|
IRRT report |
|
Experts: M. Šváb and M. Maris The authorization process in the area of nuclear installations and radiation protection has been reasonably well designed in the past. The fact that US NRC rules, guidance, codes and standards has been used for the construction of the Krško nuclear power plant has contributed to the establishment and implementation of a modern authorization practice. The practical results in the area of nuclear and radiation safety are comparable to international best practice. However the present situation could benefit much from a systematic review of the existing Acts and the creation of a more clear legislation in which regulatory responsibilities are clearly and unequivocally defined and in which regulatory requirements are less prone to interpretation. The regulatory body, the SNSA, has been faced with serious challenge: discharge full responsibility as a new regulatory organization, because it was created after the startup of the nuclear power plant. The SNSA is responsible for authorization of commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations. In order to perform its authorization functions in a satisfactory manner, the SNSA needs to acquire and to have access to more technical competence. It is a positive fact that most of the technical knowledge related to nuclear safety issues is still present in the various institutes and university faculties of Slovenia and Croatia, which, in accordance with the nuclear Acts and regulations, continue to perform their original roles of technical independent assessors. However, this creates a difficult position for the SNSA in view of their development towards a full cognizable regulator, capable of integrating all internal and external advises into a coherent and well-balanced conclusion, which should be the basis of its authorization decisions. This issue has to be evaluated in the global context of the modernization of the Slovenian nuclear and radiation protection legal framework and the roles of the various competent institutions in view of the establishment of a sustainable regulatory process. 4.1. LEGAL BASIS OF THE AUTHORIZATION PROCESS The legal basis of the authorization process in the area of nuclear safety, radiation protection, physical protection, safeguards and quality assurance is composed of: The regulations underpinning the 1984 Act are listed in Appendix IV. As already discussed in Section 1, these Acts and these regulations, stemming from the legislative framework of the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were taken over into the Slovenian legislative framework since its independence in 1991. In particular, the scope of competence of the SNSA is defined mainly in the 1994 Slovenian Act on Organization and Competences of Ministries. 4.1.1. Recommendations and suggestions See Sections 1 and 2 of this report. 4.2. CURRENT SITUATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 4.2.1. Licensing of nuclear installations The 1984 Act defines a nuclear facility as a nuclear power plant, a nuclear heating plant, a nuclear research reactor, an uranium enrichment facility, a fuel element fabrication plant, a facility for reprocessing and disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel and a facility containing installations and equipment used for storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste. The licensing system for nuclear facilities consists of four licensing steps:
Site licences and construction licences are issued by the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning, after having received the prior consent of the SNSA related to nuclear safety issues. Licences for commissioning and for start of the operation are issued by the SNSA, which also has the authority to establish the related licence conditions. The 1984 Act, Section 37, provides for the possibility to use rules, technical regulations and standards established by foreign countries or accepted at the international level, on the condition that they are not contrary to the national ones, that there are no equivalent national rules, technical regulations or standards and that they are accepted and proposed by the SNSA. This provision has been used to allow the use of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) regulatory rules and guidelines, US codes, standards as well as other rules, codes or standards of other countries of origin and the safety standards of the IAEA. The Regulation E-1 addresses the licensing conditions for the four types of licenses mentioned above and also addresses quality assurance requirements. An important feature is the requirement for a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) as the basis for the construction permit and a final safety analysis report (FSAR) as the basis for the operating permit (including Technical Specifications ). This report is the basic document for safety assessment, as stated in the regulation E-2, which also defines its general content (appendices 1 through 5, for different types of nuclear facilities). The SNSA also has the authority to issue licences for decommissioning of nuclear facilities (through the Regulation E-2, Section 6, which requires the FSAR to be updated, also when the operation ceases). It seems that the legal basis provides the SNSA with sufficient legal authority to discharge its responsibilities in the area of authorization of nuclear facilities. The law provides the possibility for using foreign rules, codes, standards and guides in those cases where Slovenian equivalents are lacking. The importance of the safety analysis report is explicitly stated. The different licensing stages are in conformance with present international practice and the IAEA draft safety guide ID NS 290 (documentation produced and required in regulating nuclear facilities). The closure of waste disposal sites is not covered but is not an urgent issue in Slovenia. 4.2.1.1. Recommendations and suggestions
See recommendation in Section 1.4.1. of this report. 4.2.2. Licensing of modifications of nuclear installations Modifications of the nuclear facility Regulation E-2, section 7, states that the procedures for updating the PSAR and the FSAR have to consider three categories of modifications:
The criteria for categorization are not defined at the level of the regulations but the categorization is controlled by the SNSA. In practice, the licensee informs the SNSA, before the implementation, on all modifications if they have any impact on the FSAR and on their proposed categorization, in order to allow the SNSA to react. Regulation E-1, section 36, requires that the licensee monitors and analyses the safety conditions of his nuclear facility and that he takes into consideration the experience gained from other nuclear facilities as well as from technological developments. If the licensee proposes any changes to the operational limits and conditions (defined in Section 35 and corresponding to what is commonly known as the technical specifications for operation), any changes to the already approved documentation and proposals for resolving open questions related to nuclear safety, he shall request the opinion of independent experts. When submitting an application to the SNSA for approval of a proposed modification, the licensee has to submit, in addition to the safety justification (safety substantiation), a positive review report established by independent experts. Modification of the SAR Regulation E-2, Section 6, requires that the FSAR is supplemented when design alterations occur during commissioning, commencement of operation as well as when the operation ceases and that this updating is to be done in conformance with all the conditions for permission for commissioning and operation of the nuclear facility. The SAR is recognized by the legislation and by the Regulation E-2 as the basic document for the assessment of the safety of nuclear installations. It constitutes an essential part of the licence. The changes of relevant parts of the SAR have to be submitted to the SNSA for approval (especially all changes of the technical specifications for operation). Minor modifications to the SAR can be introduced without prior approval by the SNSA. In practice this does not seem to introduce problems and the SNSA has the authority to disagree with such changes. Licensing practice After review and assessment and positive conclusion, the SNSA issues a Decision, which is a licence amendment and which contains the explanation of its acceptance (as required by the state administrative rules). The SNSA has the right to request more information, issue partial decisions or refuse the application introduced by the licensee. Appeal The 1986 Act on administrative procedures defines the procedure to manage complaints formulated by a licensee. The licensees can appeal against the SNSA's Decisions to the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, which issues a decision, using advice from outside experts. This decision of the Ministry can be further challenged at the Supreme Court by the licensee or by the Attorney General, but not directly by the SNSA. 4.2.2.1. Recommendations and suggestions
See recommendations in Section 1.4.1. of this report 4.3. REQUIREMENTS ON THE APPLICANTS/LICENSEE (OPERATORS) The hierarchy of requirements on the applicant/licensee in Slovenia is the following:
Regarding the licensing of the supply of safety significant parts, components, equipment and services to the licensee, the SNSA has implemented internationally recognized requirements and practices. This means that the licensee has the primary responsibility for the quality of deliveries. The Slovenian practice is based on qualification audits, performed by the NPP staff at the suppliers of significant parts, components, equipment and services. The SNSA participates at the QA audits, at least for the most important designer organizations, manufacturers or suppliers. The SNSA performs quality assurance audits also at the nuclear installations in order to verify the process of qualification of subcontractors. Some years ago, the SNSA has required a safety review of the TRIGA research reactor, using available international experience in that area. The results of this review include a new SAR, new technical specifications for operation, a new physical protection plan, an in-service inspection plan, new operational procedures, an enhanced radiation protection, a QA plan and an integrated on-site and off-site emergency plan. The present system of requirements seems to be comprehensive and comparable to international practice. However, the siting, construction, commissioning and operation of the nuclear installations of Slovenia, in particular the Krško nuclear power plant, has been licensed by the Slovenian Committee for Energy based on Yugoslavian laws and with the assistance of scientific and technical institutes in Slovenia and Croatia. The SNSA was created in 1987 and was not involved, as an organization, in the licensing process. Although it has good knowledge of the general main licensing requirements, a complete overview of all the licensing requirements is needed. The technical safety substantiation, available in the different institutes and in the plant, seems to be still available. This safety substantiation and an updated SAR are the essential components of the current licensing basis and it is international practice that they should be readily available to the regulatory body. 4.3.1. Recommendations and suggestions (1) BASIS - The SNSA established a formal system of experience feedback but had to limit its activities during the past years due to workload. The IAEA Safety Requirements - Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, Appendix, A6 states: “During the operation of the nuclear power plant, further review, assessment and authorizations by the regulatory body may be required in the light of advances in reactor safety technology or as a result of operating experience. When such advances or experiences indicate changes in operational limits and conditions or safety related modifications, the regulatory body shall review and assess the proposed changes or modifications prior to authorizing their implementation.”
(a) Recommendation - The SNSA should further strengthen its activities in the area of evaluation of operational experience feedback and to engage additional resources inside its own organization or obtain support from appropriate technical institutions or experts. (2) BASIS - The IAEA Safety Requirements - Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, paragraph 509, states amongst other: “A thorough review and assessment of the operator's technical submission shall be performed by the regulatory body in order to determine whether the facility or activity complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria. In doing this, the regulatory body shall acquire an understanding of the design of the facility or equipment, the safety concept on which the design is based and the operating principles proposed by the operator, to satisfy itself that ... (2) The information contained in the operator's submissions is accurate and sufficient to enable verification of compliance with regulatory requirements.” (a) Recommendation - The SNSA should ensure that all safety justifications, being part of current licensing basis, are identified, accessible and under the SNSA’s control. (3) BASIS - The present regulatory framework for nuclear installations does not provide for a periodic safety review. Such a review is an internationally accepted practice (e.g. IAEA draft safety guide ID NS 248 - Review and assessment by the regulatory body for nuclear facilities, paragraph 614). “The licensee should carry out this review at regular intervals to deal with the cumulative effects of facility aging, modifications, operating experience and technical developments”.
See recommendation in Section 2.5.1. of this report. 4.4. AUTHORIZATION PROCESS OF THE INSTITUTES PERFORMING SERVICES TO THE SNSA The 1980 Act, Section 14, empowers the nuclear regulatory body (at that time the Republic Committee for Energy, Industry and Civil Engineering) to authorize professional and research organizations for the performance of particular tasks such as:
The SNSA has taken over this function since its creation.
The SNSA carries out quality assurance audits in the authorized organizations about once every two years and issues new authorizations, which are required for these organizations to deliver independent review services to the licensees or to support the regulatory body. The SNSA maintains files on their qualification activities. In particular, they have controlled copies of quality assurance manuals of these organizations and they review these documents in a regular way. The tasks carried out by these authorized institutions are threefold:
In the framework of their nuclear safety activities, the authorized institutes are active mostly as a service provider to the plant and produce limited technical support to the SNSA. 4.4.1. Recommendations and suggestions See recommendation in Section 5.3.1. of this report 4.5. LICENSING OF SELECTED LICENSEE PERSONNEL Regulation E-3 addresses the requirements for certain workers in nuclear facilities. Regulation E-3, defines the positions to be licensed in the nuclear facilities. Licensing of selected NPP personnel The shift crew is licensed on the basis of an approved initial training or continued training programme, medical fitness certificate, and results of the training and the passing of the licensing examination. The technical management, management of production, maintenance and technical departments are positions, which are subject to the same examination and licensing system as for the shift crew. These managers receive a licence, but they are not allowed to perform operating activities in the control room. The SNSA approves the training programme once per year (on the basis of regulation E-3, Article 21). The SNSA appoints the Commission that is performing the state examination for all positions requiring a licence. This Commission is composed of 12 members who are representing the SNSA, the NPP and authorized institutions. Typically, the chairman is from IJS, the deputy chairman and the secretary are an inspector and another staff member of the SNSA. The rules of procedures of this Commission has been approved by the SNSA. The Commission meets twice per year and examines the candidates. The applicant for the licence of control room staff has to have at least 3 years of practice (2 years of which in NPP). The SNSA examines the personal files beforehand, using a checklist, and reports on their observations during the Commission meeting. Examinations consist of a written, oral and walk-through examination. There are approximately 1200 questions (and answers available to the trainees in advance), which have been established by the Commission for the written part of the examination. The set of questions for the oral part of the examination is not defined beforehand, but the examined persons receive questions in different predefined areas. The Commission defines the areas on the basis of the training programme. In the future, given the addition of a plant-specific simulator of the NPP, the concept of the Committee and the examination may need revision. In case of positive results, the SNSA issues the licences and thus has a veto right. The first licence will be valid for 1 year (trial period) and the prolonged licence will be valid for 4 years. Based on the licence issued by the commission, the NPP authorizes the personnel for performing their work. There is a minimum requirement on the number of “working hours” in the control room in order not to lose the licence. The licensing system of plant personnel is comparable to international practice. Licensing of selected personnel of the research reactor The selected research reactor operational personnel (operators) are examined by the special internal commission of Jo ef Stefan Institute. The operators are receiving the authorization for their work from this commission. The whole process is under control of the SNSA.
4.5.1. Recommendations and suggestions (1) BASIS – The personnel controlling the research reactor is not licensed by the SNSA. The current internationally recognized practice is to license also research reactor operators. The IAEA Safety Requirements - Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, paragraph 303 states: “In order to carry out its main responsibilities …, the regulatory body shall undertake the following: (11) Check that personnel responsible for safe operation of the facility or activity are competent”. (a) Suggestion - The SNSA should licence the operational personnel for the research reactor as for NPP personnel. |
| include("../footer.php"); ?> |