

## Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Contracting Parties

### Questions posted to Slovenia (as of 27 August 2012)

| No. | Country | Chapter of the Nat. Report | Question   | Answer   |
|-----|---------|----------------------------|--|--|
| 1.  | USA     | 6                          | What will be the basis and approach (that is, what specific information is being assessed) that will be used for establishing a new emergency protective zone (EPZ) for the Krsko NPP?   | At this point we can not say yet if there will be any changes of the EPZ and what will be the basis for changes. The main idea is to make first a thorough analysis of the current situation and a detailed overview of the solutions around the World. Only after all these information is available the decision will be made about any changes. We were happy to note that US NRC has initiated similar actions in US and we do expect that US results will be an important input for us. |
| 2.  | USA     | 5                          | What is the type of engagement between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) and the Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration (SRPA) in terms of establishing new regulations; that is, does the SRPA establish radiation protection standards that are applied by SNSA? | When preparing new regulations in the area of radiation protection (which are not applied only in medicine and/or veterinary) the cooperation is very intensive, because those regulations are adopted on the Governmental level (Decree) and not on the level of a Ministry (Rules) therefore, the materially and procedurally coordination between the SNSA and SRPA is essential for the adoption of such regulations.  |
| 3.  | USA     | 2.1                        | Does SNSA feel that 3 times the SSE is appropriate guidance for the expectation of a seismic cliff-edge effect?  | The seismic cliff-edge effects determined for NPP Krško should not by any means be regarded as being simply the 3 times SSE. In other words there is no reason why the 3 times SSE value should be considered as any kind of guidance. The cliff-edge values for NPP Krško were determined by other means (see our report), not by just simply multiplying the SSE value.  |
| 4.  | USA     | 2                          | Very informative report on external events.  | Thank you for the observation. We took note about that.  |

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| 5. | Pakistan | 4 | <p>Slovenia may please share information about the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of Severe Accident Management Equipment (SAME) in implementing SAMGs (SAGs &amp; SCGs) by including these resources.</li> <li>• The mechanism that has been adapted to link different conditions experienced for SFP following any BDBA with condition at core/containment to be addressed in same SAGs &amp; SCGS.</li> </ul> | <p><u>Use of Severe Accident Management Equipment (SAME) in implementing SAMGs (SAGs &amp; SCGs) by including these resources</u></p> <p>Procedures for use of the SAME equipment (mobile or portable DGs, compressors, pumps) are included into the EOPs as attachments. These EOP attachments are entered from the procedure EOP ECA-0.0 (Loss of all AC power) and at that time the plant operators in the Main Control Room are directing the teams on the field that are transporting, connecting and starting the mobile equipment. Transfer into the SAMGs is performed only later on, when core exit temperature reaches 650 degrees C. Upon entrance into SAMGs the Technical Support Centre coordinates the accident management and also the use of SAME equipment.</p> <p><u>The mechanism that has been adapted to link different conditions experienced for SFP following any BDBA with condition at core/containment to be addressed in same SAGs &amp; SCGS.</u></p> <p>SAG-5 is entered at conditions of SFP temperature 90 degrees C and rising.<br/>Initial SFP water inventory is 1568 m3, fuel transfer canal and cask loading area are empty. Cca 1000 m3 of water must boil to begin uncovering the fuel elements.<br/>SCG-1 is entered at conditions of SFP level at 3.05 m above the spent fuel top.</p> |
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