Such fees are paid into the state budget and not directly to the SNSA. Furthermore, if the SNSA determines that some expertise is needed within the licensing (administrative) procedure, the applicant bears the costs under the relevant provision of the Act on General Administrative Procedure.

Although the SNSA is part of the Ministry, it still has its own share of the Ministry’s budget and is independent in allocating the programmes, projects and other expenses from its budget. The state budget is prepared on the basis of a biannual cycle. The composition of the SNSA’s budget for 2014, 2015 and 2016 is shown in Table 2. This budget comprises all activities within the SNSA’s areas of competence.

Table 2: The SNSA budget for 2014, 2015 and 2016

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>1,381,010</td>
<td>1,378,652</td>
<td>1,360,516</td>
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<td>Material Expenses</td>
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<td>539,624</td>
<td>540,000</td>
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<td>Investments and maintenance costs</td>
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<td>20,090</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Membership fees (IAEA, OECD/NEA membership)</td>
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<td>150,000</td>
<td>290,827</td>
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<td>International projects</td>
<td>97,835</td>
<td>51,945</td>
<td>279,200</td>
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<td>Outsourcing</td>
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<td>Nuclear Safety</td>
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<td>69,991</td>
<td>58,800</td>
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<td>Radiation Safety</td>
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<td>100,965</td>
<td>101,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,506,608</td>
<td>2,311,267</td>
<td>2,650,343</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The figures for individual years are slightly different from those presented in previous reports because the SNSA budget for each year occasionally changes in line with adjustments to the state budget.

2. Other Regulatory Bodies

The 2002 Act assigns responsibility in the area of radiation practices and the use of radioactive sources in health and veterinary care to the Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration (SRPA) within the Ministry of Health. In general, the responsibilities are divided between the SNSA and the SRPA in the area of radiation protection, while the area of nuclear safety is the SNSA’s sole responsibility. The SNSA is responsible for monitoring emissions into the environment, while the SRPA is responsible for monitoring the exposure of the population. Based on the 2002 Act, the SNSA is competent for issuing consents for mining work, licensing operations, the completion of decommissioning and the closure of repositories, while the SRPA performs inspection tasks in the area of radiation protection (dose limits, protection of exposed workers, etc.).

The SRPA’s responsibilities and competences are (as for all other governmental bodies) also defined in the Decree on Administrative Authorities within Ministries: “The SRPA performs technical, administrative and developmental tasks in the area of radiation practices and the use of radiation sources in health and veterinary care; the health protection of people against the detrimental effects of ionising radiation; systematic inspection of work premises and living spaces due to the exposure of people to natural radiation sources; implementation of monitoring the radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and drinking water; assessment of compliance and the authorisation of radiation protection experts; inspection duties in the
above mentioned areas; and the reduction, restriction and prevention of the effects of non-ionising radiation detrimental to health.”

Besides the SNSA and the SRPA, some other administrative bodies, ministries and organisations are also entrusted with the implementation of the 2002 Act, in particular:

- The Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (within the Ministry of Defence), as the operator of the National Notification Centre, is responsible for notification procedures in the event of a radiological emergency;
- The Ministry of the Interior (following the above-mentioned reorganisation of the Government) has, *inter alia*, competences in the area of the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in general, while the SNSA approves the safety analysis report, to which the physical protection plan is attached as a separate and restricted document;
- The Environmental Agency within the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning;
- The Spatial Planning Directorate within the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning; and
- The Directorate for Energy (within the Ministry of Infrastructure).

Based on the 2002 Act, the Expert Council for Radiation and Nuclear Safety was appointed as an advisory body to the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning and the SNSA; at the same time, the Expert Council for the Protection of People against Ionising Radiation, with responsibility for radiological procedures and the use of radiological sources in health and veterinary care, was appointed as an advisory body to the Ministry of Health and the SRPA.

The position of the SNSA and the SRPA in the governmental structure is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The SNSA and the SRPA within the governmental structure

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3. Effective Independence

The effective independence of the regulatory body (the SNSA) is ensured by the overall effect of various provisions of different laws and by-laws that generally define, *inter alia*, the following: the position of administrative bodies such as the SNSA and the SRPA within the structure of the ministries; the structure of the state budget; the reporting scheme within the governmental framework; and the decision-making hierarchy in appeal processes within administrative procedures.

The SNSA is a part of the state administration. Based on the Public Administration Act, the SNSA, in terms of its administrative decisions, is an independent body within the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning. Administrative decisions mean all decisions taken by the SNSA within the licensing process and within inspection control. Decisions adopted by the SNSA within its scope of competence are taken solely
and exclusively by the SNSA and cannot be dictated or imposed on the SNSA by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, the Minister or any other body within the Ministry. In some cases, the 2002 Act provides that an appeal against an SNSA ruling is not possible. This does not mean, however, that the licensee has no judicial remedy available. The licensee may not file an appeal in an administrative procedure (where the decision would be taken by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning), but does have a constitutional right to submit its case to the court within a civil law procedure.

In accordance with the 2002 Act, besides licensing, also the inspection and enforcement of nuclear and radiation safety fall within the competence of the SNSA. The inspection powers include control over implementation of the provisions of the 2002 Act, regulations and decrees issued in accordance with the 2002 Act, and other terms of licences. Within the scope of inspection, an inspector may:

- issue decisions, conclusions and/or orders within the framework of administrative proceedings;
- order measures for radiation protection and measures for radiation and nuclear safety; and
- order the cessation of a radiation practice or use of a radiation source when it is established that the applicable licence has not been issued or if the prescribed methods of handling a radiation source or radioactive waste have not been followed.

An appeal against a decision of an inspector does not prevent its execution.

The enforcement of applicable regulations and the terms of licences is ensured by the application of penal provisions and inspection provisions, as well as by provisions related to suspending the operation of a nuclear facility, as provided by the 2002 Act.

The office of the Director of the SNSA is not a political position in the Slovene legal system (unlike the case of the office of a Minister or State Secretary), but rather it is the highest level in the structure of employees (i.e. civil servants) within the governmental administration. Open competition for the position of Director of the SNSA (or certain other positions in governmental bodies, for example managing directors, secretaries-general and the heads of bodies within ministries and of administrative units) is carried out through a special Competition Commission, which in each case shall be appointed by the governmental Council of Officials. The whole procedure is set out in the Civil Servants Act. Once appointed, the Director of the SNSA is directly subordinate to the Minister and reports to the Minister, but in administrative decisions he or she is independent of the Minister or any other body within the Ministry. The Public Administration Act and the 2002 Act ensure the de jure independence of the SNSA.
SECTION F: OTHER GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS

Article 21: Responsibility of the Licence Holder

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.

2. If there is no such license holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.

The provisions on the prime responsibility of the licence holder for the safety of nuclear and radiation facilities and also for the safety of spent fuel management or radioactive waste management is one of the main principles of the 2002 Act.

Article 57 of the 2002 Act provides the following specific requirement: “A nuclear facility, a radiation facility or a less important radiation facility may not be constructed, tested, operated or used in any other way, or permanently ceased to be used, without a prior approval or permit issued pursuant to this Act. The safety of a facility, including the safety of handling radioactive substances, radioactive waste or spent fuel which is found or produced in the facility, must be ensured by the operator.”

The system of licences is set up to ensure that facilities are designed, constructed, commissioned and prepared for operation in accordance with national and international codes, standards and experiences.

A clear requirement for the handling of radioactive waste and spent fuel is determined in Article 93 of the 2002 Act, which provides that a holder of radioactive waste and spent fuel shall ensure that the radioactive waste and spent fuel are handled in the manner prescribed and that the transfer of the burden of disposing of radioactive waste and spent fuel to future generations is avoided as far as is possible. The producers responsible for the occurrence of radioactive waste and spent fuel must ensure that the radioactive waste is produced in the smallest possible quantities.

The costs of radioactive waste and spent fuel management must be paid by the person responsible for its generation or by the holder of the waste if the ownership was transferred to him by the person responsible for its occurrence, or if he acquires it in any other way.

If the person responsible for the generation of radioactive waste or spent fuel is not known, the State must assume full responsibility for its management.

The holder of radioactive waste and spent fuel must forward the information on the generation thereof to the central registry of radioactive waste and spent fuel, which is maintained by the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration.
Article 22: Human and Financial Resources

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) qualified staff are available as needed for safety-related activities during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility,

(ii) adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning,

(iii) financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional controls and monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a disposal facility.

The licensee has the prime responsibility for the safety of its facilities. This responsibility includes the provision of adequate financial and human resources both to support the safety of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for their decommissioning.

Krško NPP

(i) Human Resources

The Krško NPP has overall responsibility for its design, engineering, construction, licence application, operation, fuel management, procurement and quality assurance procedures, as well as for radioactive waste management. The Krško NPP is organised in several divisions, including the Technical Division, which is responsible for operating, maintenance and technical services; the Engineering Division, responsible for design, engineering, configuration management, licensing, procurement engineering and the process information system; the Quality Systems Division, which encompasses the Nuclear Oversight Section, which is responsible for independent safety assessments; the Purchasing Division; the Administrative Division; and the Financial Division. In all positions, qualified personnel perform all the various activities needed for radioactive waste and spent fuel management. At the end of 2016, 617 people, both technical and non-technical staff, were employed at the Krško NPP.

The handling of radioactive waste is the responsibility of the Chemistry Department, which is a part of the Technical Division. The Chemistry Department is also responsible for decontamination activities.

The Nuclear Fuel Department, which is a part of the Engineering Division, is responsible for the accountability and control of special nuclear materials and for spent fuel management. The handling of processes themselves is carried out by the Nuclear Fuel Department and the Operations Department.

Radiological control is carried out by the Radiation Protection Department, which is also part of the Technical Division.

Personnel Qualifications and Experience

All technical posts at the Krško NPP are assessed. The minimum requirements in terms of educational qualifications, the number of years of experience in relevant positions and certified competence to undertake certain tasks are ensured by the Krško NPP.

The qualifications consist of the basic formal education and special knowledge. Special knowledge involves basic principles of the operation of nuclear power plants, radiological protection, industrial safety, safety culture, and other areas. The courses and training exercises are organised by the Training Department, which is also responsible for the record keeping of personnel qualifications.

The process of identifying potential candidates for leadership positions and for succession planning was implemented in accordance with best industry practices. Employee engagement and motivation are monitored on annual basis to support the expectations defined in the human resources policy.

Training

All personnel working at the plant receive basic introductory training. The training course is comprehensive, addressing, inter alia: organisational arrangements, area designations and arrangements for working in
radiologically controlled areas, plant layout and services, industrial safety, quality assurance, and emergency response.

Training in radiological protection is provided at different levels of complexity, depending on the level of responsibility of the employee. A basic training course is given to all personnel before they enter a radiologically controlled area, with the objective of ensuring that they have sufficient understanding of the principles of ionising radiation to enable them to work safely in the controlled area. A more advanced course is provided for the personnel permanently working in a controlled area or with systems that contain radioactive material. Personnel specialised in health physics attend the most advanced course.

Personnel dealing with radioactive waste and spent fuel are educated and trained to perform their duties. Special services in this area are also provided from abroad.

(ii) Financial Resources

The expenses for radioactive waste treatment, conditioning and storing, and for spent fuel storage are part of the production costs. The financial resources for these activities are ensured during the operational period of the Krško NPP.

According to the Agreement, the owners of the Krško NPP, GEN energija d.o.o. and Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d., are obliged to ensure the funds for the decommissioning and the final disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel.

The Slovenian share of funds for the decommissioning of the Krško NPP and for the post-operational radioactive waste and spent fuel management are ensured through the Act Governing the Fund for Financing the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP and the Disposal of Radioactive Waste from the Krško NPP. This Act was amended in 2003 in light of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Regulation of the Status and Other Legal Relations Regarding the Investment, Exploitation and Decommissioning of the Krško NPP. The Slovenian share of funds is collected through a levy for the kWh delivered to the Slovenian grid since 1996. Due to the revision of the Decommissioning Programme in 2004, in 2005 the levy was increased to 0.30 euro cents per kWh delivered to the Slovenian electrical power company GEN energija d.o.o.

The Croatian share of funds for the decommissioning of the Krško NPP and for post-operational radioactive waste and spent fuel management is ensured in accordance with the bilateral Agreement through an adequate Croatian Fund for Decommissioning and Spent Fuel Management. The Croatian Fund was established by the Act on Governing the Fund for Financing Decommissioning and Disposal of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel of the Krško NPP. This act was adopted by the Croatian legislature in October 2007.

Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre

(i) Human Resources

The TRIGA Mark II research reactor operation staff (the full-time staff consist of four reactor operators, four radiological protection technicians, the head of the radiological protection group and a secretary and the part-time staff consist of the head of reactor operation and the head of the reactor infrastructure centre) are responsible for spent fuel and radioactive waste handling and management. Staff are appropriately trained and equipped.

The Hot Cell Laboratory operates under the TRIGA Mark II research reactor operating licence. The staff consist of three part-time workers.

The TRIGA Mark II research reactor operation staff are responsible for and trained to perform specific tasks in spent fuel management and radioactive waste management. The specific knowledge, training, skills and certificates required for reactor operators to carry out these tasks are a radiological protection certificate, a crane operator certificate, a forklift driver certificate, a welder certificate and remote manipulation skills. The personnel must also have some practical experience with spent fuel shipment projects and the treatment of spent sealed sources for storage.
(ii) Financial Resources

The financial resources for maintaining the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste at the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre are provided from the budget for the operation of the reactor. Financial provisions for decommissioning are not provided. However, as the Republic of Slovenia is the owner of the facility, it will also have the responsibility to ensure financial resources for proper decommissioning and spent fuel management.

Agency for Radwaste Management

(i) Human Resources

The ARAO is a public utility service and the number of employees is defined by the Government. At present, there are four organisational units and several independent services, including the QA/QC Service and the Radiation Protection Service. The ARAO has a qualified staff of 20 persons who perform all phases of institutional radioactive waste management as a mandatory service of general economic interest and a staff competent to manage the licensing phase for the LILW repository, where subcontractors are also involved in performing specialised tasks. The ARAO established its own radiation protection service, which is responsible for periodic medical check-ups, dosimetry, and the use of appropriate personal protective equipment when working with sources of ionising radiation. Regular maintenance of personal protective equipment and measuring instruments is also provided. The Radiation Protection Service is also responsible for the monitoring of the environmental impacts of facilities for radioactive waste management (the Central Storage Facility, the Jazbec mine waste pile).

Due to the decision of the Slovenian Government to suspend recruitment in the public sector, the ARAO did not hire new employees despite some departures; the number of employees in the ARAO has fallen by almost 17% over the last five years. The consequences of the human resource deficit are already noticeable.

Consequently, the professional positions require a broad professional background and flexibility on the part of the staff, who have a diverse and adequate professional structure. The employees at the ARAO have at least the level of education required in the job classification, some even higher. Two thirds of the employees have a degree in science or technology. The ARAO has also taken on younger professionals who were involved in specialised professional training courses and other types of learning. In the last few years, special attention has been devoted to the professional development of the employee working in the field of radiation protection. The professional development of employees is an important part of ARAO policy. Participation in training courses, workshops, seminars and conferences is supported in order to maintain the high quality of the team and its outputs.

(ii) Financial Resources

The financing of the ARAO is based on the annual work plan and is subject to annual contracts between the ARAO and both the Government and the Fund for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP. Regular work has been considerably slowed due to delays in contracting with the Government and the Fund for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP.

Institutional radioactive waste management is financed from the national budget and from fees paid by waste producers when the liabilities for further waste management are transferred from them to the state. The fees are defined by the Government.

LILW repository licensing, construction and operation, and the disposal of half of the LILW from the Krško NPP are financed from the Fund for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP. This funding is also supervised by the Government. The money is collected through a levy on the kWhe delivered to the Slovenian grid and has not changed since 2005.

Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine

(i) Human Resources

At the beginning of 2002, the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine was transformed into the public company Žirovski Vrh Mine, d.o.o. At the same time, a new company organisation was also established.
Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. has an adequate and experienced staff of eight people (four permanent staff and four other staff), mostly monitoring staff. It is standard practice that additional expertise, the elaboration of projects and major remedial activities are contracted out on a commercial basis.

(ii) Financial Resources
The financial resources for the activities of the public company Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. are provided solely from the state budget.

Isotope Laboratory of the Institute of Oncology

(i) Human Resources
The staff working with radioisotopes at the Institute of Oncology have appropriate education and experience, as required by the national legislation.

Currently, the Isotope Laboratory staff are sufficient (4 medical doctors, 2 radiopharmacists, 9 radiological engineers, 1 maintenance worker and 3 nurses). The number of staff has been relatively constant during the last five years, although it may need to be increased if new nuclear medicine techniques are introduced.

(ii) Financial Resources
The Institute of Oncology is mainly financed by the Slovenian health insurance scheme and to a lesser extent from the budget of the Ministry of Health. The Department of Radiological Safety at the Institute of Oncology strives to ensure additional financial resources for its projects connected to radiological safety and the safe storage and disposal of radioactive waste.

Ljubljana University Medical Centre - Department of Nuclear Medicine

(i) Human Resources
The Department of Nuclear Medicine consists of three sections: the Section for Thyroid Diseases, the Section for Nuclear Medicine Diagnostics, and the Section for Radiopharmacy and Clinical Radiochemistry. At present, 81 persons are employed at the Department (16 medical doctors, 4 radiopharmacists, 3 biochemists, 1 biologist, 1 physicist, 2 electrical engineers, 12 radiological engineers and 13 senior hospital nurses, with the others being technicians and administration and maintenance personnel). The staff working with radioisotopes in this Department have appropriate education and experience, as required by the national legislation.

(ii) Financial Resources
The functioning of the University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine is ensured by the Health Insurance and the Ministry of Health.
Article 23: Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and implemented.

Article 63 of the 2002 Act and its amendments and the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 74/2016; hereinafter Rules JV5) explicitly require that safety and quality management measures be taken for all activities related to nuclear and radiation facilities, from the design stage, through operation, and to the decommissioning stage. An investor or an operator of a radiation or nuclear facility must ensure that the facility is managed safely and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The operator of the radiation or nuclear facility must develop, apply, evaluate and continually improve its management system and must describe the latter in documents according to the requirements determined by the minister competent for the environment.

Krško NPP

The company NEK d.o.o., as the licence holder, is responsible for the overall quality of the design, construction, operation, maintenance and modification of the plant. The quality assurance programme was already implemented in the design and construction of the plant and was in full compliance with the following: the United States Atomic Energy Commission Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 Quality Assurance Criteria for NPPs and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, the quality assurance (QA) guidance provided in the US Atomic Energy Commission WASH 12833 Guidance on QA Requirements During the Design and Procurement Phase of Nuclear Power Plants, and the WASH 1309 Guidance on QA Requirements During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.

Since the beginning of its operation, the overall Krško NPP Quality Assurance Programme and its applicable procedures were implemented to ensure that all planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all items or services will satisfy the given requirements as regards quality are in place. The overall requirements for quality, as one of the major objectives of Krško NPP operation, are set forth in the updated safety analysis report, which serves as a basis for the operating licence. The Krško NPP Quality Assurance Programme is implemented and maintained so as to comply with national legislation, best international practice and recognised industrial standards.

Krško NPP’s policy is to establish and implement an integrated management system bringing together in a coherent manner all the requirements for managing the organisation. The main aims of the system are to achieve and improve safety by planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied, and to ensure that health, environmental, security, quality and economic requirements are not considered separately from safety requirements. The policy is established by the Management Board’s Statement of Policy and Authority and implemented through the Quality Assurance Programme presented in the quality document QD-1 and applicable programmes and procedures. The QD-1 is developed and maintained by the Quality and Nuclear Oversight Division and approved by the Management Board.

The Krško NPP management system is a set of interrelated and interacting elements; it establishes policies and objectives and enables those objectives to be achieved in a safe, efficient and effective manner. Safety is the paramount element in the Krško NPP management system, overriding all other demands. Having an integrated management system in accordance with Slovenian regulatory requirements (Rules JV5) and IAEA Safety Standards requirements, it is essential for maintaining and continuously enhancing safety. An integrated management system provides a number of benefits together with enhanced safety and business performance. During the 30 years of the Krško NPP’s operation, the quality requirements and related documents have been revised and upgraded several times. The latest revision of the QD-1 Quality Assurance Plan was issued in 2016.

One of the most obvious changes of the QD-1 was to harmonise all elements with an integrated management system defined in Plant Management Programme MD-2: “Management System – Process Organisation”, bringing together in a coherent manner all the requirements for managing the organisation.
The Quality Assurance Programme applies to safety-related and seismically-designed structures, systems and components, including their foundations and supports, and non-safety related SSC (Augmented Quality), as identified on the Q-List in the Master Equipment Component Database. Activities affecting the quality of these structures, systems and components are controlled to an extent consistent with their importance to safety. The Quality Assurance Programme is implemented by all Krško NPP departments, while programme requirements are also extended to contractors and suppliers in line with the importance of their services and scope of supply for nuclear safety.

The internationally recognised standard for industrial safety, in addition to the ISO 14001:2004 standard implemented in 2008, i.e. BS OHSAS 18001:2007, was introduced into Krško NPP practices (in 2011). Internal audits within the Krško NPP are performed in annual and two-year intervals in accordance with the requirements. Internal audits cover functional and cross-functional areas in accordance with IAEA, ANSI, NRC, EPRI and WANO guidelines. Audit results are reported and documented through the company’s Corrective Action Programme, where audit findings are tracked until they are implemented.

Krško NPP suppliers are audited in three-year intervals, in accordance with requirements. For international suppliers, the Krško NPP takes part in NUPIC audits and surveys.

In line with its policy of monitoring and constantly upgrading nuclear safety and QA requirements, the Krško NPP has been following the efforts of the nuclear industry at large (the IAEA, WANO, INPO, EPRI, ASME and others) and enhancing its management system to improve safety and to excel in operation. The Krško NPP will continue to develop its internal management systems processes and requirements in the future. The most important objective of the entire organisation – to ensure safe and efficient power plant operation – will continue to be the most important goal of the Quality Assurance Programme.

**Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

QA at the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre is part of the Jožef Stefan Institute’s QA Programme. The Director of the IJS and the head of the reactor operation department are responsible for its implementation. Specific internal QA and quality control-related documentation is applied. QA activities connected with reactor operation are subject to both internal audits (Jožef Stefan Institute QA management and an audit team) and external inspections by the regulatory body. The QA Programme is subject to periodic reviews.

The IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre QA is implemented and maintained to a great extent in accordance with following standards:

- SIST EN ISO 9001:2008,
- IAEA GS-R-3,

and acceptance criteria defined in:

- the programme for the assessment of a request to perform work in the hot cell laboratories,
- the programme for performing work in the hot cell laboratories,
- the programme for informing the public of unusual events on the reactor site,
- the programme for the assessment of a request to perform work at the reactor,
- the programme for performing work at the reactor and the instructions for performing work in the hot cell laboratories,
- the programme for monitoring operating experience, and
- the programme for monitoring operating indicators.

**Agency for Radwaste Management**

Continuous improvement of the integrated management system based on IAEA GS-R-3 (GS-part 2), ISO 9001:2008 (9001:2015) and Rules JV5 gives the required priority to the safety of people and the environment. Yearly internal audits and management reviews are conducted to ensure the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the management system of the ARAO. External management system assessment and certification is conducted according to ISO 9001:2008 and ISO 14001:2008. A recertification audit according to ISO 9001:2008 was carried out in 2016.
Through a process approach, the ARAO continuously improves the effectiveness of its integrated management system to achieve company goals and to enhance nuclear safety. Based on the mission, vision and company policy, the main objectives are defined at http://www.arao.si/agencija-arao/strateski-cilji.

Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine

The basic objective of Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. is to ensure the permanent cessation of uranium ore exploitation and to mitigate the consequences of uranium production at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine. The system of quality control and quality assurance was formally introduced in Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. for the purpose of uranium mine remediation at the end of 2005 (Quality Assurance Manual – 1st edition, December 2005). The Manual was revised following personnel and organisational changes (Quality Assurance Manual – 3rd edition, June 2007).

The Quality Assurance Manual, together with the reference document, contains instructions and procedures with reference to quality control and defines efficient implementation of the responsibility for the operational quality of the company.

Internal audits of individual activities and procedures are carried out on the basis of the annual programme. On the basis of finding discrepancies, corrective measures have been introduced to ensure quality during the implementation of the permanent cessation of uranium ore exploitation and the prevention of the consequences of mining in the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine and the protection of the environment and people against the consequences of the mining operations.

Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration


In 2006, the SNSA upgraded the quality management system by introducing an integrated management system, supported by the requirements of the new IAEA safety standard GS-R-3 “Management System for Facilities and Activities” for 2006.

In December 2007, a certification audit took place and the SNSA successfully obtained the ISO 9001:2000 certificate for its management system. In December 2010, an external recertification audit was carried out in accordance with ISO 9001:2008. The external auditor concluded that the SNSA management system complied with this newer standard.

Due to the lack of financial resources, the SNSA decided not to pursue a second external recertification audit, which was foreseen for December 2013, and thus it lost the certificate for the management system’s compliance with ISO 9001:2008. However, even though the SNSA no longer has a formal certificate of its management system’s compliance with ISO 9001:2008, it continues to carry out all activities in accordance with the requirements of this standard and the IAEA standard GS-R-3 and ensures continuous improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations.

The SNSA intends to bring its management system in line with the additional requirements of the newly issued IAEA safety standard GSR Part 2 “Leadership and Management for Safety” by the end of 2017.

The aim of the SNSA management system is to ensure the implementation of the SNSA’s mission and achieve its vision while taking into consideration the SNSA’s values and optimally using the available resources. The SNSA’s management system covers all SNSA activities and is designed in such a manner that integrates all requirements relating to safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic elements, while safety is the overriding priority. The SNSA’s management has continuously ensured that SNSA employees are familiar with the management system and its vision, mission and values management policy. The SNSA’s management system is based on a process approach. The processes are divided into one management process, seven core processes and one supporting process (Figure 6).
The SNSA management system is documented at five levels of management system documentation (Figure 7):

- Level 0: The mission, vision, values and policy statement of the SNSA.
- Level 1: The management manual (Q), which defines the concept of the management system in the SNSA. This level also includes the SNSA’s strategic objectives and annual plan.
- Level 2: Organisational procedures (OP), where the management of processes is described.
- Level 3: Organisational instructions (ON), where the detailed performance of individual activities is defined.
- Level 4: Records resulting from the performance of SNSA activities.
During the period from March 2014 to March 2017, several internal audits of the SNSA’s management system were performed. At the beginning of each calendar year, management reviews of the SNSA’s management systems are carried out to ensure its continuing suitability, effectiveness and efficiency. Based on the findings, deficiencies have been remedied and several improvements to the management system have been introduced.

Regulatory requirements for the licensee’s management systems are defined in the Slovenian legislation, namely in the 2002 Act and subsidiary legislation.

The 2002 Act was amended in 2015. Amendments to the Act also define the new requirements relating to the management systems. Namely, Article 63, *inter alia*, additionally defines that as part of its management system the operator of a radiation or nuclear facility shall establish:

- Control over contractors and suppliers and ensure that work is carried out by companies that have an established quality management system and have skilled and experienced workers in the field of the expertise of commissioned work.
- Attitudes and behaviour amongst employees in the organisation that have resulted in a good safety culture. Through self-assessment and regular reviews of the management system, the operator must verify the adequacy and effectiveness of the culture of safety.

The most important regulation defining quality management systems is the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors (JV5). Chapter Five (Articles 52 to 74) of the above mentioned regulation, i.e. “Management System”, is dedicated to the requirements of a process-oriented integrated management system.
Article 24: Operational Radiation Protection

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:
   (i) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account;
   (ii) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and
   (iii) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials into the environment.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
   (i) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account; and
   (ii) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection.

3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.

Legislation, Regulations and Requirements

Radiation protection legislation as applied to nuclear and radiation facilities, including radioactive management, is regulated by the 2002 Act. The subsidiary regulations and decrees published more recently are mostly based on Council Directive 96/29/Euratom.

The new subsidiary regulations concerning the licencing and management of radiation and nuclear facilities, as well as their operational safety, are the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors and the Rules on the Operational Safety of Radiation and Nuclear Facilities. The control of radioactive discharges and the monitoring of environmental radioactivity are covered by the Rules on the Monitoring of Radioactivity.

The two competent authorities for radiation protection are the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning and the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning is responsible for licensing and inspections in industry (including nuclear facilities), research, education and administration, while the Ministry of Health has adequate competence for sources used in medicine and veterinary care.

According to the 2002 Act, the design, planning, subsequent use and operation of sources and their handling (including the handling of radioactive waste) shall be performed in such a manner so as to ensure that exposure is as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), taking into account economic and social factors. Radiation protection experts and technical support organisations are authorised to perform, inter alia, consultation, radiation safety assessments and dose calculations. Two such technical support organisations are authorised in Slovenia to perform specific tasks regarding the radiation protection of workers and the public, radiological surveillance, the monitoring of individuals, the monitoring of the radioactivity of the environment, interventions, etc. Five medical institutions are authorised to carry out health surveillance of workers in this field.

The prescribed annual limit of an effective dose for workers is 20 mSv and the annual equivalent dose limit for individual organs or tissue of workers is 500 mSv, except in the case of eye lenses, where the annual limit is 150 mSv. In general practice, it has been found in the last decade that exposure of 20 mSv per year was exceeded in only a few cases. Since 1999, the Republic of Slovenia has had a computerised registration system for the occupational radiation exposure of workers in the country, including external radiation workers. In total, approximately 15,300 workers (together with external radiation workers) have been registered, with an average of around 1,300 workers per year working in the nuclear fuel cycle.

The general limit for the annual effective dose of a member of the public is 1 mSv. The annual equivalent dose limit for individual organs and tissue of members of the public is 50 mSv. Dose constraints were used...
for specific cases (the nuclear power plant, the research reactor, the uranium mine and central storage facility).

1. Steps taken to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable

The radiation protection standards in radioactive waste management facilities and structures and spent fuel storages were already implemented during the licensing procedure. The Report on the Safety Assessment of Exposed Workers against Radiation must be submitted as part of the licensing documentation and the licensee must ensure comprehensive measures in order to protect workers and the public, as required by Article 23 (“Basis of radiation protection”) of the 2002 Act. In order to implement the ALARA principle, these measures devote special attention to the protection of pregnant women, breastfeeding women, students and workers employed by contractors, among others. The holder of a licence for the operation of a nuclear facility (including radioactive waste storage) shall ensure its own special organisational unit for radiation protection, which is to be responsible for planning and implementing measures for radiation protection. In all other cases, the person responsible for radiation protection may be contracted by the licensee. The individual dosimetry is based on thermo luminescent (TL) dosimetry or optically stimulated luminescent (OSL) and/or the monitoring of workplaces, as appropriate. Dosimetric services are authorised by the Ministry of Health.

According to Article 124 of the 2002 Act and the Rules on the Monitoring of Radioactivity, operational monitoring of radioactive activity shall be ensured by the radiation facility or nuclear installation in order to protect the public and the environment. Operational monitoring of radioactivity shall entail:

- the monitoring of radioactive discharges from a radiation facility or nuclear installation into the environment;
- the monitoring of environmental radioactivity (in the air, in surface and underground waters, and in the ground) and the monitoring of the radioactivity of drinking water, foodstuffs and animal feed as the result of radioactive discharges.

Radioactive discharges are monitored and reported at regular intervals (weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually), as prescribed in the licensing documents and in the Rules on the operational safety of radiation and nuclear facilities. Public exposure is estimated annually via all exposure pathways. The operator shall also carry out monitoring of the effects of remediation works in the event of an emergency.

2. Steps to ensure that discharges are limited to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual is exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation, with due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection


According to the 2002 Act, two levels of radiation monitoring ensure that no individual is exposed to radiation above the prescribed dose limits in normal situations.

(a) Monitoring of the discharges from radiation facilities and nuclear installations

The control of radioactive discharges into the environment from nuclear installations is carried out regularly by the operator. Independent measurements of discharges are also provided, although in a limited scope, by technical support organisations under the supervision of the SNSA as the regulatory authority. The discharge limits for nuclear installations were set by the SNSA in relation to the dose constraints. The monitoring of radioactive discharges from nuclear installations and radiation facilities in the Republic of Slovenia started in the early 1980s, with extensive programmes at the Kriško NPP (1981), the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine (1985), the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre (1986), and the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje (1986). Radioactive discharges from hospitals with nuclear medicine departments are monitored at times to verify if annual effective doses for reference individuals in the environment are below 10 µSv. Rough estimates of discharged activities for very short-lived isotopes are calculated every year, based on the purchased and applied activity of radioisotopes. The Institute of Oncology regularly orders measurements of radioactivity in its decay tanks by approved radiation protection
experts. When the specific activity decreases below authorised limits, the liquid waste is discharged into the municipal sewerage system. The Institute keeps all records and reports.

(b) Environmental monitoring of radioactivity

Monitoring of environmental radioactive contamination in the surroundings of nuclear facilities is performed exclusively by the authorised technical support organisations. The radiation exposures of representative members of the population are estimated based on measured data and modelling.

Monitoring of radioactivity in the environment is performed in accordance with the Rules on the Monitoring of Radioactivity. Samples are taken from the environment – air, water and soil, from underground and drinking water, and from foodstuffs and animal feed, and are then analysed. The exposure of the public as a result of environmental contamination due to the operation of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle is estimated and compared with the dose constraints and limits.

An automatic radiation monitoring system in the Republic of Slovenia was developed soon after the Chernobyl accident. Currently, the entire system comprises on-line data on dose-rate measurements (76 stations) and aerosol radioactivity measurements (3 stations).

During the operating lifetime of the nuclear facility, in the event of an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment, appropriate corrective measures are ensured to control the release and mitigate its effects. See also Article 25: Emergency Preparedness.

In the last few years, the SNSA has established a comprehensive database on past discharges and environmental radioactivity measurements. The database is updated on a yearly basis with data collected through various monitoring programmes. The objective of this computerised database is to analyse and visualise the statuses and trends of historical records. All these data could be used as the input data for modelling the radiation exposure of a representative person of a reference group(s).

Measures Taken by Licence Holders

Krško NPP

(a) Radiation Protection

In accordance with the 2002 Act, the Radiological Protection Unit at the Krško NPP is organised to implement radiation protection measures such as measurements, assessment and keeping records of received effective doses for all workers who have access to the controlled area, regardless of whether they are members of the NPP staff, contractors, inspectors or visitors. Radiation protection related to the management of radioactive waste at the plant site is one of the most important tasks of the Radiological Protection Unit. This task is in compliance with the general radiation protection measures established in the plant.

From the viewpoint of radiological protection, the power plant area comprises the controlled area and the supervised area. The controlled area (the area under constant radiological surveillance) includes the Reactor Building, the Fuel Handling Building, the Auxiliary Building, a part of the Intermediate Building, the primary laboratory, the hot machine workshops, the decontamination area, the Building for Decontamination, and the areas for the processing and storage of radioactive waste.

In the controlled area – where irradiation and contamination is highly probable – the Krško NPP staff and contractors must be equipped with regular protection equipment, electronic alarm dosimeters and optically stimulated luminescent personal dosimeters (OSLs). Internal contamination is measured using a whole-body counter for all workers working in the radiologically controlled areas where there is a risk of internal contamination (i.e. during annual outages or major maintenance works).

The ALARA committee is responsible for adopting and reviewing the ALARA programmes. During the ALARA planning procedure, radiological conditions are analysed, personal protection equipment defined and radiological control determined, so all key elements are taken into account.

The Monitoring Programme covers measurements of liquid and gaseous discharges, measurements of activity in plant systems, the inventory of the onsite radioactive waste storage facility, environmental
radioactivity and meteorological measurements, and preparedness for radiation measurements in cases of emergency. The operator is obliged to notify the SNSA in advance of all gaseous discharges into the atmosphere.

Organisational arrangements for controlling the production and release of radioactive discharges and waste are in place. The existing top-level plant policy and waste management programme keep the radiological impact from radioactive discharges and waste within the authorised limits and as low as reasonably achievable. Arrangements for the minimisation of radioactive waste generation are in place. All relevant elements regarding waste minimisation are taken into consideration (the fuel integrity programme, the reduction of leakages, the decontamination process, segregation practices, etc.).

The collective dose in 2014 was 0.11 mSv, in 2015 it was 0.79 mSv and in 2016 it was 0.52 mSv. The three-year average collective dose for the whole plant is shown in Figure 8. The decrease in last years is a result of previous dose reduction plan with several improvements accompanied by steam generator replacement, shielding improvements, reactor vessel head replacement, RTD by-pass removal, dose rate monitoring in the field, and organisation of ALARA planning.

Figure 8: Collective radiation exposure – 3-year rolling average at the Krško NPP in the period 2000–2016

Table 3 shows the dosimetry data for the last three years. The maximum individual dose of 7.72 mSv occurred in the year 2015. 2015 and 2016 were outage years, and the collective dose for 2014 was lower.

The collective dose of RW processing staff reached a maximum of 0,10612 mSv in 2014, and an individual dose of 3.89 mSv, due to housekeeping work before the start of the construction of the Waste Manipulation Building.

Table 3: Dosimetry data in the 2014–2016 period at the Krško NPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Collective dose (man mSv)</th>
<th>Maximum individual dose (mSv)</th>
<th>Average individual dose (mSv)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>106.12</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>790.19</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>517.80</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Liquid and Gaseous Discharges

In accordance with the licence for operating the Krško NPP, the total dose constraints for a member of the public are as follows:

- The effective dose constraint at a distance of 500 m from the reactor and beyond – for doses due to liquid and gaseous radioactivity releases during normal operation – is less than or equal to 50 μSv/year.
• The radiation dose constraint from the radioactive waste storage building and the reactor is less than or equal to 200 µSv/year at the site fence.

The limits of radioactive discharges into the environment were initially authorised in the operating licence of the Krško NPP, issued on 6 February 1984. In 2007 the operating limits were revised and slightly modified in order to ensure compliance with the Standard Radiological Effluent Controls for Pressurised Water Reactors. The modification was made in order to include the corresponding effective dose as an additional parameter for the control of plant operation performance. For the release of noble gases only, the annual limit of activity is replaced by a dose constraint. In addition, in order to ensure the operation of radioactive waste processing systems, a threshold of activity concentration for monthly projected liquid releases and a dose threshold for projected gaseous releases have been introduced.

The regular control of radioactive discharges was set out in the technical specifications for plant operation and comprises the measurement of the concentrations and flow rates of gaseous and liquid discharges at the source. In addition, the dose rates of external radiation and the radioactivity in the air are measured on-site. The competent authorities are regularly informed by the Krško NPP of discharges of radioactive materials into the environment on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly basis.

Liquid radioactive discharges (Figure 9) are released into the Sava River via the Essential Service Water System outlet upstream of the dam. The dominant radionuclides in the liquid discharges are $^3$H, $^{58}$Co, $^{60}$Co and some dissolved noble gases. The activities of $^{134}$Cs, $^{137}$Cs, $^{59}$Fe and $^{125}$Sb are up to two to three orders of magnitude lower. The main contribution to the dose originates from the radioisotopes of caesium and cobalt. The dose to the reference group due to liquid discharges is assessed as being below 0.1 µSv per year.

Figure 9: Radioactive liquid discharges from the Krško NPP, 1999-2016

Notes:
• the new limit for fission and activation products is 100 GBq (since 2007);
• the new limit for $^3$H is 45 TBq (since 2007).

Radioactive gases (Figure 10) from the Krško NPP are released into the atmosphere mainly from the reactor building and fuel handling building ventilation system via the common plant vent. The radiation monitoring system continuously measures and monitors the concentrations of individual radioactive elements at both discharge points. The maximum calculated dose using the Lagrangian model due to inhalation and external radiation caused by gaseous releases at a distance of 500 metres from the reactor was 0.62 µSv in 2014, 0.86 µSv in 2015 and 0.82 µSv in 2016.
Figure 10: Radioactive gaseous discharges from the Krško NPP, 1999–2016

Notes:
• $^{133}\text{Xe}$ equivalent was effective until 2006; since 2007 only total annual dose limit of 50 µSv has been introduced;
• the released activity of $^{131}\text{I}$ for 2011 was less than the limit of detection.

Conservatively estimated individual exposures for members of the public are based on directly measured discharge values and on model calculations. This amounts to a value of an effective dose usually around 0.1 µSv/year for an adult. The dose assessment showed that exposures to members of reference groups are well below the regulatory limit of 50 µSv/year and less than 0.1% of exposure due to natural radiation.

Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste in Brinje

(a) Radiation Protection

Radiation protection in the Central Storage Facility (CSF) for Radioactive Waste at Brinje includes occupational radiation protection (the protection of workers) and on-site and off-site monitoring of the storage facility (the protection of the public).

Radioactive waste management and other activities in the storage facility are performed according to defined procedures that also take into account radiation protection. A radiation protection worker is continuously present at all activities involving ionising radiation sources of higher activity or in non-routine activities. In the case of routine activities, the radiation protection worker checks the radiation conditions (dose rates, contamination) at the beginning and at the end of activity, at least. Personal dosimetry is provided for all radiation workers and annual doses are regularly reported to the competent regulatory body. The radiation exposure data for workers in the CSF due to radioactive waste management activities from 2005 to 2016 are given in Table 4. Increased exposure levels in 2015 are due to the replacement of wooden pallets to support the drums with radioactive waste with self-supporting metal pallets. During the action all drums were moved, checked and rearranged in the CSF.
Table 4: Radiation exposure of workers at the Central Storage Facility due to radioactive waste management, 2005–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of workers</th>
<th>Average [mSv]</th>
<th>Maximum individual dose [mSv]</th>
<th>Collective dose [man mSv]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>1.420</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>1.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * staff of the ARAO and sub-contracting workers

Workplace monitoring is performed regularly. The measurements include: the measurement of the gamma and neutron dose rate within the CSF and the determination of the gamma and neutron radiation field in the CSF, the contamination of surface and air with radionuclides, the measurement of radon and radon equilibrium equivalent concentrations, and the measurement of gamma emitters in the wastewater coming from the CSF.

A characterisation of the historical radioactive waste in the CSF was carried out in 2005 and 2008. During the detailed characterisation process, all institutional LILW that was stored at the storage facility was characterised, sorted, dismantled and re-packed according to the valid waste acceptance criteria for the facility. Material with radioactivity below the clearance level was discarded from the facility and the radioactive waste inventory database was updated. Based on the results of the characterisation, a rearrangement of packages was carried out inside the facility. These waste management measures substantially decreased the level of dose rates in the CSF and the emissions of radon from the CSF.

(b) Liquid and Gaseous Discharges

The scope of monitoring includes emissions (measurements of gaseous and liquid discharges) and environmental concentrations of radioactivity. The average emission rate of radon into the environment was 7 Bq/s in 2016. This amounts to a yearly release of 0.2 GBq. There were no liquid discharges from the storage facility according to measurement data and modelling. After treatment and conditioning of historical waste in 2005 and 2008, the emission rate of radon from the CSF has decreased (Figure 11) and was maintained at around 6 Bq/s in the following years.

The assessment of the public dose considered two pathways of dose exposure: radon progeny inhalation and external exposure. The annual effective dose for the most exposed representative of the reference group staying in the vicinity of the CSF site for a part of his or her routine work does not exceed 10 μSv/year. The employees working in the nearby research institute facilities receive about 0.9 μSv/year. The annual effective dose received by a farmer who occasionally works in a field near the site is estimated to be around 0.02 μSv.

The conservatively estimated public exposure due to the operation of the CSF is far below the dose constraint of 0.1 mSv/year set in the operational licence for the CSF that was issued by the SNSA in April 2008.
**Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

(a) Radiation Protection

Radiation protection at the Jožef Stefan Institute Research Reactor Infrastructure Centre is implemented and performed by the Radiation Protection Service of the Institute. In total, 34 persons from the Reactor Department, from the service and from the Radiochemical Laboratory were exposed to ionising radiation, with an average annual dose of 0.051 mSv in 2016 (not taking into account the neutron dose). The collective annual dose in 2016 was 1.053 man mSv.

Table 5: Radiation exposure of workers at the Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre due to radiation practices and radioactive waste management, 2004–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of workers</th>
<th>Average [mSv]</th>
<th>Maximum individual dose [mSv]</th>
<th>Collective dose [man mSv]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>1.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>3.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.0567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.0242</td>
<td>0.0876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.0208</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Liquid and Gaseous Discharges

The liquid discharges originated mostly from the radiochemical laboratory using reactor activation products. The annual reactor discharge of $^{41}$Ar is proportional to the time of reactor operation and is estimated to be typically about 1 TBq (1.0 TBq in 2016).
For the exposure of the public only two exposure pathways were considered: external exposure due to $^{41}$Ar immersion and ingestion of contaminated released water. In 2016 the total dose received by a representative person of the reference group was estimated to be on the order of 1 μSv/year (0.02 μSv/year for a farmer at a distance of 100 m and 0.52 μSv/year for a permanent resident living in a village at a distance of 0.5 km). The authorised dose limit for the operation of the research reactor is 50 μSv/year.

**Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine**

(a) Radiation Protection

Within the scope of decommissioning, the Radiological Protection Unit of Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. is responsible for tasks related to the radiation protection of workers and the general population.

Measuring occupational exposure to ionising radiation is based on the time records of the individual worker relating to his or her work at different workplaces and on the following workplace measurements:

- measurements of radon and the potential alpha energy of radon progeny in the air;
- measurements of long-lived alpha activity in the air (caused by remediation works at the mine waste piles) until the conclusion of the final arrangements of the Boršt mill tailings site in 2010; and
- measurements of external radiation (measured with TLDs on a quarterly basis).

The main contribution to occupational exposure comes from radon and radon progeny.

**Table 6: Radiation exposure of workers at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine due to radioactive waste management, 1996–2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of workers**</th>
<th>Average [mSv]</th>
<th>Maximum individual dose [mSv]</th>
<th>Collective dose [man Sv]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989*</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>&lt; 1.0</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>&lt; 1.3</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number of workers**</td>
<td>Average [mSv]</td>
<td>Maximum individual dose [mSv]</td>
<td>Collective dose [man Sv]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* in the period of regular operation; 1989–2001 effective equivalent dose; 2002–2007 effective dose
** staff and contractors (outside workers)

(b) Liquid and Gaseous Discharges

Monitoring of radioactive discharges into the environment was regularly performed during all operational phases (1985–1990) and in the post-operational phase (from 1991 onwards).

The permanent discharges of dissolved long-lived radionuclides in percolating and run-off water from disposal sites and in mine water have been slowing down due to progressive remediation. It is expected that future fluctuations will depend mainly on weather conditions in individual years. Radon release estimation is based on field measurements of the radon exhalation rate (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Radioactive discharges at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine in the period 1999–2016

Note: For the year 2016, radon discharges were estimated based on partial measurements, past experience and extrapolation.

The impact of the mine discharges extends over an area inhabited by about 330 people. The dose assessment was made for a representative of each reference population group: a 1-year-old child, a 10-year-old child and an adult resident older than 18 years. Inhalation of radon and its progeny is the main factor contributing...
to the public exposure caused by mining activities. In 2016, the exposure of an adult member of the public was estimated to be 0.059 mSv/year, of which radon and its short-lived products contributed 0.057 mSv/year. The authorised limit for an adult of the population’s reference group due to radiation exposure from the former uranium mine is 0.3 mSv/year.

**Nuclear Medicine Departments**

(a) **Radiation Protection**

Occupational exposure at the Institute of Oncology is monitored through regular individual monitoring of external exposure and workplace monitoring. The annual dose of the majority of workers at the Institute of Oncology did not exceed the value of 1 mSv in the period 2001–2016. Individual radiological engineers and radiopharmacists, mainly those handling the $^{18}$F isotope, receive a higher dose, but still below 5 mSv. The maximum annual dose in 2016 was 3.1 mSv. No worker has exceeded the annual limit of 20 mSv during the past 17 years. All of the above-mentioned values reflect the total exposures and include exposure during the handling of radioactive waste and its storage. No special tasks regarding radioactive waste are performed and no separate doses related to radioactive waste management are recorded. This is due to the fact that the collective dose is less than 1 man mSv per year, which is only a few percent of the total annual collective dose of around 20 man mSv.

Occupational exposure at the University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine is monitored through regular individual monitoring and workplace monitoring. All staff are under dosimetric control. In 2016, the effective dose of 85% of workers did not exceed 1 mSv and exposures between 1 and 2 mSv were measured for 15% of workers. The maximum annual dose, 1.6 mSv, was recorded for a radiological engineer from the Section for Nuclear Medicine Diagnostics. The quoted values are the result of overall individual exposures, i.e. they are not related only to waste management. The total annual collective dose is around 40 man mSv.

Management of radioactive waste at nuclear medicine departments is performed according to set procedures. Personal protection equipment is used where appropriate. Intermediate local storages for waste materials with short-lived contamination are in place elsewhere.

(b) **Liquid and Gaseous Discharges**

The Institute of Oncology has a system of decay storage tanks in order to control the radioactivity released. Faecal sludge is released into the hospital sewerage system only after the defined period (about four months) required for the activity of the radionuclides to decrease below the prescribed limit.

Liquid discharges from the University Medical Centre’s Department of Nuclear Medicine are monitored from time to time (on average every 5–10 years) and are estimated from the administered activities.

Five other small departments of nuclear medicine in the country deal with radiopharmaceuticals with essentially lower activities. Patients are dismissed from hospitals after iodine $^{131}$I therapy and no special decay tanks for radioactive discharges are in place, so such discharges are estimated in the same way as above.

In total, less than 0.3 TBq of $^{131}$I is released into the environment annually.
Article 25: Emergency Preparedness

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.

Regulatory Requirements

The nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Slovenia is regulated in the latest consolidated version of the Protection against Natural and Other Disasters Act and the 2002 Act. There are two authorities with responsibilities and competences to regulate and supervise emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities. The Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief is responsible for protecting the population during a nuclear accident and for the organisation of civil protection units at nuclear installations. The SNSA is responsible for regulatory control over on-site procedures and measures related to the on-site emergency plan. Their roles were described in more detail in the First National Report.

Concerning safety, the 2002 Act stipulates that every applicant shall submit, together with the application for a construction permit for a nuclear facility, an operator's emergency plan in the event of a nuclear accident. During trial operation and operation of the nuclear facility, the radiological emergency plan shall be updated, including all changes made during the construction and testing period. The on-site radiological emergency response plan is a constituent element of the safety analysis report.

The provisions of the 2002 Act mostly focus on intervention measures in the event of an emergency. According to these provisions, the operator needs to be capable of classifying accidents, assessing the consequences of such events and proposing remedial measures. In the operator's emergency plan, intervention measures should be planned in accordance with the emergency class declared. The operator shall provide to emergency planners all the requested data it has available. The operator shall maintain emergency preparedness and provide responses as stipulated in the emergency plan. The prompt notification, without undue delay, of any such event is required, and the public needs to be informed of important facts in the emergency plans.

The Regulation on the Elaboration of Emergency Plans stipulates that the on-site nuclear emergency plan should be coordinated at the national and local levels and the nuclear emergency plans should be revised at least every five years. Emergency plans are public documents and should be presented to the public within 90 days of their adoption. The regulation also specifies the set of data relevant for the emergency that is to be supplied to the authorities by companies obliged to have an on-site emergency plan.

Overall National Emergency Preparedness Scheme and Off-Site Emergency Plans

The responsibilities and competences for emergency planning and maintaining emergency preparedness for an accident at a nuclear facility are specified at four levels: operator, local, regional and national. The State is responsible for the local and national radiological emergency response planning and maintenance of the radiological response plans.

The last update of National Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear and Radiological Accidents (hereinafter: the National Plan) was in 2010. Besides a possible accident at the Krško NPP, the plan also covers accidents at other nuclear and radiation facilities in the Republic of Slovenia, nuclear or radiological accidents abroad with a potential impact on Slovenia, and other radiological accidents involving sources of ionising radiation.

At the end of 2013, an Inter-Ministerial Committee for emergency planning met in relation to the establishment of two working groups for the revision of the National Plan and for solving emergency monitoring issues. The working group for revision of the National Plan has drafted revision 4.0, which as
of mid 2017 was still in the process of reconciliation. Most revisions in the National Plan refer to the new IAEA standard GSR Part 7 (General Safety Requirements - GSR) and include the post-Fukushima improvements and some of the requirements of the new EU BSS directive\(^4\).

The IJS has a standby Ecological Laboratory with a Mobile Unit (ELME), which is a special unit for radiological and emergency response at the national level. It is intended to assist in any radiological emergency. It also performs radiation measurements and interventions in the event of lost or dispersed radioactive materials. Since 2007, the mobile unit of the Institute of Occupational Health has also been actively participating in emergency drills in field measurements and the testing of radiation monitoring preparedness in the vicinity of the Krško NPP.

**On-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan**

**Krško NPP**

The Krško NPP has competence and sole responsibility for on-site emergency preparedness and response and maintains its on-site radiological emergency response plan (RERP). The on-site RERP is harmonised with the National Plan and was upgraded in 2010 and last updated in December 2016 (rev. 33).

The Krško NPP's RERP takes into consideration the IAEA’s recommendations, the US 10 CFR 47 NUREG-0654 requirements and the post-Fukushima lessons learned. It also covers the spent fuel pool and on-site radwaste facilities.

The objectives of the Krško NPP's RERP are:

- to identify and evaluate the type and classification of an emergency, including beyond design-basis accidents;
- to take on-site emergency measures and procedures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of plant personnel and members of the public in the surrounding area;
- to identify the on-site emergency response organisation and responsibilities for the overall command and co-ordination between the particular on-site and off-site emergency measures;
- to identify additional plant support required in the event of an emergency from the off-site support organisation, the Civil Protection Headquarters of Slovenia and other competent authorities;
- to identify emergency response facilities, equipment, communications, protective and other means of managing emergencies;
- to take on-site recovery measures to manage or mitigate the consequences of an emergency and to ensure conditions for recovery;
- to provide a basis for maintaining on-site emergency preparedness; and
- to provide co-ordination between the Krško NPP and off-site local, regional and state authorities to ensure effective emergency planning and preparedness, including public information about protective measures.

**Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

The TRIGA Mark II research reactor has an on-site radiological emergency response plan, which was updated in February 2017. Off-site radiological emergencies are covered in the National Plan. Urgent protective actions for the off-site population are not expected. According to the safety analysis report, the most severe possible accident (total loss of all reactor coolant) would not cause a core meltdown, so no significant radioactive release into the environment is expected even in the worst-case scenario.

The emergency procedures are subject to internal and external verification and approval. The emergency procedures include reactor status data, the identification of an emergency situation, a description of

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appropriate actions, raising the alarm, reporting, informing, and responsibilities for the following internal and external emergency events:

- radiological reactor accidents (loss of reactor shielding – primary water, release of radioactivity in the controlled area, release of radioactivity outside the controlled area);
- non-radiological accidents or events (fire in the reactor building, earthquake, sabotage and unauthorised access, riots and demonstrations, an off-site chemical emergency due to an accident in the chemical plant in the vicinity of the Reactor Infrastructure Centre).

The most severe operational accident (loss of coolant in the pool) would not significantly affect the spent fuel if it was stored in the reactor pool (since 1999 there has been no spent fuel). The off-site consequences of a gap release from damaged spent fuel elements are negligible.

**Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje**

The ARAO has responsibility for on-site emergency preparedness and response and maintains an on-site radiological emergency response plan. The emergency response plan for the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje is designed for events identified in the safety assessment as relevant emergency events related to the operation of the facility and the handling of radioactive waste. The plan defines the competences and responsibilities of the personnel responsible for emergency preparedness and the response to an emergency situation. The emergency response plan was updated and upgraded in 2015. In October 2016, the ARAO made the decision to update the emergency response plan for the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste in accordance with the results of practical exercises and with the aim of improving the plan. It is foreseen that the plan will be updated in mid 2017.

**Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine**

Radiological emergency situations are not expected at either the Jazbec or Boršt disposal sites. The Jazbec disposal site was closed in 2015, therefore the area has become an object of the national infrastructure, and has been managed by the ARAO since the end of 2015. In 2016 additional rehabilitation work was started at the Boršt disposal site, which is expected to slow down the sliding of the base. Work is continuing in 2017. As part of the monitoring programme, the surfaces of the Jazbec mine waste pile and the Boršt mill tailings site are inspected regularly, and after heavy rain and earthquakes additional inspections are conducted. The rate of sliding of the base of the Boršt mill tailings site is measured in real time, using a GPS system, at control points on the mill tailings.

**Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration**

The SNSA emergency plan is harmonised with the National Plan. It consists of procedures for the SNSA emergency team.

The SNSA emergency team has two expert subgroups in addition to communicators and other supporting positions – one for analysing any nuclear accident, and another for dose assessment. The full composition of the team comprises 19 members working in 12-hour shifts.

The SNSA’s main role during a nuclear or radiation emergency is to recommend protective measures for the population to the Slovenian civil protection commander. In addition, the SNSA issues press releases to the public and responds to the media and public inquiries.

For primary communication between all organisations involved in the response to a radiation emergency in Slovenia, and also the Croatian State Office for Radiological and Nuclear Safety, a special on-line communication system provided by the SNSA, i.e. the MKSID, is used.

**Exercises**

In accordance with the rolling programme of the national commission, one national exercise must be organised every three years.
The SNSA emergency response is ensured by regular training of the members of emergency expert groups and verification response teams and through exercises, regular testing of equipment and participation in international activities. Each year, the SNSA also actively participates in annual Krško NPP exercises and conducts several internal exercises.

The emergency response training, drills and exercises are an integral part of the Krško NPP radiological emergency preparedness programme. It incorporates the human element with emergency response facilities, emergency equipment and emergency procedures to develop and maintain key emergency response skills and ensure the readiness and efficiency of its emergency preparedness and response team.

The programme is based on a routine annual schedule of the activities and includes the plant personnel, plant contractors and off-site support organisations.

Emergency response training consists of initial, continuing (requalification) and specialised (proficiency) emergency response training.

The Krško NPP carries out the following emergency response drills:

- facilities and on-site emergency response organisation activation;
- implementation of severe accident strategies with mobile equipment;
- placing flood protection equipment;
- evacuation and accountability;
- post-accident sampling;
- off-site field monitoring, dose assessment and off-site protective measures recommendations;
- on-site radiation protection and radiological control;
- fire-fighting;
- first aid and medical response; and
- emergency notifications.

The objectives of the drills are verified in on-site integrated exercises, carried out twice a year. The exercises are prepared by the Exercise Organisation Group, which is also in charge of preparation of the formal scenarios. Within a five-year period, all emergency response segments are tested. The exercises are prepared and conducted regularly using the plant’s full-scope simulator, which is also used for the Main Control Room (MCR) simulation. The Krško NPP emergency support organisations and local and governmental agencies also participate in the integrated exercises. The last on-site integrated exercise was conducted in March 2017. A large, two-day national integrated exercise was carried out in November 2014 and the last national one-day exercise was conducted in March 2016. In 2016, a regional integrated exercise was conducted (INEX 5), in which, in addition to the IAEA, all neighbouring countries participated (Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia). The exercise was as usual organised by the OECD (NEA), but this time prepared by the SNSA.

In the Training Centre for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, every year between 250 and 300 fire fighters and other first responders, who may also participate in nuclear and/or radiological emergencies, are trained.

The ARAO regularly organises dedicated training programmes and practical exercises for the employees at the Central Storage Facility site. The ARAO maintains regular contacts with the Professional Fire Brigade of Ljubljana, the responsible police station and the contractor responsible for physical protection services. The upgrading of theoretical training and information exchange is organised regularly. The ARAO also maintains the required equipment and is responsible for professional dosimetry.

**International Agreements and International Projects**

Slovenia is a party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and to the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Slovenia has also signed bilateral agreements with Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Italy on the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency.
In 2015, Slovenia invited an Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission to Slovenia. This is a review mission in the field of preparedness for nuclear and radiological accidents conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The mission, which will take place in Slovenia from 5 to 16 November 2017, is organised in Slovenia by the SNSA and the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (ACPDR).

In preparation for the EPREV mission to Slovenia, the SNSA and the ACPDR conducted a simulated mission in May 2016, in which all organisations in Slovenia involved in preparedness for and response to nuclear and radiological accidents participated. The findings of the simulated mission, represented in a final report of the simulated mission – EPREV, were the foundations for an action plan for improving emergency preparedness and response in Slovenia, issued by the Inter-Ministerial Commission and approved by the Government.

Slovenia is also very active in the HERCA working group. The SNSA is the editor of “Country Fact Sheets”, factsheets established in 2015 that include information on national emergency response arrangements, with the aim of enhancing knowledge and facilitating communication during a nuclear or radiological emergency.

In 2016, Slovenia continued its positive international cooperation with its neighbouring country Croatia in harmonising protective measures taken by each state during a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. One of the emergency planning zones (the extended emergency planning zone – 20 km from the NPP) also partially covers territory in Croatia, so the harmonisation of protective actions in the event of an off-site emergency is crucial. As a result of this cooperation, in 2016 the Croatian authority competent for nuclear and radiation safety became a full user of the Slovenian on-line communication system in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency (MKSID), in order to facilitate the HERCA-WENRA approach in harmonising protective actions in the event of an off-site emergency. Furthermore, a draft of bilateral arrangements for nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response, based on the HERCA-WENRA approach, is in preparation, and constructive dialogue on this topic between the two countries has been established.
Article 26: Decommissioning

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:

(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available,
(ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection, discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied,
(iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied,
(iv) records of information important to decommissioning are kept.

In the Republic of Slovenia there is no nuclear facility in the process of being decommissioned (there is ongoing remediation of the two waste disposal sites at the former uranium mine at Žirovski Vrh, but these are radiation facilities). In order to assess the financial contribution to the decommissioning fund, the Decommissioning Plan for the Krško NPP is being revised.

Krško NPP

The Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia on the Krško NPP of 2003 required the preparation of a Decommissioning Plan for the Krško NPP by the Slovenian and Croatian authorities for the management of radioactive waste. In accordance with the Agreement, a review of the Programme for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP and Disposal of Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste and Spent Fuel was prepared in April 2004. The Decommissioning Programme must be updated at least every five years.

A revision of the Decommissioning Programme was started in September 2008 with the aim of incorporating relevant developments since the first revision, improving the level of detail and the reliability of the decommissioning plan, and proposing updated and more accurate cost estimates and appropriate financing models. The first version of the document was drawn up by June 2010 and the second version by February 2011. These two versions have been neither discussed nor approved by the Intergovernmental Commission for monitoring the implementation of the Bilateral Slovenian-Croatian Agreement on the Krško NPP. In July 2015, the Intergovernmental Commission held a session where it was briefed on progress concerning the revised Decommissioning Programme. The Commission decided to suspend all the activities in connection with the drawing up of this programme. The July session in 2015 also identified the need to draft a new revision of the Krško NPP Decommissioning Programme and the Programme for the Disposal of the RW and SF from the Krško NPP. The new revision started with the preparation of the terms of reference documentation in autumn 2015, which had not finished by the end of 2016.

A few meetings were conducted in 2015, but in 2016 and 2017 there were no results or initiatives from the Intergovernmental Commission, and thus no clear actions or results that would further the revision of the Decommissioning Programme.

(i) Staff and Financial Resources

The Slovenian share of funds for the decommissioning of the Krško NPP is collected and managed by the Fund for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP. Following the first revision of the Decommissioning Programme in 2004, the levy per kWh was increased from approximately 0.2 to 0.3 euro cents. In 2012, the SNSA approved the Ageing Management Programme, which enables the operation of the Krško NPP beyond 2023. The operation of the Krško NPP could be extended from 2023 to 2043 (assuming the successful conclusion of periodic safety reviews in 2023 and 2033). Such a decision would have a significant impact on the Decommissioning Programme, the Decommissioning Fund and the National Programme for the Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel. The decommissioning of the Krško NPP could occur after 2043 and it is assumed that the Krško NPP staff will perform decommissioning together with external contractors.
(ii) Operational Radiation Protection, Discharges and Unplanned and Uncontrolled Releases

There are no specific regulations on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. All legal requirements and limitations that are applicable to all operating facilities are also applicable to nuclear facilities in the decommissioning process.

(iii) Emergency Preparedness

As no decommissioning is being performed at the moment, there is no need for an emergency preparedness plan. However, one is required and shall be prepared as part of the application for the licence for decommissioning.

(iv) Records of Information

The Engineering Support Department at the Krško NPP is in charge of record keeping and of maintaining the database required by regulations, including regarding decommissioning.

Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre

A research project estimating the quantity and composition of LILW resulting from dismantling was carried out. A Decommissioning Plan for the reactor was prepared in 2007 and revised in 2016. At present, there are no plans to shut down this reactor in the near future. It has been estimated that not more than 50 tons of LILW would be produced in decommissioning.

Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine

Properly qualified staff are available to accomplish all the remaining tasks and activities at the disposal sites at Žirovski Vrh. Adequate financial resources are available to accomplish remediation activities at the Boršt mill tailings site. For this purpose, the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning provides financial means from the national budget.

The funds necessary for the institutional control, monitoring and maintenance of the Jazbec mine waste pile, the Boršt mill tailings site and the mine water outlet will be provided by the Slovenian Government.

Safety of remediation of the Jazbec mine waste pile and the Boršt mill tailings site is ensured through licensing and regulatory supervision similarly as for the decommissioning of other nuclear or radiation facilities.

Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje

The operation of the CSF as the public national infrastructure for the storage of institutional radioactive waste ensures a safe storage area for radioactive waste for as long as it is produced by different activities in the country and for as long as there is a need for radioactive waste storage. After the cessation of operation, the CSF’s decommissioning is envisaged under two possible scenarios, which differ with respect to the commencement of the decommissioning.

There are no nuclear reactions in the facility that could cause neutron activation, and no contamination of the facility or of the immediate surroundings is envisaged during the life cycle of the CSF. The results of contamination control show that no contamination of partition walls, floors and ceilings, metal pallets, the surface of radioactive waste packages, movable and electro-mechanical equipment, and underground tank and piping wastewater is to be expected. Two scenarios were developed for the CSF’s decommissioning in the preliminary decommissioning programme formulated in 2012:

Under the first scenario, all LILW from the CSF will be transported to the LILW repository in 2022. After 2022, the CSF will be decontaminated and put into unrestricted use. The removal of the facility is not envisaged.

Under the second scenario, all LILW from the CSF that meets the waste acceptance criteria for disposal in the LILW repository will be transported to and disposed of in the LILW repository in 2022. The CSF will remain in operation as a central storage facility for institutional radioactive waste in the period during the temporary shutdown (standby mode) of the LILW repository. According to this scenario, the CSF will be
decontaminated and put into unrestricted use after the final filling of the LILW repository in 2061. The removal of the facility is not envisaged.

The ARAO is responsible for conducting an eligibility analysis by 2024 and for assessing the need for the continuation of the operation of the CSF after 2025 when the disposal of radioactive waste from the CSF in the LILW repository is envisaged. Depending on the results of the eligibility analysis regarding the continuation of the operation of the CSF after 2025, either the procedures for the decontamination of the CSF are to commence or the CSF is to continue operating.

The ARAO, as the licence holder, is responsible for decommissioning planning and implementation. It is planned that the entire decommissioning project will last approximately one year. The decommissioning of the facility will be financed from the state budget and the payments of radioactive waste generators in accordance with the price list of the mandatory service of general economic interest.
SECTIONS G AND H: SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

The Republic of Slovenia has no separate legally binding documents on the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management. The main legal pillar in this area is the 2002 Act. In this Act, the general safety requirements are applicable to both the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management. Some specific requirements regarding the type of activity are stipulated in separate articles of the 2002 Act. Thus, in order to avoid redundancy in the text, the requested information under Sections G and H is presented jointly.

Article 4: General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are adequately addressed,

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted,

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management,

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards,

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuel management,

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation,

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

Article 11: General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste management are adequately addressed,

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable,

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management,

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards,

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with radioactive waste management,

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation,

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
The criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste and spent fuel management are adequately addressed in the 2002 Act through the approval of the safety analysis report by the SNSA. The content of the safety analysis report is determined in the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors and in non-binding guidance on the content of the safety case for a particular type of nuclear facility.

The requirement that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management and the generation of other radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel-cycle policy, is ensured through the 2002 Act. Paragraph (2) of Article 93 stipulates that any person responsible for the generation of radioactive waste and spent fuel shall ensure that radioactive substances occur in the smallest possible quantities.

The interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management and radioactive waste management are addressed through the Resolution on the 2016-2025 National Programme for Managing Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in 2016. The producers of radioactive waste and spent fuel have to consider the interdependencies among different steps of their management in the safety analysis report and operating licences. The requirement to consider interdependencies among different steps in spent fuel and radioactive waste management is also provided in the Rules on Radioactive Waste Management that entered into force in May 2006.

The provisions ensuring the effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying suitable protective methods at the national level as approved by the regulatory body, are included within the framework of national regulations.

The biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuel and radioactive waste management are taken into account through the safety analysis report for each particular nuclear and disposal facility. The content of the documentation is prescribed by the regulation issued by the Ministry of the Environment (2002 Act, Article 71), while the content of the safety analysis report for the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste (2002 Act, Article 73) and uranium mining and ore processing waste (2002 Act, Article 76) shall be prescribed by the SNSA, which also acts as the licensing authority for the approval of the safety analysis reports.

Article 93 of the 2002 Act contains a provision on avoiding actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations. There are no special provisions requiring that impacts should not be greater than those permitted for the current generation in the Republic of Slovenia. This subject is addressed implicitly throughout all legally binding documents in the area of nuclear and radiation safety.


As a consequence of the Fukushima accident in March 2011, the SNSA issued a decision to the Krško NPP stipulating that safety measures must be undertaken in order to prevent severe accidents and/or mitigate their consequences. The decision, *inter alia*, stipulates that the Krško NPP has to address all possibilities to decrease the risk associated with spent fuel management, having in mind also a change in the long-term strategy. In the second half of 2012, the Krško NPP prepared and submitted a document with an evaluation of spent nuclear fuel storage options. The recognised and confirmed optimal solution was the construction of a dry storage, which would consequently improve nuclear safety due to its passive nature and by reducing the number of fuel assemblies in the pool. The timeline for the construction of the dry storage is in line with the SNSA Safety Upgrade Programme decision, which at the end assumes the finalisation of safety upgrades and measures by the end of 2021. The Krško NPP activities started in 2016 and the contract for the construction of a passive dry storage facility was signed at the beginning of 2017.
Article 5: Existing Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.

Article 12: Existing Facilities and Past Practices

Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:

(i) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility,

(ii) the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.

The Republic of Slovenia has no spent fuel management facilities. The spent fuel that is generated by the operation of the Krško NPP and the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre (TRIGA Mark II research reactor) is managed in storage sites that are integrated parts of these nuclear facilities. Similarly, the LILW generated at the Krško NPP is managed and stored in storage sites under the operating licence for the Krško NPP.

The legislative provisions for nuclear facilities were applied for the siting, construction and operation of these storage sites.

The facilities that are subject to this paragraph are the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje, the Boršt mill tailings site and the Jazbec mine waste pile at the former Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine.

The Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje was put into operation in 1986, when nuclear legislation was not yet fully implemented. The operation of the storage facility was initially not licensed on the basis of nuclear and radiation safety legislation. The operator (IJS) obtained a licence for the use of this facility on the basis of the Construction Act. In 1998, the SNSA required by decree that the operator apply for an operating licence under the 1984 Act and prohibited further operation of this facility, except for emergency cases.

When the management and operation was transferred to the national waste management organisation, the ARAO, in 1999, the SNSA required that the new operator meet the requirements of the above decree. By the end of 2002, plans for the reconstruction and modernisation of the facility were prepared. In 2004, all activities regarding the modernisation and refurbishment of the facility were concluded.

The refurbishment of the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje and the licensing were performed in compliance with the 2002 Act. The licence for trial operation of the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste was issued in 2005 and the licence for operation was issued in April 2008.

The remediation of the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine has been in progress since the cessation of operation in 1990. Remedial actions in Jazbec were finished in 2008. The final remediation work on the Boršt disposal site has been delayed due to activation of a landslide. From the legal perspective, the uranium mine, the ore processing facilities, and the disposal sites for mining and ore processing waste were not nuclear facilities.

The principal Act governing their operation was the Mining Act. This situation changed with the 2002 Act. According to Article 76 of the 2002 Act, the construction of mining or ore processing waste repositories was approved on the basis of SNSA consent. The key document is the safety analysis report. After finishing and checking the performance of environmental remediation activities at the Jazbec disposal site, the SNSA issued a decision to revoke the status of a radiation facility. The Jazbec disposal site is still being supervised in the post-closure period by the ARAO.
Article 6: Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:
   (i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its operating lifetime,
   (ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment,
   (iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public,
   (iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.

Article 13: Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:
   (i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure,
   (ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment, taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of disposal facilities after closure,
   (iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public,
   (iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 11.

The course of the procedure in the process of licensing nuclear facilities such as repositories is stipulated in the 2002 Act, the Environment Protection Act, the Spatial Planning Act, the Act on the Siting of Spatial Arrangements of National Significance in Physical Space, the Construction Act, the Rules JV5, the Decree on Categories of Projects for which an Environmental Impact Assessment is Mandatory, and the Decree on the Content of Reports on the Effects of Intended Activity on the Environment and the Method of Its Preparation.

The above-mentioned legislation provides the framework for the preparation of the nuclear and radiation safety documentation and documentation for environmental impact assessment. It stipulates which consents and licences are to be issued and the manner of public participation.

According to the 2002 Act and the Environment Protection Act, the safety documentation concerning nuclear and radiation safety during the siting and licencing of a nuclear facility shall consist of three main documents: a special safety analysis, an environmental impact assessment report and a safety analysis report. The content of all three documents is similar, as they are prepared for the same facility, but they differ regarding the level of details presented.

Article 64 (“Location of a nuclear facility”) and Article 65 (“Analysis of the safety of a site for the location of a nuclear facility”) of the 2002 Act determine that the selection of a site for the location of a nuclear facility shall be based on a special safety analysis, which will be used to assess all the factors at the site of the nuclear facility that may affect the nuclear safety of the facility during its operating lifetime and the impacts of the operation of the facility on the population and the environment.
The Environment Protection Act forms the basis for the environmental impact assessment. The Decree on Categories of Projects for which an Environmental Impact Assessment is Mandatory determines that an environmental impact assessment is mandatory for spent fuel management facilities and radioactive waste management facilities and for the disposal of mining tailings and hydro-metallurgical tailings.

Public involvement in the siting process is ensured through prescribed public hearings, consultations and presentations and by making all the information available to the public. In the siting phase, it takes place in the framework of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and in the licensing phase in the framework of an environmental impact assessment (EIA).

**Siting of the SF and HLW Disposal Facility**

The decision on the siting and construction of the national facility for the management and disposal of spent fuel is part of the broader »dual tack« approach on deep geological repository as described in the Resolution on the National Programme for Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management for the 2016–2025 Period and the Programme for the Decommissioning of the Krško NPP and the Disposal of LILW and Spent Nuclear Fuel from the Krško NPP. In parallel to national disposal program the multinational disposal option is possible. Both options go in parallel until the choice of one of the options is made. In the case of national repository decision is made, it is planned to start preparatory activities for comparative studies, preliminary designs and the preparation of qualified staff by 2045 with siting activities envisaged between 2045 and 2055. Confirmation of decision on national or multinational approach is made before 2055 and confirmation an appropriate and socially acceptable location is planned until 2055. Construction is envisaged between 2055 and 2065.

**Siting of the LILW Disposal Facility**

Due to the growing need for the final disposal of LILW, the final solution for the short-lived LILW is the key issue of radioactive waste management in the Republic of Slovenia. The ARAO successfully accomplished the siting procedure for the LILW repository and the site was approved in December 2009.

The ARAO decided on a combined mode site selection process. This in practice means a combination of technical screening and volunteer siting. It is flexible, transparent and ensures strong public involvement.

At the end of 2004, the official administrative procedure for the siting of the repository was announced. After five years of intensive work on siting, the Detailed Plan of National Importance for a Low- and Intermediate-Level Radioactive Waste Repository in Vrbina in the Municipality of Krško, was prepared and adopted at the end of the 2009 by the Slovenian Government.

The location for the LILW repository in Vrbina in the Municipality of Krško is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14: **Approved location of the LILW repository in Vrbina in the Municipality of Krško**
Article 7: Design and Construction of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases,

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account,

(iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility are supported by the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility.

Article 14: Design and Construction of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases,

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are taken into account,

(iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared,

(iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.

The measures that are prescribed in Articles 7 and 14 of the Convention are ensured through the licensing process for the construction of nuclear facilities.

The permit for the construction of a nuclear facility is issued by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning on the basis of the Construction Act; consent issued by the SNSA (2002 Act, Article 68) is one of the conditions for such. In issuing consent, the SNSA evaluates the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of the spent fuel management or radioactive waste management facility from the point of view of nuclear and radiation safety and environmental protection.

According to Article 68 of the 2002 Act, an application for consent for a construction permit for a nuclear facility shall include project documentation, a safety analysis report, including relevant evaluations, and the opinion of an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety. The project shall be in compliance with the design bases according to the provisions of Chapter II of Rules JV5. The contents of the project documentation and the methods of its preparation and revision are prescribed by the rules governing project and technical documentation and, in the case of mining works, with the provisions of the rules governing the method of the compilation, sequence, contents and revision of mining works project documentation. The key document governing the technical and safety measures for the construction and operation of a nuclear facility is the safety analysis report. The content of the safety analysis report for the disposal of uranium mining and ore processing tailings and mines is prescribed in detail by the SNSA. The main content of the safety analysis report is prescribed by the 2002 Act and Rules JV5. The detailed content of the safety analysis report for the LLW repository was prepared by the SNSA in the form of guidelines issued in 2012.

Chapter II of Rules JV5 sets the requirements for the design bases for radiation and nuclear facilities and the main principles that the design of radiation or nuclear facilities should adhere to. It includes general provisions for the design bases and specific provisions for, inter alia, safety functions, physical protection, site conditions, postulated initiating events, normal operation, events and accidents, facility states, capability for decommissioning and emergency preparedness.

Sixth Slovenian Report under the Joint Convention
Design Basis for the LILW Repository

The silo repository type was confirmed with the adoption of the Decree on the Detailed Plan of National Importance for a LILW Repository in Vrbina in the Municipality of Krško. The area included in the plan is 18 ha. The planned LILW repository, with a net area of about 10 ha, includes all structures, systems and components required for its operation as an independent nuclear facility. An area for an additional two silos is reserved for future extension of the capacity if needed.

According to Article 70 of the 2002 Act, the preparation of design bases for nuclear facilities, in different stages of the facility life cycle, is prescribed. In 2016, the design basis for the LILW repository was prepared as a part of the application for environmental consent. In the design basis all the requirements for the planned LILW repository are collected, which are then implemented in the final design.

Design for the Construction Permit for the LILW Repository

With the development of the design and following recommendations and suggestions from the expert missions and international reviews, some optimisations of the design were proposed. The design was analysed in additional studies. The main focus was on the silo design (water tightness), the access shaft (incorporation into the silo) and the design of the closing structure of the silo. Additionally, studies were performed regarding the necessary capacity of the repository, possible optimisations regarding waste packages, the characteristics of the backfill material, treatment for disposal (suggested optimisations of waste packages), and the disposal of larger components.

The foreseen layout of structures, systems and components shall ensure the relevant conditions for the safe operation of the repository.

From the landscape architecture aspect, the repository includes the following areas:
- the eastern part of the repository, where access from the municipal road is provided;
- a narrow area of the repository intended for administrative/service activities and waste acceptance, waste disposal in disposal units, and the provision of the physical security of the repository; this area is surrounded by a fence;
- free surfaces for the repository; and
- surfaces required for connections to infrastructure.

Areas within the disposal area and a major part of the inner areas of the waste conditioning structure are classified as radiologically controlled areas and are protected by a fence.

At the entrance area of the repository there is an entrance to the repository, an access road connected to the municipal road, parking for employees and visitors, and green open areas.

The narrow area of the repository includes a flood protection embankment, the structures of the repository, the necessary infrastructure and landscape arrangements within the fence of the repository.

The area outside the narrow area of the LILW repository consists of free surface and the outer maintenance road, which runs along the fence of the repository.

The area for connection to infrastructure consists of structures for access to the repository (an access road) and all connections necessary to meet the needs of the new repository (water, electricity, sewage systems, IT, etc.).

The narrow area of the repository is intended for administrative and service activities, the acceptance of waste, the disposal of waste, and the security of the repository. The size of the area is approximately 6 ha, with the following structures:
- the Administrative and Service Building;
- the Technological Building;
- the Disposal Silo with a hall above the silo; and
- the Control Pool.
In accordance with the level of protection against flooding, structures are situated on a flood protection embankment for protection against probable maximum flood. The dimensions and shape of the embankment are in accordance with technological requirements. The repository is surrounded by an external service road.

In the Administrative Building there are facilities and systems for repository management activities, service and administrative activities, and access control, personal and vehicle entrance control, as well as control of the repository area.

The service part of the building is intended for energy supply, fire protection water, municipal waste collection, storage of equipment and geological samples, and for workshops. This part of the building contains all infrastructure, energy and service premises needed for the safe and smooth operation of the repository.

The Technological Building is located in the central part of the repository. It is designed for temporary storage and, if necessary, the repair of damaged waste containers, basic laboratory research, and the control of technological processes, and the other necessary technological and service functions of the repository, as well as the functions for ensuring radiation safety. Functionally, the building is designed in such a manner that its construction can be performed in two stages. The technological building is also the entrance and exit point regarding the controlled area of the LILW repository.

The silo is designed as a reinforced concrete cylindrical structure with an inside diameter of 27.3 m and a height (depth) of 55 m. A vertical communication shaft runs inside the silo. The central part of the shaft consists of stairs and an elevator, with installation shafts on the side. The entrance to the communication shaft is provided from the hall or from the outside.

The net floor area of the silo enables the arrangement of 99 containers on one level. The height of the silo is designed to contain 10 levels of containers, including the closing structure, a reinforced concrete plate and a clay barrier. The closing barrier is below the level of the existing aquifer.

The hall above the silo is located in the central part of the repository in the radiologically controlled area and covers the entire floor area of the silo, including the handling area. The hall protects the silo and gantry cranes for the disposal of containers from weather conditions.

The Control Pool is designed to collect water from the silos, from the hall above the silo, and from the Technological Building, resulting from the cleaning of the floor, and the decontamination of tools and equipment. The construction of the Control Pool is in line with the technological requirements.

Figure 15 shows the structures inside the LILW repository in Vrbina, Krško, as shown in the design for the construction permit.
The reinforced concrete container is one of the engineering barriers that must comply with all required safety functions. The basic geometry of the container was determined on the basis of the 4 TTC overpacks, which are the most commonly used overpack at the Krško NPP. The chosen design in terms of both design and materials meets all the basic safety functions for concrete containers.

Figure 16 shows the reinforced concrete container as presented in the design for the construction permit.

Figure 16: A reinforced concrete container for the disposal of LILW
During the period of operation, the silo is protected by a hall, where a portal gantry crane is located. All waste will be put in reinforced concrete containers prior to disposal. In total, 990 type N2 containers, with a maximum (design) weight of 40 t will be disposed of. The disposal containers will be transported to the handling area near the silo by vehicle and then disposed of using the gantry crane and special grippers. The empty spaces will then be backfilled with backfilling material. The last layer of the containers will be covered with a reinforced concrete plate and a layer of fairly impermeable material (e.g. clay).

The repository concept is flexible and covers as many future developments in the programme as could reasonably be expected. It consists of a modular approach and an intermittent mode of operation. Each silo is an independent unit and the number of silos is expandable. The second silo will be constructed when the first one has been filled and the need for a second one arises. The repository can operate intermittently, i.e. it can be temporarily in standby mode for longer or shorter periods of time. The repository also has the potential to accommodate all LILW from the Krško NPP if it is decided that this will be a joint LILW disposal facility for both Slovenia and Croatia.

Figure 17 shows a cross section of the silo and the hall above the silo, as in the design for the construction permit, and Figure 18 shows the disposal silo from above, as in the design for the construction permit.

Figure 17: The LILW disposal silo and the hall above the silo, as shown in the design for the construction permit
Figure 18: The LILW disposal silo from above, as shown in the design for the construction permit.
**Article 8: Assessment of Safety of Facilities**

*Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:*

(i) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out,

(ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

**Article 15: Assessment of Safety of Facilities**

*Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:*

(i) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out,

(ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory body,

(iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

**Assessment of Safety before Construction**

The assessment of safety before the construction of a spent fuel management facility or a radioactive waste management facility is ensured by Article 71 of the 2002 Act. It is ensured through the provision requiring that an application for a licence shall contain project documentation, a safety analysis report and the opinion of an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety.

Article 43 of Rules JV5 lays down the general contents of the safety analysis report, which shall provide the following information:

- a site description, a general description of the facility and its normal operation, and a description of how the facility’s safety is ensured;
- a description of the programme for trial operation;
- a description of the technical characteristics of the radiation or nuclear facility and a description of performance in all operational states of the facility;
- a description of the facility’s design concept and the approach adopted to meet the fundamental safety objectives and a description of the design bases of the radiation or nuclear facility and of their methods of fulfilment;
- a detailed description of the safety functions, of all safety systems, and of safety-related structures, systems and components (SSCs), their design bases and the functioning of all safety-related SSCs in all operational states of the facility;
- a list of regulations and standards applied as the basis for descriptions and safety analyses covered in the safety analysis report;
- a description of the plant organisational set-up of the facility operator intended for ensuring nuclear safety;
- an assessment of the safety aspects relating to the facility site;
- a description of safety analyses performed to assess the safety of the radiation or nuclear facility in response to postulated design-basis events and a comparison with the technical acceptance criteria;
- a description of the probabilistic safety analyses;
• a description of the emergency operational procedures and of the severe accident management guidelines in the case of a nuclear facility;
• a description of the measures for protection against internal fire;
• a description of the emergency plan for the facility and of the facility operator's internal organisational set-up for emergency events and of its alignment with the national protection and rescue plan in the event of a nuclear accident;
• a description of the measures providing for SSC inspection, testing and surveillance; a description of the operational experiences feedback programme; and a description of the ageing management programme;
• a description of the training and education of the personnel;
• the operating limits and conditions of safe operation and technical bases explaining expert bases for each operating condition or limit;
• a description of the strategy for protection against radiation – a description of the methods and measures for the protection of exposed personnel against ionising radiation, including an assessment of their protection against radiation and an assessment of the exposure of the general population and the environment;
• a description of any radioactive and nuclear materials and other sources of radiation;
• a description of the radioactive waste and spent fuel management programme;
• a description of all activities in the facility’s operational phase planned to facilitate termination of operation and decommissioning;
• a description of the management system;
• an outline of the physical protection of the facility and nuclear and radioactive substances;
• the anticipated and maximum allowable releases of radioactive substances into the environment;
• the programme of meteorological measurements and radioactivity monitoring during operation; and
• in the case of a radioactive waste repository, a spent fuel repository, a hydrometallurgical tailings repository or a mining tailings repository, a plan for long-term surveillance.

The safety analysis report shall be amended when changes in the situation referred to therein arise during the construction or decommissioning of the facility or during the period of trial operation.

The SNSA shall issue consent for construction within 24 months after the submission of a complete application. Article 77 of the 2002 Act allows the SNSA to issue a special decision splitting the contents of the application into thematically related subjects to obtain partial opinions in order to shorten the time period for the issuance of consent for construction. In April 2017, the SNSA issued a decision to split the contents of the application into content-based thematic sections. This approach will contribute to a more systematic review of the documentation and accelerate the overall licensing process.

Assessment of Safety before Operation

After construction work has been completed, every nuclear facility shall undergo a period of trial operation. Prior to the start of the trial operation of a nuclear facility, it is mandatory to obtain the consent of the SNSA. An application for consent for the start of trial operation shall contain a safety analysis report updated with any changes that have occurred during construction, the opinion of an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety, and other prescribed documentation.

Article 26 of Rules JV5 determines the contents of the application for consent for the start of the trial operation of a radiation or nuclear facility.

The SNSA shall issue consent for trial operation for a fixed period, which may not exceed two years. The consent for trial operation may be extended. There is no right to appeal against the refusal of consent for the start of trial operation.
The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the LILW Repository

After the end of the siting of the LILW repository, the preparation of the safety case for the licensing thereof was started. The main goal of this phase is to attain confidence that the combination of the repository site and the disposal concept is safe, especially regarding long-term safety. This information is used both in the licence application and to support the environmental impact assessment. As a part of the safety case, a new iteration of the safety assessment was prepared. The purpose of this was to develop reasonable assurance that the facility will remain within regulatory safety constraints for a long time into the future, as determined in legislation. The safety assessment was undertaken using the Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies (ISAM methodology) of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has become an internationally accepted standard for conducting safety assessments. At each stage of the process, the methodology is intended to focus attention on key issues that need to be addressed to develop confidence that the final decision is well supported, documented and fully coherent.

The scenario development process for the repository’s long-term safety resulted in the identification of five main scenarios, for which analyses were conducted. For all of these scenarios, detailed models were prepared to calculate the impact of the facility on people and the environment. At the end of the process, all the results were evaluated.

On the basis of the initiating event analysis and final design, the scenarios for the operational phase of the disposal facility were developed and analysed.

The post-closure safety assessment and operational safety assessment showed that the proposed facility meets the regulatory safety criteria for post-closure and operational safety with a good margin for all the analyses conducted. This conclusion is contingent on a number of basic assumptions that form the foundation of the safety assessment analyses. On the basis of these studies, it is concluded that there is high confidence that the Vrbina repository meets regulatory constraints with a sufficient margin.
Article 9: Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the license to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements,

(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary,

(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures,

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility,

(v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the license to the regulatory body,

(vi) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate,

(vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Article 16: Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the license to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements,

(ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary,

(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For a disposal facility, the results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for the period after closure,

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility,

(v) procedures for characterisation and segregation of radioactive waste are applied,

(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the license to the regulatory body,

(vii) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate,

(viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body,

(ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Initial Authorisation for Operation

The operating licence is issued by the SNSA only after the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning issues, in accordance with the Construction Act, a licence for the use of a facility.
The application for the operating licence shall contain an updated safety analysis report, an opinion from an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety, and other documentation prescribed by Article 27 of Rules JV5. The safety analysis report shall be updated with any changes that occur during the trial operation.

A licence shall be issued by the SNSA within 90 days of receiving a complete application and information on the trial operation indicating that all the conditions for radiation and nuclear safety have been fulfilled.

**Operational Limits and Conditions**

In accordance with Article 71 of the 2002 Act, the proposed operational limits and conditions (technical specifications as part of the safety analysis report) have to be submitted to the regulatory body as a part of the safety analysis report first already with the application for consent for construction, then with the application for consent for trial operation, and subsequently with the application for the operating licence.

Article 46 of Rules JV5 sets basic requirements for operational limits and conditions and also defines that they shall be specified for all operational states of the facility.

Article 47 of Rules JV5 defines the contents of the operational limits and conditions, which should contain:

- definitions of terms;
- safety limits;
- limits on operating parameters for safety systems;
- limits on operating parameters and stipulation of the minimum amount of operable equipment, including the number of SSCs important for safety, which should be in operational or standby condition;
- necessary measures in cases of exceeded operating limits and conditions, and the time available for taking such measures;
- requirements for surveillance; and
- requirements for the minimum staffing levels to ensure safe operation in different operational states of the facility.

Article 3 of the Rules on the Operational Safety of Radiation or Nuclear Facilities (JV9) defines the application of operational limits and conditions. It is required that the personnel licensed to operate and monitor the technological process in a radiation or nuclear facility shall be highly knowledgeable as to the contents, purposes and technical bases of the operational limits and conditions. Information on the operational limits and conditions shall be accessible to all personnel involved in operating the facility. In facilities fitted with a control room, such information shall be available in the control room.

The operational limits and conditions shall be reviewed and kept updated as appropriate in accordance with operational experience and developments in science and technology and upon any modification to the facility that warrants or requires such updates.

Articles 83 and 84 of the 2002 Act outline the procedure for the approval of changes to the safety analysis report. The procedure defines three classes of changes according to safety relevance:

- changes for which it is necessary to notify the SNSA;
- changes for which the intention of their implementation shall be reported to the SNSA; and
- changes of significance for radiation or nuclear safety and for the implementation of which a licence from the SNSA shall be obtained.

Rules JV9 define the methodology for the assessment and classification of modifications and the method and form of reporting and proposing modifications to radiation or nuclear facilities.

**Operation, Maintenance, Monitoring, Inspection and Testing**

In accordance with Article 27 of Rules JV5, the documentation submitted for the application for an operating licence shall also contain a list of prepared operating procedures, a report on trial operation, a radioactive waste or spent fuel management programme, management system documentation, a decommissioning programme, a programme of following operational experiences, a programme for
monitoring ageing, programmes for SSC maintenance, testing and inspection, the results of pre-operation monitoring, a safety analysis report, an opinion by an approved radiation and nuclear safety expert, and other prescribed documentation. At the request of the SNSA, the investor or the operator of a radiation or nuclear facility shall make licence application reference documentation available.

**Periodic safety review**

In accordance with Article 81 of the 2002 Act, the operator of a radiation or nuclear facility shall ensure regular, full and systematic assessment and inspection of the radiation or nuclear safety of the facility through periodic safety reviews.

The operator shall draw up a report on a periodic safety review and submit it to the SNSA for approval.

Where a report on a periodic safety review indicates the need to change the conditions of operation or the limitations from the safety analysis report with the aim of improving radiation or nuclear safety, the operator shall draw up a proposal for any such changes.

An approved report on the periodic safety review shall be a condition for the renewal of the licence for the operation of the nuclear facility.

The frequency, contents, scope, duration and method of performing periodic safety reviews and the methods of reporting such reviews are defined in Chapter V of Rules JV9.

**Exceptional review of the safety analysis report**

According to Article 86 of the 2002 Act, the operator shall evaluate and verify the safety of the facility and ensure a review of the concordance of the safety analysis report with the conclusions of the evaluation and verification of safety directly after any emergency at the facility or after the completion of work relating to the mitigation of the consequences thereof.

**Engineering and Technical Support**

In-house capabilities have been developed to perform engineering and technical support at the existing nuclear facilities. The Krško NPP, the Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre, the ARAO and the Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o. are capable of processing minor design changes in-house. The capability to prepare purchase specifications, review bids and bidder selection, quality assurance, the quality control and engineering follow-up of projects, and the review and/or acceptance testing of products are possible to a certain extent at all of the above facilities. Other engineering and technical support is provided through outsourcing to Slovenian research and engineering organisations or abroad. However, major projects require an open invitation to tender. The Ministry of Education, Science and Sport financially supports research and development projects in the field of nuclear safety in the Republic of Slovenia through a research fund, with the participation of the nuclear industry and the SNSA.

**Characterisation and Segregation of Radioactive Waste**

According to Article 93 of the 2002 Act and the Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, the licence holder shall collect radioactive waste, classify them with regard to the aggregation state and the level and type of radioactivity, report on radioactive waste and spent fuel generation, keep accounting records for the waste, label the waste, provide for the processing, transport and storage of waste, and perform activities in such a manner that the lowest possible quantities of radioactive waste are generated, taking into consideration safe working conditions, radiation protection and economic criteria.

**Incidents Significant for Safety**

Article 87 (“Reporting on the operation of facilities”) of the 2002 Act stipulates that an operator shall submit exceptional reports to the SNSA containing information on:
• equipment malfunctions that could cause an emergency, emergencies themselves, and measures taken for the mitigation of the consequences of the defects or emergencies;
• mistakes made by workers while handling or operating a facility which could cause an emergency;
• deviations from operational limitations and conditions; and
• all other events or operational circumstances that significantly affect the radiation or nuclear safety of the facility.

Chapter III of Rules JV9 prescribes detailed requirements for reporting and for the notification of the regulatory body by the operator of a nuclear facility. The regulations distinguish between routine reporting and notification and reporting in the event of an abnormal event. They specify the time period for each report. Reporting criteria are also provided and abnormal events are specified.

According to Article 108 of the 2002 Act, the licence holder is required to report to the ministry that issued the operating licence and to other competent agencies on an emergency in the shortest possible time.

Programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience

In accordance with Article 60 of the 2002 Act ("The use of experience gained during operational events"), the operator of a radiation or nuclear facility shall ensure that programmes for collecting and analysing operating experience at nuclear facilities are implemented.

The method and frequency of reporting on the implementation of programmes for collecting and analysing operating experience are defined in Chapter II.2 of Rules JV9.

In the assessment, examination and improvement of radiation and nuclear safety, the operator of a radiation or nuclear facility shall take into account the conclusions of the programmes referred to in the first paragraph here.

Decommissioning plans

In accordance with Article 3 of the 2002 Act ("Definitions"), the decommissioning of a facility shall mean all the measures leading to cessation of control over a nuclear or radiation facility pursuant to the provisions of the 2002 Act. Decommissioning includes both decontamination and dismantling procedures and the removal of radioactive waste and spent fuel from the facility.

The legal requirements for approval for decommissioning a nuclear facility comprise a two-step procedure and are defined in Articles 71 and 80 of the 2002 Act, which prescribe that an investor intending to decommission a radiation or nuclear facility shall attach to an application for the consent for decommissioning and to the project documentation a safety analysis report and the opinion of an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety and to an application for the permit for commencement of decommissioning activities the updated safety analysis report, an opinion from an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety and other documentation. The detailed contents of these applications are defined in Articles 31 and 32 of Rules JV5.

In the case of the decommissioning of a facility, the content of the safety analysis report shall refer to the decommissioning of the facility and the related measures for radiation or nuclear safety.

Two special acts have been approved by the Slovenian National Assembly for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, namely the Act Governing the Fund for Financing the Decommissioning of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant and the Disposal of Radioactive Waste from the Krško NPP and the Permanent Cessation of Exploitation of the Uranium Ore and Prevention of Consequences of the Mining at the Uranium Mine at Žirovski Vrh Act. Through the legal provisions of these two Acts, the legal framework is established for the financing and planning of decommissioning activities for the respective facilities.
Article 17: Institutional Measures after Closures

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:

(i) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the regulatory body are preserved,
(ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions are carried out, if required, and
(iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.

In the safety report of the repository facilities relating to the time period following the closure thereof, all the possible risks relating to the spent fuel or radioactive waste shall be assessed, as well as the exposure of the population after the closure and the exposure of the workers working at the repository during the maintenance thereof and the long-term supervision of the repository facility following closure (Article 73 of the 2002 Act).

The plan for the long-term post-closure supervision of a repository for radioactive waste or a disposal site for uranium mining and milling waste material shall include the following:

• the extent and content of the operational monitoring of radioactivity at the repository, the monitoring of natural phenomena affecting the long-term stability of the repository and the functioning of the individual parts of the repository; and

• the criteria on the basis of which decisions on the carrying out of maintenance work at the repository shall be made, dependent on the results of the operational monitoring referred to in the previous indent and on inspection (Article 76 of the 2002 Act).

The records on the location, design and inventory of a facility required by the regulatory body are preserved through the provision of Article 80 (“Application for a permit”), stipulating that it is necessary to attach to the application for a closure permit a safety analysis report, an opinion from an authorised expert for radiation and nuclear safety, and other prescribed documentation.

Article 80 of the 2002 Act further stipulates that the owner or operator of a facility that has obtained a permit for the disposal of spent fuel, radioactive waste, or mine and hydro-metallurgical tailings shall ensure the maintenance and supervision of the disposal site in line with the conditions laid down in the safety analysis report.

Article 96 (“Long-term supervision and maintenance of closed repositories”) of the 2002 Act stipulates that the long-term supervision and maintenance of repositories of mining and hydro-metallurgical tailings resulting from the extraction of nuclear mineral materials is provided as a service of general economic interest.

The contents of applications for a permit for the closure of a radioactive waste or spent fuel repository or for the closure of a repository for mining or hydrometallurgical tailings are defined in Rules JV5 in Articles 36 and 37, respectively.

Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine

The closure of the uranium mine, including the environmental remediation activities on disposal sites for mining and milling waste material, is carried out by the public company Žirovski Vrh Mine d.o.o., which was established by the Act on the Permanent Cessation of Uranium Ore Exploitation and Prevention of the Consequences of Uranium Mining. The environmental remediation activities were carried out under the control and with the approval of the regulatory body competent for nuclear and radiation safety (SNSA). The radiological safety requirements were defined in the safety report, which also includes the post-closure period and defines the general programme of post-closure surveillance and maintenance of the location. After closure, the disposal site became a facility within the state infrastructure, and thus excluded from legal transactions. The Government of Republic of Slovenia assigned the management of the Jazbec disposal site to the ARAO in 2016.

The post-closure surveillance and maintenance of the uranium mining waste disposal site is ensured as a mandatory service of general economic interest performed by the ARAO. The scope of its mandatory
service of general economic interest is defined in the Decree on the Method, Subject and Conditions for the Provision of the Obligatory Public Utility Service of the Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance of Landfills of Mining and Hydrometallurgical Tailings from the Extraction and Exploitation of Nuclear Minerals. Fulfilling the requirements for record keeping, reporting and updating the safety report and the programme of long-term surveillance and maintenance of the disposal site is supervised by the SNSA, although the closed uranium mining waste disposal site is not considered to be a radiation facility and its environmental impact cannot be distinguished from the natural background radiation.
**Article 10: Disposal of Spent Fuel**

If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.

**Krško NPP**

After the period of dry storage, spent fuel or high-level waste generated from spent fuel processing is to be further treated, packaged and disposed of. For spent fuel or HLW generated from the reprocessing of spent fuel, a deep geological repository should be built to ensure adequate temporal isolation of the waste from the environment.

For long-term spent fuel management, a dual-track strategy has been adopted as a reasonable solution in the present situation. In parallel with the national disposal programme, a multinational disposal option is possible.

The reference scenario for Slovenia’s own repository in suitable hard rock has been developed, assuming the disposal of spent fuel in 2065, with an option to also consider the construction of a regional repository or use of disposal services provided by a disposal facility in a host country. Both options continue in parallel until the choice of constructing national repository or participation in multinational repository is made.

Slovenia is a member of the ERDO-WG, which brings together a group of EU countries to consider a model for the development of joint disposal solutions for the benefit of its Member Countries. The main reason for cooperation and integration in this area is Slovenia’s extremely small-scale nuclear programme and that by participation in joint programmes it can achieve significant positive economic effects.

The reference conceptual design is based on the best available current knowledge of future inventories and the operation of both nuclear facilities in Slovenia. The national concept scenario includes the overall geological disposal programme, including research, development, and implementation activities for the siting, construction, operation, and closure of a geological repository.

No site investigations for a deep geological repository have been carried out in Slovenia, and no specific data for geological disposal are available at the moment. The reference scenario is made for a generic location in hard rock media. For some specific aspects, assumptions and estimates based on expert judgments were used.

The conceptual reference scenario for spent fuel disposal was developed with the following assumptions:

- for the direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel (no reprocessing), the repository will be constructed in a hard rock environment at a depth of 500 m,
- the repository concept and entire disposal system is based on the Swedish KBS-3V concept, developed by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB),
- the repository development also includes the construction and operation of an underground testing facility at the site of the future repository,
- and it assumes that a sufficient cooling period is available prior disposal to allow the full utilisation of the canisters’ capacity.

**Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

At present, no spent fuel from the TRIGA Mark II research reactor is planned for disposal. The spent fuel management will be arranged jointly with the spent fuel disposal of the Krško NPP, unless the Government finds another solution.
SECTION I: TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT

Article 27: Transboundary Movement

1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments.

   In so doing:

   (i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that transboundary movement is authorised and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination,

   (ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilised,

   (iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention,

   (iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorise a transboundary movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary movement,

   (v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.

2. A Contracting Party shall not license the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.

3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:

   (i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international Act,

   (ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State of origin,

   (iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing,

   (iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.


Transboundary movement is covered in Articles 101–103 of the 2002 Act, Subparagraph 4.9, “Shipments into and out of EU Member States – The import, export and transit of nuclear and radioactive substances and radioactive waste.”

The SNSA issues permits for the import from, export to, and shipment into and out of other EU Member States and the transit of certain radioactive and nuclear materials. Detailed provisions defining for which shipments a permit is necessary are stipulated in the 2002 Act and in the Rules on Transboundary Shipments of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials. It is necessary to obtain SNSA consent for shipments from and into other EU Member States and for licences for the import, export or transit of radioactive waste and spent fuel. Before issuing consent or a licence, the SNSA evaluates the measures relating to radiation and

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nuclear safety throughout the duration of the transport of radioactive waste and spent fuel from the place of origin to the final destination.

The SNSA may refuse to issue an approval for the import, export or transit of radioactive waste and spent fuel if it has concluded that the country of export or the country receiving the consignment does not have the technical, legal or administrative resources necessary for the safe handling of radioactive waste or spent fuel, such as for shipments to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees south.

In addition to the insurance stipulated by customs regulations, an exporter, importer, or other person or body carrying out shipments from and into other EU Member States or the transit of radioactive waste, spent fuel or nuclear substances shall ensure for each consignment thereof financial warranties to a level which guarantees the payment of expenses incurred in:

• a refusal of shipment by the competent regulatory authority in the destination country, or

• the handling ordered by the regulatory authority when it has concluded that there is no assurance for shipments of radioactive waste out of EU Member States or imported radioactive waste handled in a manner pursuant to the 2002 Act.

The established legislation implements all obligations under Article 27 of the Convention.

Experiences

In the past, there were several transits performed on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia under the framework of the US and Russian research reactor spent fuel return programmes.

The last transits of nuclear material took place in October and November 2012, with regard to which we reported in the 5th Slovenian report under the Joint Convention. All those shipments were accomplished professionally and successfully within strong international cooperation, and by such Slovenia contributed to nuclear non-proliferation.

Besides these occasional transits, approximately every three years there is a shipment of radioactive waste from the Krško NPP that is sent for incineration and melting to another EU Member State. The last shipment was sent in December 2014 and returned to the Krško NPP in September 2015.
SECTION J: DISUSED SEALED SOURCES

Article 28: Disused Sealed Sources

1. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national Act, take the appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, re-manufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.

2. A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the framework of its national Act, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.

In the Republic of Slovenia, radioactive sealed sources are used in medicine, industry and research applications. Minor quantities are also used by certain state institutions (e.g. customs, the police and the army).

Licensing is required for all activities dealing with sealed sources: for purchase and use, for shipments from and to other EU Member States, for import or export, and for transport or transit – the latter based mainly on the activity of the sealed sources. The competent authorities (the SNSA and the SRPA) keep records on sealed sources in use.

In accordance with Article 130 of the 2002 Act, a register of radiation practices and a register of radiation sources shall be maintained. The registers shall be maintained as public registers by the SNSA, except for the register of radiation practices and of radiation sources in health and veterinary care, which shall be maintained as a public register by the SRPA. The contents of the registers are prescribed in Article 131 of the 2002 Act and in Articles 85–87 of the Rules on the Use of Radiation Sources and on Activities Involving Radiation.

The aforementioned Rules also set a basis for the termination of the use of radioactive sources. The person carrying out a radiation practice who terminates the use of a radioactive source shall report this, within 15 days, to the SNSA or the SRPA. Where radioactive sources are involved, the person carrying out a practice involving radiation shall hand them over, within three months, to the ARAO or to another holder of a licence to carry out a radiation practice, or return it to the manufacturer or supplier. The person carrying out a radiation practice shall, within eight days of the transfer of a radioactive source, send a notification, i.e. a document on the transfer of the radioactive source that records the transfer of the radioactive source to another person, to the SNSA or the SRPA.

When sealed sources are no longer in use, they become disused. Since 1986, disused and spent sealed radioactive sources from small producers have been stored at the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje. In 1999, the national public service for managing waste from small producers was established by a governmental decree. The ARAO, being assigned to perform this public service, became responsible for operating the storage and management of waste and disused sealed sources from small producers.

Until 2000, the acceptance of waste for storage was free of charge. Since then, according to the “polluter pays” principle, each waste producer or holder has had to pay a fee for the acceptance of a radioactive waste/disused radioactive source. If the waste producer or holder is not known, the expenses are covered from the national budget. When accepted into the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje, the liabilities for the disused radioactive source are transferred to the ARAO, which becomes responsible for the further management of the disused and spent sealed radioactive source, including future disposal.

The Republic of Slovenia is not a significant producer of sealed sources. The IJS has practically ceased the production of radioactive sources for the domestic market (no such sources have been produced since the First Report under the Convention in 2003), so the return of exported sources is essentially a hypothetical issue.

However, in 2003 the SNSA started an action to promote the transfer of disused sealed radioactive sources that remain with their former users to the ARAO. As a result, several hundred sealed radioactive sources of various activities have been transferred since then, including calibration sources and “historical sources”. In addition, many radioactive sources and items with added radionuclides once used in defence (e.g.
compasses) have been transferred, appropriately treated and safely stored at the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje since then. Disused sealed sources from industrial radiography (\(^{192}\)Ir and \(^{75}\)Se; also one case with \(^{60}\)Co) or brachytherapy (\(^{192}\)Ir) of high-activity (i.e. Category 2 at the time of manufacturing) have been returned to the foreign suppliers. Holders who predominantly use \(^{192}\)Ir in industrial radiography replace decayed sources with new ones almost annually. \(^{192}\)Ir used in brachytherapy is replaced several times per year. There are up to 20 transfers of such sources per year. In addition, the number of disused ionising smoke detectors with mainly \(^{241}\)Am transferred to the central storage facility amounted to more than 6,200 pieces in the period 2014–2016. The SNSA’s inspectors have conducted nearly 80 different inspections with regard to such smoke detectors – and the pertinent supervision was intensified in particular after 2010.

Disused sealed sources are one of the regular themes in Radiation News (Sevalne novice in Slovene), which is distributed quarterly to users of radiation sources and other stakeholders in the country. The SNSA, as the main author and distributor of Radiation News, assesses that in its more than ten years, this outreach activity has proved itself to be a positive approach with added value.

**Figure 19: Radiation News**

Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003, on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, was transposed into the Slovenian legal system through the Rules on the Use of Radiation Sources and on Activities Involving Radiation. Among other provisions, these Rules lay down that the holders of high-activity sources have to return each disused high-activity source to the supplier or place it in a recognised installation (e.g. the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste). In December 2010, Slovenia reported to the European Commission (EC) on the experience gained through the implementation of this Directive.

Disused sealed sources can also enter into the scrap metal recycling stream. This happens practically everywhere in the world. The Slovenian experience shows that most cases of orphan sources are related to the import of scrap metal into Slovenia and to the transit of such material through the country. In order to minimise the number of sources outside regulatory control, several regulatory and law enforcement measures have been implemented. Customs and police officers are equipped with various radiation detection devices in order to prevent illicit trafficking and other unauthorised activities. Since 2002, the SNSA has had an officer on duty 24 hours a day to give advice in the event of the discovery of orphan sources or elevated radiation levels. Major scrap metal dealers and recyclers are equipped with portal monitors and various handheld radiation detection equipment. The Decree on Checking the Radioactivity of Shipments of Metal Scrap has been in force since 1 January 2008. This Decree stipulates that every shipment of scrap metal that is either imported or shipped into Slovenia is measured using adequate detection equipment. Such measurements shall be performed only by certified organisations (there are approximately 20 of them at the time of writing this report). The experiences gained after almost a decade of validity of this Decree is fairly positive and the awareness thereof, including an adequate response, has improved in this regard. Authorised organisations have to provide annual reports. The number of orphan sources that end up in the Central Storage Facility is on the order of two per year. In addition, each year a handful of cases may occur that encompass the return of shipments with orphan sources (spent radioactive sources) transiting through Slovenia and measured and denied by the neighbouring countries.
SECTION K: GENERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SAFETY

This section addresses the challenges and planned actions to improve safety that were listed in the rapporteur’s report on Slovenia at the end of the last (5th) Joint Convention review meeting.

Revision of the National Programme for Managing RW and SF

A new revision of the National Programme for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel was adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in April 2016. It covers the period from 2016 to 2025. According to the programme, the Krško NPP shall continue to operate until 2043, pending the successful conclusion of periodic safety reviews in 2023 and 2033.

Dry Cask Storage for SF operational in 2018

In December 2015, the Krško NPP prepared a document entitled “Technical Specification – Spent Fuel Dry Storage Construction”, which was the officially published documentation aimed at selecting a vendor for the required equipment and an entity to carry out the project. Following the completion of the public procurement procedure, the Krško NPP selected the company HOLTEC (from the USA) as the most advantageous bidder. One of the non-selected bidders, i.e. the company AREVA (from France) filed a complaint with the National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures (hereinafter: the National Review Commission). The procedure at the National Review Commission was finished in the first months of 2017. The whole entanglement due to the complaint in the public procurement process lasted approximately eight months and for at least this amount of time the foreseen construction and beginning of operation of the dry storage for spent fuel at the Krško NPP were postponed. The start of operation of the dry storage facility is now foreseen for 2020.

Radioactive Waste Management at the Krško NPP

The timely construction of the LILW repository is essential for the normal operation of the NPP. Contingency plans at the Krško NPP have been commenced to overcome the period until the final repository is operational. A new building for handling waste is under construction. With its construction the plant will be provided with new premises for drums storage in the process of the manipulation and preparation for transport, collection, and sorting of radioactive waste.

Periodic Safety Review for the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje

The first periodic safety review of the Central Storage Facility started in 2015 and will be completed in 2018. It will provide the basis for the renewal of the operating license of the facility for another ten years.

Two important improvements were carried out. In 2015, the storage technology was changed. The wooden pallets for drums storage were replaced with self-supporting metal pallets. This major improvement is reflected in fire safety, mechanical safety, retrievability, safe handling and the space optimisation of the storage. In 2016, security doors and windows of the facility were upgraded.

In order to optimise the available space in the CSF, the dismantling of sealed sources and the clearance of uncontaminated material is performed.

LILW repository licensing, construction and operation

See Sections G and H.

Revision of the Decommissioning Programme of the Krško NPP

The second revision of the Decommissioning Programme of the Krško NPP and Disposal of LILW and High-Level Waste, which was prepared in 2011, has not been discussed or approved by the
Intergovernmental Commission for monitoring the implementation of the Bilateral Slovenian-Croatian Agreement on the Krško NPP. In July 2015, the Intergovernmental Commission held a session where it was briefed on progress concerning the revised Programme. The Commission decided to suspend all the activities in connection with the drawing up of this Programme. The July session in 2015 also identified the need to draft a new revision of the Krško NPP Decommissioning Programme and the Programme for the Disposal of the RW and SF from the Krško NPP and, in accordance with the bilateral Slovenian-Croatian Agreement on the Krško NPP, two professional organisations from Slovenia and Croatia were authorised to draw up two project tasks for the implementation of the new revision. A few meetings were conducted in 2015, but in 2016 and 2017 there were no results or initiatives from Intergovernmental Commission, and thus no clear actions or results that would further the revision of the Decommissioning Programme.

Furthermore, the issue of a common LILW disposal solution and a spent fuel management solution between Slovenia and Croatia based on dual ownership of and shared responsibility for the management of radioactive waste from the Krško NPP has not been addressed by both countries and there has been no progress.

Jožef Stefan Institute Reactor Infrastructure Centre

The owner has decided to operate the facility until at least 2026. The periodic safety review of the TRIGA Mark II research reactor and the hot cell laboratories started in 2011 and was completed in 2014. 85 issues were identified, which will be addressed by the end of 2019. In 2014 the pneumatic transfer system was digitalised, which enables easier traceability of prepared and irradiated samples and prevents some human errors. In 2015 and 2016 a water leakage detection system was installed; this alerts reactor staff in the event of an internal or external flood.

Remediation of former Žirovski Vrh uranium mining sites


Retain technical capabilities of nuclear institutions including Regulatory Body and associated public constraints

Retaining technical capabilities of nuclear institutions, including the regulatory body, is a constant challenge for countries with small nuclear programmes. Knowledge and competence management is becoming more and more important with the ageing of the existing regulatory and other institutional staff.

In recent years, the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) increased and improved the training programme by the implementation of a systematic approach to training. The SNSA devotes attention to education and training by monitoring and developing the careers of its employees and continuously offering them possibilities for improving their professional skills. In particular, each employee has to attend a two-month course entitled Fundamentals of Nuclear Technology. In addition, employees spend on average two to three weeks annually attending international workshops or technical meetings from their area of expertise.

The financial situation in Slovenia has improved in the last few years; budgetary funds provided to the SNSA are again at the normal level and stable; extra budgetary financial resources of the SNSA obtained on the basis of its cooperation and work on various projects to assist third countries, as tendered by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission, represent an important share of the total amount of funding. For this reason, in 2017 the SNSA was able to again finance some research and development necessary for the administrative control of radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

In 2014, the SNSA organised an all-day working meeting on the challenges of nuclear safety. The meeting was attended by approximately 60 experts from all prominent Slovenian organisations dealing with nuclear safety. At the meeting colleagues from the Jožef Stefan Institute, the Institute for Metal Constructions, the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, the Institute of Occupational Health and the Institute of Civil Engineering presented their research projects relating to nuclear energy, including radioactive and spent fuel management. The SNSA presented its strategy regarding the research and development needed to maintain sufficient capacity for the provision of nuclear and radiation safety in Slovenia. The focal point of the
meeting was to open a discussion on how to ensure the stable financing of research and development in the nuclear sector, thereby preventing the migration of nuclear safety experts to other areas and abroad. The participants agreed that it is necessary to ensure stable financing for the institutions working in the area of nuclear safety, which would enable a critical mass of experts to be maintained. It was clearly pointed out that research in nuclear safety cannot meet high standards of scientific excellence, which means, in other words, that the “citation index” is too low and nuclear safety projects simply cannot compete in open bidding processes with other areas. It needs to be ensured that nuclear safety will obtain the share it deserves.

In recent years, the SNSA has investigated the possibility of establishing a special fund for financing appropriate research and development in the area of nuclear technologies, including radioactive and spent fuel management. During the collection of data to support such a project, it became evident that annually the nuclear industry and the state budget conclude contracts with research, development and engineering organisations and companies in Slovenia with a total value sufficient to support approximately 100 man/year of work. This figure also includes approximately 20 man/year of pure research funds for research projects financed from the state budget. Such level of financing of domestic institutions, which has also been stable over the years, ensures reasonable stability of the nuclear expertise inside the country and outside the main nuclear facility, i.e. the Krško NPP. By determining the level of such stable financing, the concern that the nuclear expertise in the country might be decreasing proved to not be immediate or urgent. It was therefore decided to abandon the effort to establish a dedicated nuclear safety research fund as it was also determined that the creation of such would be very difficult to get through the necessary approval processes of the Government and National Assembly.

A similar process for collecting data on the financing of nuclear professionals in the country has also shown that it would be very beneficial to have more coordination among those who finance external engineering, development and research projects. It was agreed that a clear national research and development (R&D) strategy for future activities of such kind should be developed and utilised by investors and implementers as a means of guidance.
SECTION L: ANNEXES

(a) List of Spent Fuel Management Facilities
There are no off-site spent fuel management facilities in the Republic of Slovenia.

(b) List of Radioactive Waste Management Facilities
The Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste in Brinje, and the Boršt mill tailings site and the Jazbec mine waste pile at the former Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine are the only radioactive waste management facilities in the Republic of Slovenia.

(c) List of Nuclear Facilities in the Process of Being Decommissioned
There are no nuclear facilities being decommissioned. The Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine, including the mining and milling waste disposal sites, which are radiation facilities in accordance with the definition determined in the 2002 Act, are the only facilities that are in the process of being decommissioned in the Republic of Slovenia. The mine and all technological facilities are decommissioned. The disposal site for mining waste is remediated and closed, while the remediation works at the mill tailings disposal site are in the final phase.
(d) Inventory of Spent Fuel

Spent Fuel Pool at the Krško NPP

Table 7: The number, the average burn-up, and the total mass of heavy metal of the fuel assemblies in each fuel batch

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</table>

**Spent Fuel Pools at the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre**

There are no spent fuel elements stored in the spent fuel pools at the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre.

(e) Inventory of Radioactive Waste

**Radioactive Waste Storage Facilities at the Krško NPP**

Table 8: Radioactive waste inventory in the Krško NPP Solid Radwaste Storage Facility as of 31 December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of waste</th>
<th>No. of drums</th>
<th>Volume [m³]</th>
<th>Total beta/gamma activity [Bq]</th>
<th>Specific activity beta/gamma [Bq/m³]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incineration products (A)</td>
<td>76*</td>
<td>15,808</td>
<td>6.02E+09</td>
<td>1.22E+08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blowdown Resins (BR)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>2.67E+09</td>
<td>3.91E+06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressible Waste (CW)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>1.38E+08</td>
<td>3.17E+05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaporator Bottom (EB)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>2.51E+08</td>
<td>1.24E+05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filters (F)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>24,104</td>
<td>1.34E+11</td>
<td>4.97E+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (O)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>7.47E+08</td>
<td>1.51E+06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supercompacted Waste (SC)</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>197,440</td>
<td>1.50E+10</td>
<td>2.19E+08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent Resins (SR)</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>143,312</td>
<td>2.10E+12</td>
<td>3.89E+09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supercompacted Waste (ST)</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>1,723,961</td>
<td>6.01E+12</td>
<td>9.51E+09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (PR) and blowdown (BR) resins, incineration products (A) and dry concentrate (DC) in tube-type containers (TI)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>152,075</td>
<td>8.83E+12</td>
<td>1.14E+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,740</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,271,244</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.71E+13</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.52E+10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *33 drums of incineration products (A) were inserted into 11 tube-type containers (TI).

The specific radionuclides (beta, gamma) are $^{58}$Co, $^{60}$Co, $^{134}$Cs and $^{137}$Cs.

A description of the waste types and acronyms used is as follows:

- Evaporator Bottom (EB) - the residue from evaporating wastewater, containing boric acid, solidified in vermiculite cement packed in 208 l drums.
- Filters (F) - spent filters from the primary water purification and liquid waste processing system, packaged in standard 208 l steel drums with an inner concrete biological shield.
- Spent Resins (SR) - spent ion exchange resins from purification systems, embedded in 208 l drums with vermiculite cement.
• Compressible Waste (CW) - waste arising mostly from using personal protective clothes, coveralls, shoe covers, plastics, etc., packed into 208 l drums.
• Other (O) - miscellaneous waste arising during operation and maintenance activities, such as contaminated used parts, cables, hoses, valves, concrete, wood, etc., packed in 208 l drums.
• Supercompacted waste (SC) - radioactive waste of Compressible Waste type, supercompacted and packed in 320 l carbon steel overpacks (campaign conducted in 1988 and 1989).
• Supercompacted waste (ST) - radioactive waste of Compressible Waste and Evaporator Bottom types, supercompacted, Spent Resins inserted and packed in tube-type container.
• Incineration products (A) - ashes, dust and other residues from the incineration of combustible waste.
• Primary Resins (PR) - spent ion exchange resins from primary water purification systems dried and packed in stainless steel drums with 3-cm-thick walls as a biological shield.
• Blowdown Resins (BR) - resins arising from the purification system of a secondary system, packed in stainless steel drums.
• TI package as Primary Resins (PR), Blowdown Resins (BR), Incineration Products (A) and Dry Concentrate (DC) additionally inserted in tube-type containers (3 drums of Primary Resins/Blowdown Resins/DC in 1 tube-type container).

The types of packages in the Solid Radwaste Storage Facility are as follows:
• 208 l standard drum - designed in accordance with the ANSI DOT-17H standard; appropriate for the following solid waste: Compressible Waste, Other, Filters, Spent Resins and Evaporator Bottom.
• 320 l overpack - used solely for the packaging of compressed standard 208 l drums from the first supercompaction campaign.
• 2001 Stainless Steel heavy drum with biological shield (150 l of usable volume) - used for dried primary spent resins (Primary Resins) tested as a Type A Package in accordance with IAEA Safety Standards.
• 2001 Stainless Steel heavy drum without a biological shield - used for secondary spent resins (Blowdown Resins) and dried concentrate (DC) tested as a Type A Package. The use of stainless steel drums with biological shields started after the in-drum drying system for volume reduction was introduced.
• 200 l heavy carbon steel drum with coating - a limited number of this type of drum were filled with secondary spent resins (Blowdown Resins) and dried concentrate (DC). Periodic inspection of these drums is required to confirm corrosion resistance.
• 100 l drums containing ash from incineration - these drums are immobilised with concrete in 208 l drums.
• tube-type container, usable volume 869 l with a welded lid - an overpack, used in the second supercompaction campaign. Tested as a IP 2 container according to IAEA Safety Standards.
• tube-type container, usable volume 864 l with a flanged lid - used for in-drum drying system products and other types of radioactive waste as a preferred final package for interim storage in a solid radwaste storage facility, awaiting transport to an off-site disposal area. Tested as an IP 2 container in accordance with IAEA Safety Standards.

Table 9: Contaminated/activated material inventory in the Decontamination Building – decontamination area, as of 31 December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of radioactive waste</th>
<th>Number of pieces</th>
<th>Volume [m³]</th>
<th>Mass [kg]</th>
<th>Contamination [Bq/dm²]</th>
<th>Packaging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rx old head – CRDM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rx old head – DRPI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor screw tensioners</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete blocks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA cooler</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavity cleaner RM-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Contaminated/activated material inventory in the Decontamination Building – old steam generators area, as of 31 December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of radioactive waste</th>
<th>Number of pieces</th>
<th>Volume [m³]</th>
<th>Mass [kg]</th>
<th>Activity/Contamination/Dose Rate</th>
<th>Packaging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steam generators*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>646,000</td>
<td>&lt; 3.00E+12 Bq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radlok containers (from 1 to 10)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>10,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE reservoir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regenerative and refuelling water heat exchanger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>3.5 mSv/h</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance department equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1 mSv/h</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ropes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>300 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools for pressure monitoring of the reactor vessel temporary sealing lid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary lid seal of old steam generators</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>6,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary reactor vessel lid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,600 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framatome steam generators equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>4,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotor supports of the reactor coolant pumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor coolant pumps equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent parts of the reactor coolant pumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner parts of the CSAPCH01 pump</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>6,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old cranes for the removal of reactor vessel screws</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support plates of the steam generators from container No. 6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>400 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Rx real ring</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2 mSv/h</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Rx seal cover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>400 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Stainless steel container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diving equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Rx seal ring</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor coolant pumps elevator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressible waste press</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor coolant pumps convenient elevator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INETEC equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supercompactor cylinder and vacuum pump</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead shields</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of radioactive waste</td>
<td>Number of pieces</td>
<td>Volume [m³]</td>
<td>Mass [kg]</td>
<td>Activity/Contamination/Dose Rate</td>
<td>Packaging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor coolant pump motor base</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rod position digital system cables</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Wooden containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare winch for fuel handling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam generators drying equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactor coolant pump motor equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG for WP equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP motor oil cooler</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingots *</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49,700</td>
<td>&lt; 50 µSv/h/pc</td>
<td>Steel and Al ingots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packages (drums) awaiting incineration**</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>&lt; 100 µSv/h/barrel</td>
<td>Barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP01 motor stator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal stand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA pump motor (RB-126)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS heat exchanger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rx head - old</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>2 mS/h</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete blocks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>5 µSv/h</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>6,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old RTD valves and insulation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>10 mS/h</td>
<td>Metal containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filter housing from RB126</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Activated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC-PAC vacuum cleaner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200 Bq/dm²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fission cell drives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>IP2 container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rad waste drums from incineration*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>Up to 2 mSv/h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing electric cables</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>100 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>Metal container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old hydrogen recombiners from RB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500 Bq/dm²</td>
<td>PE foil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>528</td>
<td>1,043.9</td>
<td>1,005,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Material is temporarily stored in the old steam generators storage.
** Packages awaiting transport to an external incineration facility.
### Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste at Brinje

**Table 11: Inventory of RW and disused radioactive sources stored at the CSF as of the end 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Subgroup and Type</th>
<th>Number of packages</th>
<th>Volume (m³)</th>
<th>Main radionuclides</th>
<th>Activity (Bq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group I – Solid RW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 (solid, compressible, combustible)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$^{226}$Ra, $^{60}$Co, $^{241}$Am, $^{109}$Cd, $^{108}$Ag, $^{238}$U, $^{37}$Co, $^{232}$Th, $^3$H</td>
<td>7.6E+08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (solid, compressible, non-combustible)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$^{226}$Ra, $^{60}$Co, $^{241}$Am, $^{109}$Cd, $^{108}$Ag, $^{238}$U, $^3$H, $^{238}$U, $^{14}$C, $^{228}$Th, $^{106}$Ru, $^{209}$Pb</td>
<td>1.6E+10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3 (solid, non-compressible, combustible)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$^{226}$Ra, $^{60}$Co, $^{232}$Th</td>
<td>4.5E+09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4 (solid, non-compressible, non-combustible)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>$^{226}$Ra, $^{60}$Co, $^{109}$Cd, $^{137}$Cs, $^{108}$Ag, $^{238}$U, $^{14}$C, $^{232}$Th, $^{133}$Ba</td>
<td>1.3E+11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group II – DSRS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZV0 (ionisation smoke detectors)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$^{241}$Am, $^{220}$Ra</td>
<td>2.4E+10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRS (sealed radioactive sources)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$^{226}$Ra, $^{60}$Co, $^{241}$Am/Be, $^{238}$U, $^{232}$Th, $^{63}$Ni, $^{55}$Fe, $^{90}$Sr, $^{106}$Ru, $^3$H, $^{152}$Eu, $^{137}$Cs, $^{85}$Kr, $^{133}$Ba, $^{241}$Am</td>
<td>2.6E+12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group III – other RW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L – liquid waste</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M – mixed waste</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>832</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.8E+12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total mass</strong></td>
<td>53 tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12: Mine waste and other debris at the Jazbec mine waste pile, situation as of the end of 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deposited</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(decontamination, demolition)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final arrangement</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface, total</td>
<td>67,325 m² (the area of the mine waste pile inside the drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>channels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altitude</td>
<td>74,239 m² (the area inside the safety fence of the mine waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of disposed waste</td>
<td>854,500 m³ of mine waste,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126,000 m³ of low grade uranium ore,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34,000 m³ of red mud,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,600 m³ of filter cake from the mine water treatment station,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>181,000 m³ of contaminated soil and rubble from uranium ore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>processing facilities and crash station demolition,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800 m³ of technological equipment from uranium ore processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>facilities and the crash station,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total volume of disposed material: 1,198,900 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of disposed waste</td>
<td>1,366,589 t of mine waste,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200,684 t of low grade uranium ore,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48,000 t of red mud,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,220 t of filter cake from the mine water treatment station,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>289,723 t of contaminated soil and rubble from uranium ore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>processing facilities and crash station demolition,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,209 t of technological equipment from uranium ore processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>facilities and the crash station,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total amount of disposed material: 1,910,425 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average specific activity of disposed material</td>
<td>7.7 kBq/kg mine waste (53 g (\text{U}_3\text{O}_8)/t),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 kBq/kg red mud (\text{^{230}Th}\ 97%)),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.4 kBq/kg filter cake (236 \text{ g U}_3\text{O}_8)/t),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.2 kBq/kg low grade uranium ore (200 \text{ g U}_3\text{O}_8)/t,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 2 kBq/kg contaminated soil and rubble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total activity of disposed material</td>
<td>21.7 TBq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose rate, average</td>
<td>0.13 μGy/h (covered with a final layer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: most of the \(\text{^{230}Th}\) was not contained in the mill tailings, but remained in the so-called red mud as a neutralisation by-product.
**Boršt mill tailings site at the Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine**

Table 13: **Boršt mill tailings site with basic data, situation as of the end of 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final arrangement</td>
<td>2010 arrangement of the mill tailings, till 2017 remediation of the mill tailings base rock sliding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface, total</td>
<td>42,000 m² (mill tailings surface), 67,923 m² (surface inside the safety fence of the mill tailings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altitude</td>
<td>Bottom: 535 m; top: 565 m (above sea level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of disposed waste</td>
<td>339,000 m³ of mill tailings, 70,000 m³ of mine waste, 6,543 m³ contaminated materials. Total volume of the disposed material is 415,543 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of disposed waste</td>
<td>610,000 t of mill tailings, 111,000 t of mine waste, 9,450 t contaminated materials. Total amount of disposed material: 730,450 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average specific activity of disposed material</td>
<td>78.2 kBq/kg mill tailings, 10.2 kBq/kg mine waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total activity of disposed material</td>
<td>48.8 TBq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose rate, average</td>
<td>0.14 μGy/h (covered with a final layer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The specific activity of the contaminated materials was not measured, however, it was low.
(f) References to National Acts, Regulations, Requirements, Guidelines, etc.

Besides the 2002 Act and the regulations that cover spent fuel and radioactive waste management (see Article 19 of the Report), the Acts and regulations stated below should also be mentioned.

**Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Physical Protection, Safeguards, Quality Assurance**

On the basis of the 2002 Act, the following decrees and regulations for implementing radiation protection and nuclear safety provisions are in force:

- Decree on Activities Involving Radiation (Official Gazette RS, No. 8/2017),
- Decree on Dose Limits, Radioactive Contamination and Intervention Levels (Official Gazette RS, No. 49/2004),
- Decree on the Areas of Limited Use of Space due to a Nuclear Facility and the Conditions of Facility Construction in these Areas (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 36/2004, 103/2006 and 92/2014),
- Decree on Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials (Official Gazette RS, No. 34/2008),
- Decree on the Criteria for Determining the Compensation Rate due to the Restricted Use of Areas and Intervention Measures in Nuclear Facility Areas (Official Gazette RS, No. 92/2014),
- Decree on Checking the Radioactivity for Shipments of Metal Scrap (Official Gazette RS, No. 84/2007),
- Decree on the Implementation of Council Regulations (EC) and Commission Regulations (EC) on the Radioactive Contamination of Foodstuffs and Feedstuffs (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 52/2006 and 38/2010),
- Decree on the Method, Subject of and Conditions for Performing a Compulsory Public Utility Service of Long Term Surveillance and Maintenance of Landfill of Mining and Hydrometallurgical Tailings Resulting from Extraction of and Exploiting of Nuclear Mineral Raw Materials (Official Gazette RS, No. 76/2015),
- Decree on the Programme of the Systematic Monitoring of Working and Residential Environments and Raising Awareness about Measures to Reduce Public Exposure to Natural Radiation Sources (Official Gazette RS, No. 19/2016),
- Rules on the Specialist Council on Radiation and Nuclear Safety (Official Gazette RS, No. 35/2003),
- Rules on the Use of Radiation Sources and on Activities Involving Radiation (Official Gazette RS, No. 27/2006),
- Rules on Authorised Experts on Radiation and Nuclear Safety (Official Gazette RS, No. 51/2006),
- Rules on Providing Qualification for Workers in Radiation and Nuclear Facilities (Official Gazette RS, No. 32/2011),
- Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors (Official Gazette RS, No. 74/2016),
- Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management (Official Gazette RS, No. 49/2006),
- Rules on Operational Safety of Radiation and Nuclear Facilities (Official Gazette RS, No. 81/2016),
- Rules on Radioactivity Monitoring (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 20/2007 and 97/2009),
- Rules on Transboundary Shipments of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel (Official Gazette RS, No. 22/2009),
- Rules on the Transboundary Shipment of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 75/2008 and 41/2014),
- Rules on the Requirements of Using Ionising Radiation Sources in Healthcare (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 111/2003 and 75/2015),
- Rules on the Method of Keeping Records of Personal Doses Due to Exposure to Ionising Radiation (Official Gazette RS, No. 81/2016),
- Rules on the Requirements and Methodology of Dose Assessment for the Radiation Protection of the Population and Exposed Workers (Official Gazette RS, No. 83/2016),
- Rules on Health Surveillance of Exposed Workers (Official Gazette RS, No. 2/2004),
• Rules On approving of Experts Performing Professional Tasks in the Field of Ionising Radiation (Official Gazette RS, No. 18/2004),
• Rules on the Obligations of the Person Carrying Out a Radiation Practice and Person Possessing an Ionising Radiation Source (Official Gazette RS, No. 3/2017),
• Rules on the Use of Potassium Iodine (Official Gazette RS, No. 59/2010),
• Rules on the Conditions to be met by Primary Health Care Centres for Breast (Official Gazette RS, No. 110/2004),
• Rules on Monitoring of Radioactivity in Drinking Water (Official Gazette RS, No. 74/2015),
• Rules on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, and Transport of Nuclear Material (Official Gazette RS, No. 17/2013),

Third Party Nuclear Liability
• Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage (Official Gazette RS, No. 77/2010),
• Ordinance on Determining the Persons to whom the Conclusion of the Insurance of Liability for Nuclear Damage is not Obligatory (Official Gazette RS, No. 110/2010),
• Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (Official Gazette SFRY, Nos. 22/78 and 34/79) - The Act ceased to apply on the day Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage enters into force (4 April 2011), except the provision of Article 20 which shall apply until a full application of the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage,

Civil Protection and Disaster Relief
• Protection Against Natural and Other Disasters Act (consolidated text - Official Gazette RS, Nos. 51/2006 and 97/2010),
• Decree on the Contents and Drawing Up of Protection and Rescue Plans (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 24/2012 and 78/2016),

Administrative
• Inspection Act (consolidated text - Official Gazette RS, Nos. 43/2007 and 40/2014),

Energy and Environmental
• Energy Act (consolidated text - Official Gazette RS, No. 17/2014 and 81/2015),
• Decree on the Transformation of the Krško NPP, p.o., into the Public Limited Company NPP Krško, d.o.o. (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 54/98, 57/98, 59/2002 and 10/2003),
• Decree on Environmental Encroachments that Require Environmental Impact Assessments (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 51/2014 and 57/2015),
• Decree on the Content of Report on the Effects of Intended Activity into the Environment and its Method of drawing up Instruction on the Methodology of Preparing Reports on Environmental Impact (Official Gazette RS, No. 36/2009),
• Decree on Criteria for Determining the Likely Significance of Environmental Effects of Certain Plans, Programmes or other Acts and its Modifications in the Environmental Assessment Procedure (Official Gazette RS, No. 9/2009),
• Decree laying down the Content of Environmental Report and on Detailed Procedure for the Assessment of the Effects on Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment (Official Gazette RS, No. 73/2005),
• Permanent Cessation of Exploitation of the Uranium Ore and Prevention of Consequences of the Mining in the Uranium Mine at Žirovski Vrh (Official Gazette RS, No. 22/2000),
• Decree Determining the Area and of the Compensatory Amount due to the Limited Use of the Environment in the Area of Žirovski Vrh Uranium Mine (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 22/2001 and 50/2002),

Transport, Export and Import


Export of dual-use items

• Act Regulating the Exports of Dual-Use Goods (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 37/2004 and 8/2010),
• Regulation on Procedures for Issuing Authorisations and Certificates and on Competence of the Commission for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 34/2010 and 42/2012).

General

• Decree on Administrative Authorities within Ministries (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 35/2015, 62/2015 and 84/2016),
• Maritime Code (consolidated text - Official Gazette RS, No. 62/2016),
• The Criminal Code (consolidated text - Official Gazette RS, Nos. 50/2012, 54/2015 and 38/2016),
• Siting of Spatial Arrangements of National Significance Act (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 80/2010, 106/2010 and 57/2012),
• Decree on the Detailed Plan of National Importance for Low and Intermediate Level Waste Repository at Vrbina in the Krško Municipality (Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, Nos. 114/09 and 50/2012),
• Decree on the Method and Subject of and Conditions for Performing a Public Utility Service of Radioactive Waste Management (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 32/1999 and 41/2004),
• Price List of Public Service of Radioactive Waste Management (Official Gazette RS, No. 102/2000),
• Standardisation Act (Official Gazette RS, No. 59/1999).

Multilateral and Bilateral Treaties, Conventions, Agreements/Arrangements

In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, all announced and ratified international treaties also constitute an integral part of the Slovenian legal order and can be applied directly. The following international instruments to which the Republic of Slovenia is a party should be mentioned:

Multilateral Agreements

• Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (including the Amendment of Article VI and XIV),
• Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
• Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (including the Amendment from 2005),
• Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,
• Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
• The IAEA Incident Reporting System (IAEA-IRS),
• Convention on Nuclear Safety,
• Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
• Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
• Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor,
• European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR),
• Convention on International Railway Carriage (COTIF), including Appendix B (RID),
• Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,
• Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982,
• Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982,
• Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention,
• Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
• Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Bilateral Agreements

• Arrangement between the SNSA and the US NRC for the Exchange of Technical Information and Co-operation in the Nuclear Safety Matters (signed, in the process of ratification),
• Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Austria on the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of Radiological Emergency and on Common Interests in the Field of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection,

• Arrangement between the Nuclear Safety Administration of the Republic of Slovenia and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Environment and Water Management of the Republic of Austria regarding Co-operation in the Field of Radiation Protection and Strengthening of the Mutual Exchange of Data of the Aerosol Monitoring Systems,

• Arrangement between the Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) of the Republic of Slovenia and the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) of the Republic of Italy for The Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency and Co-operation in Nuclear Safety Matters,

• Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia for the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency,

• Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Slovak Republic for the Exchange of Information in the Field of Nuclear Safety,

• Arrangement between the Nuclear Safety Administration of the Republic of Slovenia and the Council for Nuclear Safety of South Africa for the Exchange of Technical Information and Co-operation in the Regulation of Nuclear Safety,

• Arrangement between the Nuclear Safety Administration of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea for the Exchange of Information and Co-operation in the Field of Nuclear Safety,

• Arrangement between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and the Directorate for Nuclear Safety of the French Republic on the Exchange of Information and Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Safety,

• Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Regulation of the Status and Other Legal Relations Regarding Investment, Exploitation and Decommissioning of the Krško NPP,

• Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Canada for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,

• Administrative Arrangement between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of Canada for co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,

• Arrangement between the Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) of the Republic of Slovenia and the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) of the Republic of Italy for the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency and Co-operation in Nuclear Safety Matters,


International acts that are not international treaties

• Memorandum of Understanding between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and the State Office for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic on the Exchange of Information on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Matters,

• Memorandum of Understanding between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and the Macedonian Radiation Safety Directorate on the Exchange of Information on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Matters,

• Memorandum of Understanding between the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency for International Peer Review Missions to the EU Member States,
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Exchange of Information on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Matters,


(g) References to Official National and International Reports Related to Safety


(h) References to Reports on International Review Missions Performed at the Request of a Contracting Party


• OSART Mission (IAEA), 17 October to 20 November 2003 and Follow-up Visit, 7 - 11 November 2005.

• WANO Peer Review Mission, 20 October - 3 November 2014.


• INSARR (Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors) performed a safety review of the TRIGA Reactor, 12-16 November 2012.


• IAEA Expert Mission, 8-10 March 2010; (M. Garamszeghy, J-M. Potier and L. Valencia).

• IAEA Expert Mission, 18-20 January 2011; (J. Pacovsky, R. Chaplow).

Furthermore, there were two additional international reviews of the LILW Repository Preliminary Design:


(i) Other Relevant Material

General Description of the Krško NPP

The Krško NPP is the only nuclear power plant in the Republic of Slovenia. The Krško NPP commenced operations in autumn of 1981. It has been operating commercially since 1983. It is equipped with a Westinghouse pressurised light water reactor. At present, the gross electrical output is 727 MWe and the net output is 696 MWe. The previously installed capacity of 676 MWe net electrical output was updated due to the replacement of the low pressure turbines in 2006. In 2004, the Krško NPP started operating with eighteen-month fuel cycles.

Figure 20: The Krško NPP

The Krško NPP was designed and operates in accordance with the Slovenian safety regulations and the operating license. In addition, the Krško NPP systematically observes the regulations and industrial standards of the USA, which is the supplying country.

The regulations followed in the design, construction and operation of the Krško NPP are divided into the following categories:

• The Acts and standards of the former SFRY (during construction and the first years of operation) and the Republic of Slovenia.
• The US 10 CFR Code of Federal Regulations as applicable to the design of the Krško NPP;
• Regulatory guidelines issued by the US regulatory authority;
• The US ANS/ANSI, ASME, and IEEE industrial standards;
• IAEA standards and guidelines.
Table 14: Some technical data on the Krško NPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactor Thermal Power</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Electrical Output</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Electrical Output</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal Efficiency Factor</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTAINMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside Diameter</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Diameter</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Shell Test Pressure</td>
<td>MPa</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Composition</td>
<td></td>
<td>H₂O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additives</td>
<td></td>
<td>H₃BO₃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cooling Loops</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mass Flow</td>
<td>kg/s</td>
<td>9,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>MPa</td>
<td>15.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Volume</td>
<td>m³</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature at Reactor (Vessel) Inlet</td>
<td>°C</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature at reactor (Vessel) Outlet</td>
<td>°C</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Pumps</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Capacity</td>
<td>m³/s</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Driving Power</td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUCLEAR FUEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Fuel Assemblies</td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Fuel Rods per Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Rod Array in a Fuel Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 x 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Rod Length</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>3.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clad Thickness</td>
<td>cm</td>
<td>0.0572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clad Material</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Chemical Composition</td>
<td></td>
<td>UO₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellet Diameter</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td>8.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Pellet Length</td>
<td>cm</td>
<td>1.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enriched Pellet Length</td>
<td>cm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annular Pellet Length</td>
<td>cm</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardised Pellet Length</td>
<td>cm</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Weight of Nuclear Fuel</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTROL RODS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Control Rod Assemblies</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Absorber Rods per Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Weight of a Control Rod Assembly</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>53.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutron Absorber</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ag-In-Cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Composition</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>80-15-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diameter</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>g/cm³</td>
<td>10.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clad Thickness</td>
<td>mm</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clad Material</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS 304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Krško NPP Structures

All principal structures of the Krško NPP are located on a solid reinforced concrete platform situated on the Pliocene sandy-clay sediments of the Krško basin. The structures are designed and constructed to resist the hazard of earthquakes.

The Reactor Building, where the reactor, the Reactor Coolant System and the safety systems are installed, consists of an inner cylindrical steel shell and an outer reinforced concrete shield building. The Containment Airlock is equipped with a sealed passage chamber with double doors. Numerous piping and cable penetrations are double sealed. The Auxiliary Building, the Component Cooling Building, the Fuel Handling Building, the Diesel Generator Building and the Turbine Building are located adjacent to the Reactor Building.

Cooling water and essential service water intake structures are located on the bank of the Sava River above the Sava River dam, which maintains an adequate water level. The cooling water discharge structure is below the Sava River dam. In addition, cooling towers are provided for cooling circulating waters in case of low water flow of the Sava River.

Reactor Coolant System

The Westinghouse pressurised light water reactor with two cooling loops consists of a reactor vessel with its internals and head, two steam generators, two reactor coolant pumps, the pressuriser, piping, valves, and reactor auxiliary systems. Demineralised water serves as the reactor coolant, the neutron moderator and for the dilution of the boric acid solution. In the steam generator the reactor coolant gives up its heat to the feedwater on the secondary side of the steam generator to generate steam. Reactor coolant pressure is maintained by the pressuriser, which is supported by electrical heaters and water sprays that are supplied with water from the cold leg of the reactor coolant. The data necessary for reactor control and reactor protection are provided by the neutron flux, reactor coolant temperature, flow rate, pressuriser water level and pressure detectors.

Reactor power is regulated by control rods. The control rods’ drive mechanism is attached to the reactor head, while the absorber rods extend into the reactor core.

Long-term core reactivity changes and core poisoning with fission products are compensated by means of boric acid concentration change in the reactor coolant.

Nuclear Fuel

The reactor core is composed of 121 fuel assemblies. Each fuel element consists of fuel rods, top and bottom nozzles, grid assemblies, control rod guide thimbles and instrumentation guide thimbles. The fuel rods contain ceramic uranium dioxide pellets welded into zircaloy-4 or ZIRLO tubes. Uranium oxide fuel is shaped into sintered pellets and is enriched with $^{235}$U.

Every 18 months approximately half of the fuel assemblies are removed and fresh fuel is loaded. Fresh fuel assemblies are kept in the Fresh Fuel Storage. During refuelling, fuel assemblies are removed from the reactor through the flooded transfer canal penetrating the containment vessel into the spent fuel pool. During refuelling, the reactor is open and the reactor cavity is flooded. The refuelling machine removes the spent fuel assemblies from the reactor core and replaces them with the fresh ones. Fuel assemblies remain in the reactor core for three years. Spent fuel assemblies are kept under water in the spent fuel pool, where they are cooled.
Performance Indicators of the Krško NPP

The volume of low and intermediate-level solid radioactive waste is one of the performance indicators of the Krško NPP. The purpose of the low-level solid radioactive waste indicator is to monitor progress toward reducing the volume of low-level waste production, which will decrease storage, transportation, and the final disposal needs and improve public perception of the environmental impact of nuclear power. This indicator is defined as the volume of low-level solid radioactive waste that has been processed and is in final form ready for disposal during a given period. The volume of radioactive waste that has not completed processing and is not yet in final form is not included. Low-level solid radioactive waste consists of dry active waste, sludge, resins and evaporator bottoms generated as a result of nuclear power plant operation and maintenance. Low-level refers to all radioactive waste that is not spent fuel or a by-product of spent fuel processing.

It can be noticed that the trend of produced volume of low-level radioactive waste is positive, i.e. the amount of produced waste is lower from year to year. Contributors to this trend are the improvement of the systems for radioactive waste treatment and the introduction of a highly restrictive programme for radioactive waste management control. The systems for radioactive waste treatment were improved by introducing the in-drum drying system into operation, the reconstruction of the waste and boron evaporator packages and installation of the supercompactor.

One of the highest priorities in the Krško NPP in the last years has been to reduce the volume of low-level solid radioactive waste produced. The Krško NPP goal for the period 2005-2007 was ≤ 45 m³ and for the period 2008-2016 ≤ 35 m³. This task was more or less fulfilled, as it can be seen in the following chart that only in 2013 and 2015 did the amount of LILW exceed the goal (Figure 22).
General Description of the TRIGA Mark II Research Reactor

The TRIGA Mark II research reactor is a part of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre. A view of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre is shown in Figure 23.

Figure 23: View of the IJS Reactor Infrastructure Centre

The reactor is a typical 250 kW TRIGA Mark II light-water reactor with an annular graphite reflector cooled by natural convection.
The core is placed at the bottom of a 6.25 m-high open tank with a 2 m diameter filled with demineralised water. The core has a cylindrical configuration. In total, there are 91 locations in the core, which can be filled with either fuel elements or other components, such as control rods, a neutron source, irradiation channels, etc. The core lattice has an annular but not a periodic structure. The elements are arranged in six concentric rings. Each location corresponds to a hole in the aluminium upper grid plate of the reactor. The core is supported by a bottom grid plate that in addition provides accurate spacing between the fuel elements. The top grid plate also provides accurate lateral positioning of the core components.

A graphite reflector enclosed in an aluminium casing surrounds the core. There are two horizontal irradiation channels running through the graphite reflector and the tangential irradiation channel. Other horizontal channels extend only to the outer edge of the reflector.

**Fuel Elements**

The TRIGA fuel element is a cylindrical rod with stainless steel cladding. There are cylindrical graphite slugs at the top and bottom ends which act as axial reflectors. In the centre of the fuel material there is a hole that is filled by a zirconium rod. Between the fuel meat and the bottom graphite end reflector there is a molybdenum disc. The fuel is a homogeneous mixture of uranium and zirconium hydride. The basic data on the TRIGA fuel element is given in Tables 15 and 16.

**Table 15: Data on the standard TRIGA fuel element**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Dimension [cm]</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Density [g/cm³]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel element</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer diameter</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Element length</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel material</td>
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<td>U-ZrH</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer diameter</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner diameter</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zr rod</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zr</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Dimension [cm]</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Density [g/cm³]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diameter</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axial reflector</td>
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<td>Graphite</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diameter</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height upper</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height lower</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting disc</td>
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<td>Mo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diameter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cladding</td>
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<td>SS-304</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thickness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top and bottom ends</td>
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<td>SS-304</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height top</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height bottom</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 16: Standard TRIGA fuel element

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total mass of the uranium [g]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass of $^{235}$U [g]</td>
<td>55.4</td>
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<td>U in U-ZrH [wt.%]</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrichment [wt.%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>H/Zr atom ratio</td>
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</tr>
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